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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review by this cross-appeal: 
1. Did the trial court err by applying the equitable doctrine of laches and refusing to 
rescind the Rossi Hills transaction? 
2. Did the trial court err by ruling the warranty deed, trust deed and trust deed note 
do not constitute a single contract or transaction; and by refusing to rule that Doms was 
excused from performance and not in default under the trust deed and trust deed note? 
3. If rescission is denied, did the trial court err by awarding Doms only one-half the 
amount of damages found by the expert appraiser, Jerry Webber, as a result of the 
encumbrances on Rossi Hills? 
4. Did the trial court err by ruling that Doms' Counterclaim against the Estate of D.C. 
Anderson, as it relates to the remedy of damages, is time-barred by the probate "nonclaim" 
provisions of U.C.A. §§ 75-3-801 and 75-3-803? 
5. Did the trial court err by refusing to award attorney's fees and appropriate costs 
to Doms? 
6. Did the trial court err in its award of attorney's fees and costs to Plaintiffs? 
Standards of Appellate Review: All of the above six issues present questions of law, 
either in whole or in part, which should be reviewed for legal correctness without deference 
to the trial court's rulings. City of Logan v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 796 P.2d 697 (Utah 
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1990). Issues 2 and 4, regarding the transaction documents between the parties and 
construction of probate statutes, respectively, present questions of law only. 
Issues 1 and 3, regarding laches/rescission and damages, respectively, present some 
initial questions of law which should be reviewed according to the legal correctness standard. 
Issues 1 and 3 also involve mixed questions of law and fact which, on review, do not warrant 
the deference due findings on questions of pure fact. Margulies by and through Margulies 
v. Unchurch. 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985). The overall standard of review which should be 
applied to issues 1 and 3 is an abuse of discretion standard. Papanikolas Bros. Enterprises 
v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates, 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975); Mavbev v. Kav 
Peterson Construction Co., 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984). 
Issues 5 and 6, regarding awards of attorney's fees and costs, present initial questions 
of law as to which parties are entitled to attorney's fees and costs. The overall standard of 
review in regard to any awards of attorney's fees and costs is an abuse of discretion standard. 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes or rules determinative of or 
pertinent to the issues presented for review is contained in the body of this brief or in the 
addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In March of 1982, Defendant/Appellee and Cross-Appellant Eugene E. Doms 
("Doms") and Michael R. McCoy ("McCoy") purchased the subject property of this appeal 
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("Rossi Hills") from Plaintiffs for $276,750.00 (F. of F. 17; Ex. 69D).1 Rossi Hills is located 
in the Park City Survey, Summit County, State of Utah (F. of F. 1; Ex. IP). 
Doms and McCoy purchased Rossi Hills as part of a residential development to be 
built in conjunction with two other adjacent parcels (F. of F. 26, 35). Doms and McCoy 
eventually became adversaries in 1983, and McCoy had nothing further to do with the 
development of Rossi Hills or this lawsuit (R. 7185-91, 7517-20; Ex. 78D). From a 
subsequent land survey and diligent legal investigation, Doms learned in December of 1984 
that a road (the "loop road") and other physical encroachments were located on the property 
and constituted prescriptive easements and encumbrances (R. 7498-7500, 7611, 7625). 
In January of 1985, Doms informed Plaintiffs he was entitled to rescission of the 
transaction and the return of all money received by Plaintiffs (R. 7504-07). Doms even 
offered to deed Rossi Hills back to Plaintiffs in exchange for cancellation of the trust deed 
note, thus allowing Plaintiffs to keep all money already received under the contract (F. of 
F. 44; R. 7507-08). 
Plaintiffs responded by filing their Complaint to foreclose on June 6,1985 (F. of F. 45; 
R. 1-9). Plaintiffs eventually obtained a default judgment against Doms and McCoy in 
January of 1988 (R. 34-40). The default judgment against Doms was subsequently set aside 
(R. 76-78, 126-27), but not as against McCoy. Doms filed an Answer and Counterclaim, an 
1
 Unless otherwise indicated, all references in this brief to Findings of Fact (F. of F.), 
Conclusions of Law (C. of L.), and Judgment (Judg.) are to the trial court's final Second 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 6874-99; Add. 1) and Second 
Amended Judgment (R. 6900-07; Add. 2). All references to exhibits are to trial exhibits 
admitted into evidence at trial on April 17-19,1990, and August 21-24,1990. All references 
to attorney's fees exhibits are to exhibits admitted into evidence at the hearing held on 
attorney's fees on December 31, 1991. 
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Amended Counterclaim, and eventually a Second Amended Counterclaim (R. 41-44,102-05, 
237-42). 
Following three days of trial on April 17-19, 1990, the trial court issued a Memoran-
dum Decision denying rescission based upon the doctrine of laches (R. 4188-95). Following 
four days of trial on August 21-24, 1990, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision 
ruling that Doms suffered $83,000.00 in damages as a result of the encumbrances on the 
property (R. 4348-54). Subsequently, a hearing was held on December 31, 1991, in regard 
to awards of attorney's fees and costs (R. 6360-6540). 
Following extensive objections, motions and argument by the parties over the 
appropriate findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment, the trial court entered its final 
Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 6874-99) and Second 
Amended Judgment (R. 6900-07) on June 23, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In March of 1982, Doms and McCoy purchased Rossi Hills for $276,750.00 (F. of F. 
17; Ex. 69D). D.C. Anderson (who subsequently died in September of 1983) and his wife, 
Ellen Anderson; and Dan Scott and his wife, Jeanne Scott; all executed the warranty deed 
as grantors and transferred Rossi Hills to Doms and McCoy as tenants in common (F. of F. 
1, 4; Ex. IP; Add. 3). This deed of conveyance was a warranty deed under Utah law and 
conveyed with it all of the statutory warranties and covenants pursuant to U.C.A. § 57-1-12 
(F. of F. 1-6; C. of L. 1). 
Pursuant to an earnest money agreement dated November 12, 1981 (Ex. 63D; Add. 
4), D.C. Anderson and Dan Scott received $10,000.00 as earnest money and another 
$72,500.00 as the down payment, leaving a balance due of $194,250.00 after closing of the 
sale (F. of F. 18; Exs. 4P, 69D). Doms and McCoy executed a trust deed and trust deed 
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note in the amount of $194,250.00, which called for monthly interest payments of $2,266.25 
up to and including January 10, 1985 (F. of F. 19, 20; Exs. 2P, 3P; Add. 5, 6). All of these 
monthly interest payments were received by Plaintiffs, in the total amount of $72,520.25 (F. 
of F. 22; Ex. 6P; Add. 7). The entire unpaid balance of $194,250.00, together with interest, 
was due on January 25, 1985 (F. of F. 19; Ex. 3P). 
Rossi Hills was purchased by Doms and McCoy as part of a residential development 
to be built in conjunction with two other adjacent parcels known as the "Slipper Parcel" and 
"Block 62" (F. of F. 26, 35). Doms and McCoy purchased an interest in the Slipper Parcel 
in October of 1982 to further the integrated residential development potential of the three 
parcels, and strengthen their position with the developers of Block 62 and the other interest-
holders of the Slipper Parcel (F. of F. 36, 37). Prior to Doms' purchase of Rossi Hills and 
the interest in the Slipper Parcel, Doms was shown a preliminary site plan for the 
development of the three parcels prepared by an architect by the name of Richard Kohler 
(F. of F. 39; Ex. 68D). Doms relied upon this architectural plan for the residential 
development of the three parcels (R. 7430). Prior to purchasing Rossi Hills in March of 
1982, Doms met with D.C. Anderson and Anderson's real estate agent, Michael Sloan, in 
the fall of 1981 (F. of F. 33, 34). Both Sloan and Anderson represented to Doms that Rossi 
Hills was a "prime piece" of development property and its "highest and best use" would be 
as part of the integrated residential development with Block 62 and the Slipper Parcel (F. 
of F. 35). 
In October of 1982, Doms retained attorney Gerald H. Kinghorn for the purpose of 
closing a deal with regard to Doms' purchase of an interest in the Slipper Parcel, and 
continuing negotiations with the owners of Block 62 for purposes of creating the three-parcel 
development based upon representations of Sloan and the architect, Kohler (F. of F. 38). 
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Kinghorn subsequently met several times with the owners of Block 62 between October of 
1982 and the summer of 1983 in an effort to negotiate a joint venture agreement which 
would be acceptable to all of the parties (R. 7421, 7479-80; Exs. 81P, 82P). 
In anticipation of the three-parcel development, Doms and McCoy conveyed Rossi 
Hills by warranty deed to Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. ("Domcoy") on August 20, 1983 (R. 
7182-84; Ex. 16P; Add. 8). Domcoy was a closely held Utah corporation formed in October 
of 1981 for the general purpose of acquiring, developing and selling real property (R. 7179-
81; Ex. 3IP). The two corporate officers of Domcoy were McCoy as president and Doms 
as secretary/treasurer; and the directors were Doms and his wife, and McCoy and his wife 
(Exs. 3 IP, 32P). Doms and McCoy had problems over a number of issues and eventually 
became adversaries in 1983 (R. 7185-86). 
Negotiations for the joint venture agreement broke down in the summer of 1983 as 
a result of the position taken by the owners of Block 62, who informed Kinghorn that the 
percentage of profit to be received by Doms would be much smaller than anticipated due 
to the fact that much of Rossi Hills was undevelopable due to apparent easements and 
encumbrances on the property (R. 7481-83). Kinghorn was told by the Block 62 group that 
they had been through all of this before with the previous owners of the property, and 
Kinghorn relayed this information to Doms (R. 7482, 7484, 7603-04). 
Pursuant to Doms' instructions to find out what the Block 62 group was talking about, 
in the spring of 1983 Kinghorn walked the loop road on Rossi Hills and observed the 
encroachments which the Block 62 owners believed constituted easements and encumbrances 
on the property (R. 7484-87). Although the loop road appeared to be located on Rossi 
Hills, Kinghorn was uncertain about the location of the loop road and other encroachments 
because he did not know the exact boundaries of the property (R. 7486). 
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Kinghom contacted Doms and informed him a road and other encroachments 
appeared to exist on the property and might constitute easements and encumbrances (R. 
7619). Doms instructed Kinghom to immediately take whatever steps were necessary to 
determine whether or not the loop road and other encroachments did in fact constitute legal 
easements and encumbrances (R. 7620). 
In August of 1983 Kinghom retained surveyor Bing Christensen to locate and stake 
the boundaries of Rossi Hills (R. 7489). Although Christensen claimed to have placed 
stakes on the property to determine the boundaries sometime in the fall of 1983, it was 
November when he informed Kinghom, and there was already two feet of snow on the 
ground and no way to locate the stakes (R. 7491). After the snow melted in the spring of 
1984, Kinghom walked the property and was unable to locate any of the stakes (R. 7491-92). 
Shortly thereafter, in the spring of 1984, Doms and Kinghom both contacted Alliance 
Engineering in Park City, Utah, and eventually retained Alliance in the late summer of 1984 
to do a complete land survey of Rossi Hills (R. 7493-94). At about the same time, in March 
of 1984, Kinghom met with attorney Edward S. Sweeney, who represented the Estate of 
D.C. Anderson (and Ellen Anderson, who was the personal representative of the estate), 
and Dan Scott (R. 7500). At this meeting, Kinghom expressed concerns to Sweeney that 
the loop road and other physical encroachments which appeared to be on Rossi Hills may 
constitute easements and encumbrances on the property (R. 7504-05). 
In October of 1984, Alliance Engineering completed their land survey of Rossi Hills 
(R. 7494; Ex. 77D). This land survey clearly revealed to Kinghom and Doms for the very 
first time that the loop road and other physical encroachments were physically located on 
the property (R. 7170-72, 7496). Doms then instructed Kinghom to do further investigation 
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and form a legal opinion as to whether or not these encroachments constituted prescriptive 
easements or otherwise were encumbrances under Utah law (R. 7175, 7624-25). 
Kinghorn personally talked to several long-time residents of Park City regarding the 
physical encroachments and the use of the loop road by abutting property owners (R. 7498-
99). Several of these people told Kinghorn that Elden and Ella Sorensen, and other people 
who resided on property abutting Rossi Hills, had always used the loop road for access to 
their property long enough to qualify as prescriptive easements (R. 7498-99). Kinghorn also 
was aware that the Park City Planning Department required all developments in Park City 
to recognize and respect lawful prescriptive easements and other property interests which 
exist upon property (R. 7499). Kinghorn then formed a legal conclusion for the first time 
that the loop road and other encroachments constituted prescriptive easements and 
encumbrances upon Rossi Hills, and shortly thereafter reported his conclusion to Doms in 
December of 1984 or early January of 1985 (R. 7500, 7611, 7625). 
Doms and Kinghorn both concluded that neither the three-parcel development nor 
Rossi Hills by itself would be economically feasible to develop because there was not enough 
useable land due to the encumbrances (R. 7398-7400, 7445-46, 7500). Doms accepted 
Kinghorn's legal opinion and instructed him to attempt to negotiate a resolution to the 
problem that would avoid litigation (R. 7176-77, 7500-01). Doms instructed Kinghorn to 
offer to deed the property back to the Andersons and Scotts in exchange for cancellation 
of the trust deed note and not to demand the return of money which had already been paid, 
in order to attempt to avoid expensive and protracted litigation (R. 7176-77, 7501-02, 7625). 
In a telephone conversation with Sweeney in January of 1985, Kinghorn informed 
Sweeney about the survey (Ex. 77D), and that the loop road and other encroachments 
constituted a serious problem which needed to be resolved; and that he wanted to meet with 
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Sweeney and present a proposal and discuss these issues (R. 7504-05). On January 17,1985, 
Kinghorn had a lengthy meeting with Sweeney in Kinghorn's law office (R. 7505). At this 
meeting, Kinghorn showed Sweeney the Alliance Engineering land survey of Rossi Hills, 
which clearly showed the loop road and other physical encroachments located upon the 
property (R. 7506). Kinghorn told Sweeney the names of the people he had talked to in 
Park City regarding use of the loop road by the Sorensens and others far in excess of 20 
years as access to their property, and that in his legal opinion the loop road, back yards, 
sheds and fences constituted prescriptive easements on the property under Utah law (R. 
7506-07). Kinghorn further told Sweeney these prescriptive easements constituted a 
violation of the covenant against encumbrances contained in the warranty deed conveying 
Rossi Hills to Doms, pursuant to U.C.A. § 57-1-12; and Doms was entitled to rescission of 
the transaction and the return of all money received by Plaintiffs (R. 7507). 
As a compromise, in lieu of seeking full rescission, Kinghorn presented Doms' offer 
to deed the property back in exchange for cancellation of the trust deed note, and allowing 
Plaintiffs to keep all money already received under the contract (F. of F. 44; R. 7507-08). 
Sweeney told Kinghorn he would have to talk to his clients, but not to worry about making 
the principal payment of $194,250.00 due January 25, 1985, until he got back to Kinghorn 
(R. 7508). 
On March 18, 1985, Kinghorn again met with Sweeney and another lawyer in his law 
firm by the name of Peter Mulhern at Kinghorn's law office to further discuss the matter (R. 
7509). In a lengthy meeting, Kinghorn reiterated to Sweeney and Mulhern all of the 
information he had given to Sweeney at the January 17,1985, meeting (R. 7510). Kinghorn 
again made the offer that Doms, in an attempt to avoid litigation, would deed the property 
back to the Andersons and Scotts in exchange for cancellation of the trust deed note, and 
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they could keep all payments already received by them (R. 7511-12). Mulhern and Sweeney 
indicated they would get back to Kinghorn and assured Kinghorn that Doms would not be 
expected to make the $194,250.00 payment purportedly due under the trust deed note until 
they got back to Kinghorn in regard to this matter, and the situation was straightened out 
(R. 7514). 
However, Plaintiffs did not subsequently respond to Doms' offer or contact Kinghorn, 
but rather filed a Complaint to foreclose on the property on June 6, 1985 (F. of F. 45; R. 
7514-15). This Complaint is Civil No. 8339, the main case now on appeal (R. 1-9; Add. 10). 
After Plaintiffs filed their foreclosure Complaint in June of 1985, Kinghorn engaged 
in numerous discussions with various counsel representing Plaintiffs at that time, and several 
extensions, stipulations and agreements were entered into to allow Doms to locate new 
counsel because Kinghorn was going to have to be a witness in this case (R. 3182-85). 
Contrary to an agreement between Kinghorn and counsel for Plaintiffs at that time, and 
unbeknownst to Kinghorn, Plaintiffs filed a motion for entry of judgment by default and 
obtained a default judgment against Doms and McCoy on or about January 20,1988 (R. 34-
40, 3185-86). 
On January 29,1988, Kinghorn filed an Answer and Counterclaim to rescind the Rossi 
Hills transaction, unaware that a default judgment had been entered against Doms (R. 41-
44; Add. 11). 
The default judgment against Doms was subsequently set aside by the trial court 
effective June 1,1988, upon Doms' payment of $4,467.60 to Plaintiffs, which represented all 
attorney's fees and costs incurred by Plaintiffs in the action up to and including that date (R. 
76-78, 126-27). The trial court issued an Order that whether or not it was appropriate to 
award that amount as attorney's fees was an issue reserved until final disposition of the case 
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on the merits (R. 245-47; Add. 12). The default judgment against McCoy was never set 
aside. 
On June 15,1988, Doms filed an Amended Counterclaim (R. 102-05; Add. 13). In this 
Amended Counterclaim, Jeanne Scott (the wife of Dan Scott) and Ellen Anderson, 
personally, were joined as involuntary Plaintiffs pursuant to an Order of the trial court (R. 
248-50). On July 6, 1988, Doms filed a Second Amended Counterclaim against all four 
Plaintiffs (R. 237-42; Add. 14). Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim alleged breach of the 
implied statutory covenants of warranty contained in the warranty deed pursuant to U.C.A. 
§ 57-1-12, breach of contract, and fraud and misrepresentation; and sought rescission of the 
Rossi Hills transaction or, in the alternative, damages (R. 237-42). 
The major portion of Rossi Hills was sold in May of 1987 to Summit County for non-
payment of property taxes (R. 3115). Due to the adversarial relationship between Doms and 
McCoy, and a lack of communication with Kinghorn, Doms was unaware that this had 
occurred until sometime later (R. 3115). 
In July of 1988, after researching and investigating the status of the title to Rossi Hills, 
Doms' new counsel (and present counsel herein) informed Doms the tax sale had indeed 
taken place in May of 1987; and Summit County was in fact deemed to be the owner of the 
major portion of Rossi Hills (R. 3116). Doms immediately instructed counsel to do whatever 
was necessary to redeem or purchase back Rossi Hills from Summit County (R. 3116). In 
August of 1988, pursuant to instructions of counsel, Doms tendered a cashier's check paid 
to the order of the Summit County Treasurer in the amount of $4,175.51, to pay all 
delinquent taxes, penalties, interest and costs, plus the 1988 estimated taxes, due to Summit 
County; and for conveyance of the property back to Domcoy, the record owner of the 
property prior to the tax sale to Summit County (R. 3116, 3158). 
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Upon receipt of this payment, Summit County, by quit-claim deed dated August 24, 
1988, conveyed Rossi Hills back to Domcoy, the prior record owner (R. 3117, 3160-61; Add. 
15). On August 26,1988, Domcoy conveyed Rossi Hills by warranty deed to Doms (Ex. 17P; 
Add. 16). 
The action proceeded through a lengthy discovery process and the consolidation with 
another case, Civil No. 10066 (Supp. R. 244). Civil No. 10066 (the "tax sale case") was filed 
by Plaintiffs in December of 1988 to declare unconstitutional and set aside the May 1987 tax 
sale of Rossi Hills to Summit County and to quiet title to the property in Plaintiffs (Supp. 
R. 2-66). The Summit County tax sale was subsequently declared void and set aside by the 
trial court upon stipulation of all of the parties in the tax sale case (C. of L. 42; Judg. 1116). 
In February of 1989, Plaintiff Jeanne Scott filed a Petition in the Utah Supreme Court 
for Permission to File an Interlocutory Appeal from an Order of the trial court denying her 
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of In Personam Jurisdiction over her in the action (Add. 17). 
Pursuant to a Minute Entry dated March 9, 1989, the Supreme Court denied this Petition 
for an Interlocutory Appeal (Add. 18). 
Shortly thereafter, in June of 1989, Plaintiffs filed a Petition for Extraordinary Writ in 
the Utah Supreme Court, seeking to restrain and prohibit the Third Judicial District Court 
and the judges thereof from proceeding further in the trial of this case based upon exactly 
the same in personam jurisdiction arguments which were rejected by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Plaintiff Jeanne Scott's Petition to File an Interlocutory Appeal (Add. 19). In an 
Amended Minute Entry, dated July 31, 1989, the Supreme Court denied this Petition for 
Extraordinary Writ (Add. 20). 
In a bifurcated trial, the trial court first decided to resolve the issue of whether or not 
the Rossi Hills transaction should be rescinded (R. 7315). FoUowing three days of trial on 
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April 17-19, 1990, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision denying rescission based 
upon the doctrine of laches (R. 4188-95; Add. 21). 
The remainder of the trial was held on August 21-24, 1990, and related primarily to 
the issue of damages suffered by Doms as a result of the encumbrances on Rossi Hills (R. 
7753-8285, 6541-89). Following this portion of the trial, the trial court issued a Memoran-
dum Decision which ruled that Doms suffered $83,000.00 in damages as a result of the loop 
road and other encumbrances existing on Rossi Hills as of March of 1982, when the 
transaction was closed and the warranty deed delivered (R. 4348-54). 
Subsequently, a hearing was held on December 31, 1991, to determine which parties 
were entitled to awards of attorney's fees and costs in the action (R. 6360-6540). Plaintiffs 
and Doms submitted attorney's fees affidavits, memoranda of costs, other documents 
regarding expenses; and Plaintiffs' counsel and Doms' counsel testified at this hearing. 
Following extensive objections, motions and argument by the parties over the 
appropriate findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment, the trial court entered its final 
Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 6874-99; Add. 1) and Second 
Amended Judgment (R. 6900-07; Add. 2) on June 23, 1992. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred by applying the equitable doctrine of laches and refusing to 
rescind the Rossi Hills transaction. Rescission is the appropriate remedy based upon 
Plaintiffs' breach of the statutory warranties and covenants contained in the warranty deed 
pursuant to U.C.A § 57-1-12, and also upon Plaintiffs' misrepresentations of material facts 
prior to the Rossi Hills transaction. Laches cannot be applied against Doms for a number 
of compelling reasons: (1) Doms acted promptly to rescind after obtaining knowledge, 
through diligent efforts, that there were legal encumbrances on the property; (2) Doms 
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diligently attempted to develop the property and thereby mitigate damages; (3) Plaintiffs 
failed to establish they were prejudiced by any alleged delay; and (4) Plaintiffs have come 
into a court of equity with "unclean hands." 
The trial court erred by ruling the warranty deed, trust deed and trust deed note do 
not constitute a single contract or transaction, which must be construed together in 
determining the rights and obligations of the parties. Plaintiffs were in breach of this 
contract when they delivered the warranty deed conveying Rossi Hills with encumbrances 
and title defects. Because Plaintiffs were in breach of the Rossi Hills contract, Doms was 
excused from all performance regarding the Rossi Hills transaction, and therefore was never 
in default under the trust deed and trust deed note. Furthermore, Plaintiffs cannot foreclose 
or otherwise seek equitable relief because they have come into a court of equity with 
"unclean hands." 
If rescission is denied, the trial court erred by awarding Doms only one-half the 
amount of damages found by the expert appraiser, Jerry Webber, as a result of the 
encumbrances on Rossi Hills. The trial court should have awarded the $166,050.00 in 
damages found by Jerry Webber because it represents the only determination based on 
assumptions and conditions permitted by law. The trial court should have excluded or 
disregarded the testimony and appraisal report of Plaintiffs' appraiser as a sanction against 
Plaintiffs for violating discovery rules; and also because the opinions of Plaintiffs' appraiser 
were based on assumptions and conditions not permitted by law. 
The trial court erred by ruling that Doms' counterclaim against the Estate of D.C. 
Anderson, as it relates to the remedy of damages, is time-barred by the probate "nonclaim" 
provisions of §§ 75-3-801 and 803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. Doms' causes of 
action against the estate are not "claims" under the Probate Code, and therefore were not 
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required to have been filed against the estate. Notwithstanding the application of the 
nonclaim provisions to Doms' remedy of damages, Doms is still entitled to a set-off for the 
damages against the purchase price of Rossi Hills. 
The trial court erred by refusing to award attorney's fees and appropriate costs to 
Doms. Doms is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs for sustaining 
his title to Rossi Hills against Plaintiffs' foreclosure and quiet title actions. Doms is also 
entitled to an award of out-of-pocket attorney's fees as consequential damages flowing from 
Plaintiffs' breach of contract. 
The trial court erred in its award of attorney's fees and costs to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs 
are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs because Doms is the prevailing party in this 
lawsuit and was never in default under the trust deed and trust deed note, which provided 
the only possible basis upon which Plaintiffs could make a legitimate claim for attorney's fees 
or costs. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs incurred in their petitions 
to the Utah Supreme Court for an interlocutory appeal and extraordinary writ because 
Plaintiffs lost both of these petitions. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or 
costs pursuant to their motions for sanctions in regard to Doms' objections to discovery 
requests because all of Doms' objections were substantially justified under Rule 37(a)(4), 
U.R.C.P. Finally, Doms is entitled to a refund of a substantial amount of the attorney's fees 
and costs paid to Plaintiffs as a condition of the trial court setting aside the default 
judgment. 
Doms' cause of action in his counterclaims alleging breach of the warranties and 
covenants in the warranty deed is not barred by the six-year limitation contained in U.C.A. 
§ 78-12-23(2). Doms' original counterclaim was filed less than six years after Plaintiffs' 
breach of the warranties and covenants in the warranty deed. Furthermore, Doms' 
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counterclaims are deemed under Utah law to "relate back" to June 6, 1985, the date 
Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed. Finally, notwithstanding the statute of limitations, Doms' 
claims are entitled to be set-off against Plaintiffs' claims in their Complaint up to the 
purchase price of the property. 
If rescission is denied, the doctrine of election of remedies does not preclude Doms' 
remedy of damages. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly allow a party to demand 
relief in the alternative or of several different types, and a party may state as many separate 
or alternate claims as he has regardless of consistency. The doctrine of election of remedies 
does not prevent recourse to any particular remedy, but operates only to prevent double 
redress for a single wrong. 
Plaintiffs lack standing to attack the validity of the warranty deed conveying Rossi Hills 
from Domcoy to Doms because Plaintiffs are strangers to the warranty deed and are not 
stockholders or creditors of Domcoy. Furthermore, Domcoy had clear power and authority 
to convey Rossi Hills to Doms under the applicable provisions of the Utah Business 
Corporation Act regarding the winding up of affairs of a dissolved corporation. 
Doms is prosecuting his Second Amended Counterclaim as the real party in interest 
because he is the fee simple title holder to Rossi Hills, and in fact is the only party in 
interest. Doms and McCoy did not purchase Rossi Hills as a partnership, and Rossi Hills 
was never partnership property. Even assuming, arguendo, there ever was a partnership 
between Doms and McCoy, any such alleged partnership was terminated in May of 1982. 
Doms is prosecuting his Second Amended Counterclaim as an "immediate grantee" 
under the warranty deed from Plaintiffs, not a "remote grantee." Doms cause of action for 
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breach of the covenants and warranties in the warranty deed arises from the original deed 
executed by Plaintiffs conveying Rossi Hills to Doms. Doms is being sued by Plaintiffs as 
an immediate grantee, and in turn is counterclaiming against Plaintiffs as an immediate 
grantee. Furthermore, Plaintiffs also breached the covenant of general warranty of title 
when they delivered the warranty deed to Rossi Hills, and a remote grantee can bring an 
action on this covenant because it runs with the land. Finally, Doms' cause of action for 
misrepresentation is not dependent upon any covenants and warranties in the warranty deed 
and is not affected by Doms' status as either an immediate or a remote grantee. 
Jeanne Scott and Ellen Anderson are properly joined as involuntary Plaintiffs because 
they are necessary parties under Rule 19(a), U.R.C.P. This issue has been decided by the 
Utah Supreme Court in the Court's ruling denying Plaintiffs' Petition for an Extraordinary 
Writ. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY 
APPLYING THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF LACHES AND 
REFUSING TO RESCIND THE ROSSI HILLS TRANSACTION, 
A. Rescission is the appropriate remedy based upon Plaintiffs* breach of the statutory 
warranties and covenants contained in the warranty deed pursuant to U.C.A. § 57-1-
The trial court correctly ruled that the deed executed by Plaintiffs conveying Rossi 
Hills to Doms and McCoy was a warranty deed under Utah law and conveyed with it all of 
the statutory warranties and covenants pursuant to U.C.A. § 57-1-12 (Ex. IP; F. of F. 1-6; 
G of L. 1; Add. 23). 
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The trial court also correctly ruled that the loop road, sheds, fences and backyard 
areas bordered by the fences and sheds, all as shown on the Alliance Engineering survey 
(Ex. 77D), constitute encumbrances upon Rossi Hills which were not excepted in the 
warranty deed, and thus a breach of the statutory covenants contained in the warranty deed 
pursuant to U.C.A. § 57-1-12 (C. of L. 2-4; Judg. K 3).2 The trial court also correctly ruled 
that the aforesaid statutory covenants were breached upon delivery of the warranty deed on 
March 23, 1982 (C of L. 5).3 The trial court made its Findings of Fact and based its 
aforementioned Conclusions of Law on the uncontradicted testimony of Ella and Elden 
Sorensen, who have resided on Ontario Avenue since 1941, and whose rear property abuts 
and in fact intrudes upon Rossi Hills (R. 7342-77; F. of F. 8-13). All of the uses of the loop 
road, sheds, fences and backyards by the Sorensens and other abutting property owners 
clearly constitute prescriptive easements under Utah law and are therefore encumbrances 
under U.CA. § 57-1-12.4 
In addition, Ex. 77D and the uncontradicted testimony of Ella and Elden Sorensen 
clearly establish that the Sorensens actually had acquired title to the portion of their 
backyard intruding upon Rossi Hills when Plaintiffs conveyed Rossi Hills to Doms in March 
of 1982. The Sorensens testified their shed and backyard fence had been there since at least 
2
 See Bergstrom v. Moore. 677 P.2d 1123,1124-25 (Utah 1984); Brewer v. Peatross. 595 
P.2d 866, 868 (Utah 1979). 
3
 See Bergstrom. supra, at 677 P.2d 1125; Brewer, supra, at 595 P.2d 868. 
4
 See Marchant v. Park City. 788 P.2d 520, 524 (Utah 1990); Jensen v. Brown. 639 P.2d 
150, 152 (Utah 1981); Crane v. Crane. 683 P.2d 1062,1064 (Utah 1984); Malouf v. Fischer. 
159 P.2d 881 (Utah 1945); Richins v. Struhs. 412 P.2d 314 (Utah 1966); Willie v. Local 
Realty Co.. 175 P.2d 718 (Utah 1946). 
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1941 and nothing had changed since then (R. 7345-46). The Sorensens further testified that 
they and the other residences on Ontario Avenue have used their property openly and 
notoriously in their backyards out to the fences since 1941, and that nobody had ever asked 
them to move any of the sheds or fences (R. 7366-67). 
Under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence as recently set forth by the Utah 
Supreme Court, the Sorensens have acquired actual title to the portion of their backyard 
intruding on Rossi Hills. See Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1990). It is clear 
from the Sorensens' testimony and the Alliance Engineering Survey (Ex. 77D), that the 
Sorensens have acquired title out to their fence line and shed. Plaintiffs therefore breached 
the covenant of general warranty of title when they conveyed Rossi Hills to Doms in March 
of 1982. 
Rescission of the Rossi Hills transaction is clearly appropriate pursuant to precedent 
established 98 years ago. In Adams v. Reed, 40 P. 720 (Utah 1985), affirmed, Adams v. 
Henderson, 168 U.S. 584 (1897), the Utah Supreme Court held that where an easement 
exists on land or there is a defect in title, equity will rescind the warranty deed, note and 
mortgage. 40 P. at 723-25. 
The prescriptive easements and the actual lack of title in Plaintiffs at the time of the 
Rossi Hills transaction are considered "irremediable" under Utah law. Neves v. Wright, 638 
P.2d 1195, 1199 (Utah 1981). The Utah Supreme Court and this Court have further held 
that when the unexcepted encumbrances on a grantor's title are irremediable and the 
grantor cannot fulfill his covenant against encumbrances contained in the warranty deed, 
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rescission is the appropriate remedy. Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 
1984).5 
The facts of the instant case are strikingly similar to those in this Court's recent 
decision of Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716 (Utah 1990). In Breuer-Harrison, 
this Court upheld the trial court's summary judgment of rescission as the appropriate remedy 
for the plaintiffs, even though the plaintiffs did not assert their right of rescission for five 
years after they learned of an irremediable pipeline easement. 
Notwithstanding the trial court's findings that Doms knew some sheds and a road 
existed on the property, Plaintiffs are still subject to the statutory covenant against 
encumbrances under U.C.A. § 57-1-12. Actual or constructive knowledge by a grantee of 
an encumbrance is inadmissible parol evidence and not a valid defense, as the covenant 
against encumbrances protects against all known as well as unknown encumbrances. Jones 
v. Grow Investment & Mortgage Co., 358 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah 1961); Bergstrom, supra, at 
677 P.2d 1125.6 
5
 See also Neves v. Wright, supra, at 638 P.2d 1198; Smith v. Permain, 548 P.2d 1269 
(Utah 1976); Thackeray v. Knight, 192 P. 263 (Utah 1920); Callister v. Millstream Associates, 
Inc., 738 P.2d 662,664 (Utah App. 1987); Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 724 
(Utah App. 1990). 
6
 Plaintiffs make the untenable argument in Point VII of their opening brief that this 
Court should disregard the law in Utah as clearly set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Jones and Bergstrom. supra. 
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B. Rescission is the appropriate remedy based upon Plaintiffs' misrepresentations of 
material facts prior to the Rossi Hills transaction. 
Utah law has long recognized that rescission is the appropriate remedy based upon 
negligent or even totally innocent misrepresentations of material facts regarding the real 
property which forms the subject of a contract. See Adams v. Reed, supra, at 40 P. 725; 
Zuniga v. Leone. 297 P. 1010 (Utah 1931). The weight of authority throughout the country 
also recognizes that even innocent misrepresentation of material facts is a proper basis for 
rescission of a contract. See, e^ g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164; Barrer 
v. Women's National Bank. 761 F.2d 752, 757-58 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
In regard to non-disclosures preceding the Rossi Hills transaction in the instant case, 
a clear duty was imposed upon Michael Sloan, Plaintiffs' agent and a licensed real estate 
broker, to disclose to Doms all facts material to the Rossi Hills transaction. Dugan v. Jones, 
615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980).7 Any misrepresentations made by Sloan to Doms 
regarding the Rossi Hills transaction, whether positive assertions or non-disclosures, are 
imputed to Plaintiffs under the law governing principal and agent.8 
The Rossi Hills transaction should have been rescinded by the trial court based upon 
the following specific misrepresentations established by the evidence at trial: 
Material Misrepresentations 
1. Sloan testified, and the trial court found, that Sloan told Doms the loop road didn't 
matter as an encroachment because an improved road would follow or make use of 
7
 See also Secor v. Knight. 716 P.2d 790, 795 (Utah 1986); First Security Bank v. 
Banberrv Development 786 P.2d 1326, 1329-33 (Utah 1990). 
8
 See, e.g., Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., 104 P.2d 619, 623 (Utah 1940); Xanthos v. Board 
of Adjustment of Salt Lake City. 685 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Utah 1984). 
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it (F. of F. 42; R. 7668, 7672). Sloan also testified that he knew what a prescriptive 
easement was and he did not believe the loop road was a prescriptive easement (R. 
7673-75). 
2. Sloan testified, and the trial court found, that Sloan told Doms the encroachments 
would not impair the three-parcel development with Block 62 and the Slipper Parcel 
(F. of F. 42; R. 7668, 7683-84). 
3. Doms testified, and the trial court found, that Sloan and D.C. Anderson told Doms 
that Rossi Hills was a "prime piece" of development property (F. of F. 35; R. 7101, 
7227, 7236, 7404-05). 
4. Sloan and Doms both testified, and the trial court found, that Sloan and D.C. 
Anderson told Doms the "highest and best use" of Rossi Hills was the three-parcel 
development (F. of F. 35; R. 7680, 7158-60). 
5. Sloan and Doms both testified that Sloan told Doms, with D.C. Anderson present, 
the three-parcel development would be a "profitable venture" and a "good, sound 
investment" (R. 7679, 7404-05, 7410-12). 
6. Sloan testified in his deposition he told Doms that Rossi Hills was the "best 
undeveloped piece of property outside Deer Valley within walking distance to town" 
(R. 454, p. 42 1. 19-22). 
7. Doms testified that Sloan and D.C. Anderson told Doms that Rossi Hills could be 
developed on its own as a "stand alone" piece of property (R. 7111, 7158-60). 
8. Doms testified that Sloan and D.C. Anderson told Doms the three-parcel 
development could be built under then current Park City ordinances (R. 7417-18, 
7617). 
9. Sloan testified in his deposition he told Doms that attempts at the three-parcel 
development had previously failed, but Doms could get the deal done by working with 
the Mountain Realty Group (R. 454, p. 44 1. 21 - p. 45 1. 13). 
Material Non-Disclosures 
10. Plaintiffs and Sloan failed to tell Doms that Plaintiffs' attempts at the three-parcel 
development had previously failed because of the encroachments on Rossi Hills (R. 
7437-38, 7481-82, 7484, 7593-94, 7603-04). 
11. Plaintiffs and Sloan failed to tell Doms that the three-parcel development had 
already been submitted for preliminary approval to Park City and rejected (R. 7556). 
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The preponderance of the evidence clearly establishes that the aforementioned 
misrepresentations of material facts were made to Doms, whether by positive assertions or 
Plaintiffs' non-disclosures. Doms reasonably relied on these misrepresentations which 
induced him to purchase Rossi Hills, and the trial court erred by not rescinding the Rossi 
Hills transactions based upon said misrepresentations of Plaintiffs. 
C. Laches cannot be applied against Doms because he acted promptly to rescind after 
obtaining knowledge, through diligent efforts, that there were legal encumbrances on 
the property. 
In the very recent case of Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 227 (Utah 1992), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated the following: "In order to prove that Sandy was guilty of 
laches, defendants had to show that there was a clear lack of diligence on the part of Sandy, 
and that they suffered identifiable damage, injury, or prejudice arising from the unwarranted 
delay. 827 P.2d at 229-30 (footnote omitted and emphasis added).9 
In Breuer-Harrison, this Court affirmed the trial court's granting of rescission on the 
buyers' motion for summary judgment even though the buyers had delayed five years in 
seeking rescission after they obtained knowledge of a pipeline easement on the property. 
In reaching this conclusion, this Court stated the following: 
However, even though the pipeline easement was incurable, the circumstances 
in this case did not demand immediate rescission of the contract by B-H. The 
complete impact of the pipeline easement was not known until further 
engineering work was completed and the development cost of the property 
became prohibitive in light of the pipeline easement. 
799 P.2d at 726 (emphasis added). 
9
 See also Papanikolas Bros. Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates, 535 
P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975); Breuer-Harrison. supra, at 799 P.2d 726. 
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In the instant case, Doms sought rescission of the Rossi Hills transaction less than 
three years after he purchased the property (R of F. 44). Furthermore, even assuming 
Sloan had told Doms about the loop road and sheds on the property prior to the sale (which 
Doms adamantly denies), Doms still did not have knowledge that these encroachments 
constituted prescriptive easements or other legal encumbrances which would give him 
grounds to seek rescission of the transaction. Sloan himself admitted at trial that he told 
Doms these encroachments would be no problem and would not impair the three-parcel 
development (F. of F. 42; R. 7668, 7672, 7683-84). Sloan further admitted that he did not 
believe the loop road was a prescriptive easement (R. 7673-75). In addition, Doms received 
a warranty deed containing covenants against encumbrances and other defects in title. 
Relying on Sloan's representations and the warranty deed, Doms had absolutely no reason 
to suspect that the encroachments would present a problem or were legal encumbrances of 
any kind (R. 7195, 7401-02, 7625-26). 
Furthermore, the uncontradicted facts of this case clearly establish that Doms acted 
promptly to rescind after obtaining knowledge, through diligent efforts, that there were legal 
encumbrances on the property which would give him grounds to seek rescission. Not only 
was there no unreasonable delay by Doms in this case, there was in fact virtually no delay 
at all in seeking rescission from the time Doms first learned there were legal encumbrances 
on the property. 
The foregoing facts clearly establish that Doms was in fact very diligent and did not 
delay in seeking rescission of the Rossi Hills transaction. A more complete chronology is 
set forth in the Statement of Facts of this brief, supra, and Doms' arguments against 
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application of laches are presented in detail in his "Trial Brief Regarding Issue of Laches," 
which Domssubmitlcd to - on Apnl 'II I "HI |l< 111! Il ' 'itllill \"M) I hi1. Mini 
brief sets forth in great u .«« «*c evidence which clearly demonstrates that Doms was 
entitled to rescission of the Rossi Hills transaction. 
Neverthele! a Memorandum ?\\~:*:rr - - • * ,y Lne trial court ruled 
that Doms waited an unreasonable amount of time to seek rescission, and that rescission was 
((mdnir Ivnrril by llhr ilncliinc \\\ hrlir I h1 liSK1!') -Iilil ' l | I lir Minimis md 
conclusions contained in said Memorandum. Decision are incorporated into the trial court's 
of Law 33-40, and paragraph 13 of the Judgment. Conclusions of Law 33-40 are reviewed 
by this Court simply for legal correctness, and all of these are incorrect legal conclusions. 
In particular, Conclusion,, of I aw 'VI constitutes a dviu t rnti of ln\v, as it states that it was 
not necessary for Doms to obtain a H ii^ l opinion that the loop n ' ^ther encroach-
ments wei e pi escripti < e easeiu . y 
before Doms could make his rescission olilli i 
D. Laches cannot be applied against Doms because he diligently attempted to develop 
the property and thereby mitigate damages. 
In Breuer-Harrison. supra, the buyer of the property sought to mitigate the damage 
t 
concluded that "a non-breaching party may appropriately attempt in. good faith to mitigate 
damages by attempting to honor the contract and work around, pi oblems presented b) the 
bi each.11 799 P.2d at /^u. m ieie'-vry* *ne sellers' claim of laches, this Court further 
concluded as follows: 
As we have stated, B-H's delay in exercising its rescission rights was due to its 
efforts to mitigate damages due to the pipeline and easement not because they 
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were relinquishing their later-asserted claim of rescission. Further, since the 
delay was a reasonable attempt to work around the easement, we reject the 
Combes' laches claim. 
799 P.2d at 727 (emphasis added). 
A very similar situation occurred in the instant case. The undisputed facts and 
evidence show that Doms and his lawyer, Kinghorn, diligently pursued efforts to develop the 
property and work around the loop road and other encroachments. The trial court even 
acknowledged in open court on two separate occasions that Doms was diligently attempting 
to develop the property (R. 7422-23, 7615-16). Therefore, Plaintiffs' laches claim should 
have been rejected by the trial court, and the trial court erred by not granting rescission of 
the Rossi Hills transaction. 
E. Laches cannot be applied against Doms because Plaintiffs failed to establish that they 
were prejudiced by any alleged delay. 
Both the Utah Supreme Court and this Court have made it clear that in addition to 
unreasonable delay or lack of diligence, the second element of laches which must be 
established by the party asserting such a claim is an identifiable injury or prejudice owing 
to such lack of diligence or delay.10 In Papanikolas, the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
"the propriety of refusing a claim is equally predicated upon the gravity of the prejudice . . . 
and the length of . . . delay." 535 P.2d at 1260. In the instant case. Plaintiffs presented no 
evidence whatsoever to show they have been injured or prejudiced by any alleged 
unreasonable delay by Doms. Furthermore, based upon this complete lack of evidence, the 
trial court failed to enter any findings or conclusions that Plaintiffs had suffered any injury 
or prejudice. Laches is an affirmative defense, and the burden of proof was on Plaintiffs to 
10
 See Sandy City, supra, at 827 P.2d 229-30; Papanikolas Bros. Enterprises, supra, at 535 
P.2d 1260; Breuer-Harrison, supra, at 799 P.2d 726. 
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establish a clear lack of diligence by Doms and an identifiable injury or prejudice to 
Plaintitls. SiiiiiL IMiimUlls riuiiplctcly lulled li isLibhsli «tit st/omitl rlrnu iiiiil I! Indies, the 
trial court erred by applying the doctrine against Doms and refusing to rescind the Rossi 
I Ills transaction. 
I . Laches cannot be applied against Doms because Plaintiffs have come into a court of 
equity with "unclean hands." 
It is a well-settled principle of jurisprudence that equity "reserves its rewards foi those 
who are themselves acting in fairness and good conscience, or as is sometimes said, to those 
who have come into court with clean hands." Jacobson v. Jacobson. 557 P.2d 156,158 (Utah 
1976).11 " 11 til In in i mil in itn l ulliiii hih in ptrionn A malnial obligation nil llllllllif, rnntrnct 
is not in court with ,u j \ .:*/ .uid cannot invoke an equitable remedy when he has failed 
to disch
 ;,L- .HIICI \. jni,ti.Non, 525 P 2d 45, 16 1 ) ( I Jfc Ji 
1974); Annotation, Clean Hands in Equity, 4 A.L.R. 44, 73.12 
The facts and evidence of the instant case clearly establish that Plaintiffs have come 
into court with "unclean hands," and therefore have no right to seek equitable relief such as 
laches. Again, the numerous misrepresentations made by Plaintiffs dictate they cannot be 
s > ^ i i • . i 
hands" because they did not attempt, in any way whatsoever, to remedy their breach of the 
( O V C I U i l l l S L I I I I I l * ( m . m l n . I l l M i l . i i l l I .I l l i l lU i l l t i l l l l l i l l M l ( | I L I I | H I  \\ w I I  I  I I M i l l l l l ' i l l III M l / 
encumbrances and detects in title. D.C Anderson and Dan Scott owned Kuusi Hills for 
11
 See also LHIW. Inc. v. DeLorean. 753 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1988); Hortoii v. 'Morton, 
695 P.2d 102, 107 (t Jtah 1984); Travelers Insurance Company v. Lewis, 531 P.2d 484, 485 
(Utah 1975). 
Military Academy, 223 P.2d 1 72, 1 74-75 (Ore ^ 0 ) 
approximately 16 years before they sold it to Doms in March of 1982 (R. 2724, pp. 21-24). 
Plaintiffs clearly had knowledge of the encroachments on the property (F. of F. 14), and yet 
refused to do anything to attempt to remedy their breach of the covenants and warranties, 
even when Doms and Kinghorn presented convincing evidence that these encroachments 
constituted legal encumbrances (F. of F. 15). In fact, Plaintiffs frustrated every attempt by 
Doms to negotiate a reasonable resolution. When Doms gave notice of his intent to rescind 
in January of 1985 by way of a settlement offer which was much better for Plaintiffs than a 
straight rescission, Plaintiffs demonstrated a complete lack of good faith by failing to even 
respond to the rescission offer, but rather filed a foreclosure complaint against Doms and 
McCoy in June of 1985 (F. of F. 44, 45). 
It is clear that Plaintiffs have come into a court of equity with "unclean hands." The 
trial court therefore erred by applying the equitable doctrine of laches against Doms and 
granting Plaintiffs equitable relief to which they were not entitled. 
G. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and remanded with directions to 
enter a judgment rescinding the Rossi Hills transaction. 
The application of the equitable doctrine of laches in favor of Plaintiffs and against 
Doms to deny rescission of the Rossi Hills transaction constitutes a manifest injustice which 
cannot reasonably be supported by the evidence, and therefore is an abuse of discretion by 
the trial court. Papanikolas Bros. Enterprises, supra, at 535 P.2d 1260. The judgment of 
the trial court should be reversed, and the case remanded to the trial court for entry of a 
judgment of rescission of the entire Rossi Hills transaction. Rossi Hills is undeveloped land 
which can be returned to Plaintiffs in the same condition as it was in 1982. The judgment 
of rescission should revest title in the Plaintiffs, who held title to Rossi Hills prior to the sale, 
and order the return of all money received by Plaintiffs pursuant to the Rossi Hills 
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transactioi is prejudgment interest on all such sums at the statutory rate of 1 0%' per 
annum un^ T^qn, supra, a L-. -• -*vpi il 
Industries. Inc. 560 P.2d 5 J , 317 (Utah 1977), cert denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RULING THE WARRANTY DEED, 
TRUST DEED AND TRUST DEED NOTE DO NOT CONSTITUTE A SINGLE 
CONTRACT OR TRANSACTION. AND BY REFUSING TO RULE THAT POMS 
WAS EXCUSED FROM PERFORMANCE AND NOT IN DEFAULT 
UNDER THE TRUST DEED AND TRUST DEED NOTE. 
A. The warranty deed, trust deed and trust deed note constitute a single contract or 
transaction and must be construed together in determining the rights and obligations 
of the parties. 
The warranty deed conveying Rossi Hills to Doms and McCoy was executed by 
Plaintiffs in consideration for the execution of the trust deed and trust deed note by Doms 
constitute a single contract or transaction evidencing the sale of Rossi Hills. 
of conveyance such as a warranty deed.13 Further moi e, the Utah Supreme Court has 
definitively ruled that the legal debt or obligation secured by a trust deed or mortgage is part 
of and inseparable from the trust deed or mortgage: " As a matter of law, in order to 
establish a valid trust deed or mortgage, a legal debt or obligation with a specific amount 
In accord General Glass Corp. v. Mast Consl i i ic 1 ion Co,. 766 P.2d 429, 432 (Utah App. 
^ee U.CA §§ 57-1-12, 57-14,4, 57-1-19 (Add. 23); Brown v. Skeen. 58 P.2d 24, 32 
(Utah 1936); Bvbee v. Stuart. 189 P.2d 118, 122 (Utah 1948); Kiar v. Brimlev. 497 P.2d 23, 
25-26 (Utah 1972); W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Nat. Res. Co.. 627 P.2d 56. ™ "Ttah 1981); 
Bown v. Loveland. 678 P.2d 292, 297 (Utah 1984). 
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a mortgage or a beneficiary under a trust deed is Ma mere lien, incapable of being separated 
from the debt and transferred bv itself." State Bank of Lehi v. Woolsev, 565 P.2d 413, 415 
(Utah 1977)(emphasis added); Belnap v. Blain. 575 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah 1978). 
The unquestioned law in Utah is that a note and mortgage (which includes the 
warranty deed) constitute a single contract. In First Savings Bank of Ogden v. Brown, 54 
P.2d 237, 240-41 (Utah 1936), the Utah Supreme Court held as follows: "The note and 
mortgage, given at the same time, and as parts of the same transaction, must be construed 
together as constituting one contract. They supplement each other and express the entire 
contract between the parties." (emphasis added).14 
The fact that a warranty deed, trust deed and trust deed note are deemed to constitute 
a single contract under clear Utah law simply follows the general rule of law in Utah and 
throughout the country that contemporaneously executed instruments regarding the same 
subject matter or transaction must be construed together as a single contract. This basic 
principal of law is clearly set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. 
Lentz. 501 P.2d 266 (Utah 1972): 
[W]here two or more instruments are executed by the same parties contempora-
neously, or at different times in the course of the same transaction, and concern 
the same subject matter, they will be read and construed together as far as 
14
 See also Brown v. Skeen. 58 P.2d 24, 32-33 (Utah 1936); Bvbee v. Stuart. 189 P.2d 
118, 122-23 (Utah 1948); Kjar v. Brimlev, 497 P.2d 23, 25-26 (Utah 1972). 
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determining the respective rights and interests of the parties, although thev do 
not in terms refer to each other. 
The fact that the warranty deed must be considered i; • he part of a single contract or 
transaction along with the othei documents of transit ;.. *„...,her emphasized by all t.»:l the 
Utah rescission cases cited in Point I, supra. In each of these cases, the entire transaction 
was rescinded, not just the warranty de s cill 
T h e liiiiiill m i l i i i l i > | i l n l t in r i i n n n i i i ' i iiiiiiiil MMiip l i li ly mnmis.iiil>slantiatchc! n r p u m e n t 
advanced by Plaintiffs that the Rossi Hills transaction should be split into separate contracts 
ni'iiliug tin; „ali evidenced by the \A aiiaiiiLy dad i in iiinliriil, i in I llllii 'lin.iiu uii1" 
evidenced by the trust deed and trust deed note as another contract. The trial court 
erroneously applied the doctrine of merger, which has nothing to do with this issue, to 
somehow * i separate contracts. Fherefore, 
Conclusions ot Lav t \ *• and 9 represent cieai vi:. ^ 01 .aw by the trial court and must 
B. Plaintiffs were in breach of contract when they delivered the warranty deed conveying 
Rossi Hills with encumbrances and title defects, 
q
 s 
contained in the warrantv deed pursuant \.- t A \ c w~;. ^ were breached by Plaintiffs 
_
 ue]ivery of the warran : . . A . . *• pcipiuni \. ,>ium-. - 5, 
1125 ^Jtah 1984); Soderberg v. Holt 46 P.2d 428, 431 (Utah 1935). 
15
 In accord First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Maxwell 659 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 
1983); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987); Big Cottonwood 
Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City. 740 P.2d 1357, 1358-59 (Utah App. 1987); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) O F CONTRACTS § 202(2); 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 388; 55 Am. Jur. 
2d Mortgages § 176: ^ C ^ S . Mortgages § 156; 17A n IS. Contracts § 298. 
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C. Poms was excused from all performance regarding the Rossi Hills transaction, and 
therefore was never in default under the trust deed and trust deed note. 
In Bergstrom v. Moore, supra, the Utah Supreme Court held as follows: "If it plainly 
appears that a seller has lost or encumbered his ownership so that he will not be able to 
fulfill his contract, he cannot insist that a buyer continue to make payments." 677 P.2d at 
1125 (citations omitted and emphasis added).16 In other words, the buyer is excused from 
performance under the contract because he is not considered under the law to be in default. 
In regard to the law of contracts in general, clear Utah case law and the general rule 
of law throughout the country hold that where one party to a contract has failed or refused 
to perform an obligation under it, the non-breaching party is excused from performance 
under the contract, and may recover all money already paid and other losses incurred by 
him. Sprague v. Bovles Bros. Drilling Co.. 294 P.2d 689, 693 (Utah 1956).17 The 
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 274(1), cited by the Utah Supreme Court in Sprague, 
frames the issue in terms of a failure of consideration by the breaching party which 
discharges the non-breaching party from his duties under the contract. Comment (a) to § 
274 explains that in any such case the non-breaching party is excused from performance and 
may reclaim what he has given, or its value. The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held 
16
 The cases cited in Bergstrom include Marlowe Investment Corp. v. Radmall 485 P.2d 
1402 (Utah 1971); Tremonton Investment Co. v. Home, 202 P. 547 (Utah 1921); Foxlev v. 
Rich, 99 P. 666 (Utah 1909). See also Neves v. Wright, 638 P.2d 1195,1198-99 (Utah 1981); 
American Savings & Loan Assoc, v. Blomquist, 465 P.2d 353, 355 (Utah 1970); Huck v. 
Haves, 560 P.2d 1124, 1126 (Utah 1977). 
17
 Sprague cites the following authority in support of this proposition: Anvil Mining Co. 
v. Humble, 153 U.S. 540 (1894); 5 WlLLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1303 (rev. ed.); RESTATE-
MENT OF CONTRACTS § 274(1). See a]so 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts §§ 621, 664, 701; 17A 
C.J.S. Contracts § 452; Sjoberg v. Kravik, 759 P.2d 966, 969 (Mont. 1988); Sharbono v. 
Darden, 715 P.2d 433, 435 (Mont. 1986); O'Hara Group Denver, Ltd. v. Marcor Housing 
Systems. Inc., 595 P.2d 679, 684-85 (Colo. 1979). 
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that failure of consideration is a complete defense to any claim of the breaching party based 
u p o n the contract, and thai illllin nun-bleaching pail) is excused hum [ tn tn in ia i in .null nut 
in default under the contract.1 8 
D. Plaintiffs cannot foreclose or otherwise seek equitable relief because thev have come 
into a court of equity with "unclean hands." 
In paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Plaintiffs elect to seek foreclosure of the trust 
deed and trust deed note as a note and mortgage pursuant to paragraph ieed 
ancj u.CA. § 57-1-23 (R. 1-9). An action to foreclose a morh^ue is deemed to be an action 
in equity under clear holdings of the Utah Supreme Court ^ Bank of Lehi v. Woolsey. 
'li1' I1 M 41 \ 111 11 I Ill I'll f| Udnap v. Blaitt ( I' \i f»l • Jtah 1978). However , 
Plaintiffs a re not entitled to a decree of foreclosure or any other eqi litable relief because 
E . If rescission is denied, the judgment of the tr ial cour t should be reversed and 
r e m a n d e d with direct ions to enter j udgmen t in accordance with the law a s set forth 
above. 
Conclusions of Law 6-9, 20-32 and 51-54; and paragraphs 1, 5-12 and 19-22 of the 
Judgment ; all consti tute errors of law by the trial cour t which must be reversed under the 
1 egJJ I c"11rrec111ess s I \i it 1< III; i HI 11 ,»II 11' \ mi< \ ; nrt 's 
rulings sphtting the Rossi Hills transaction m t r ;wr;trate contracts: ; ... ng Doms in aeiaul t 
a 
"h) bi id" p rocedure involving mortgages and/or trust deeds; awarding Plaintiffs amounts due 
18
 See Assets Realizat ion Co. v. Cardon. 272 P. 204, 207 (Utah 1928); Genera l Ins. Co. 
of A m . v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp. . 545 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1976); Bentlev v. Pot ter , 694 
P.2d 617, 619 ( U t a h 1984) (quoting 6 S. WiLLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 814, at 
17-78 (3d ed. 1 962)); C o p p e r State Leasing v. Blacker Appliance, 770 P.2d 88, 91 (Utah 
1988) 
33 
under the trust deed and trust deed note plus interest; and awarding Plaintiffs attorney's fees 
and costs based upon Doms' alleged default under the trust deed and trust deed note. 
If rescission is denied, on remand the trial court should be directed to enter a 
judgment consistent with the principals of law set forth in subpoints A through D above. 
The judgment should be that Doms must pay the purchase price of the property, with a set-
off for all amounts received by Plaintiffs toward the purchase of the property and for any 
damages suffered by Doms as a result of Plaintiffs' breach of contract. 
Doms owes Plaintiffs nothing under the trust deed and trust deed note, and is entitled 
to the following amounts as set-offs against the $276,750.00 purchase price of Rossi Hills: 
1. $82,500.00, which represents the earnest money payment of $10,000.00 and the 
down payment of $72,500.00 (F. of F. 18). 
2. $72,520.25, which represents the sum total of all monthly payments received by 
Plaintiffs under the trust deed note (F. of F. 22). Since Doms was excused from 
performance under the trust deed note, no interest ever accrued and all such monthly 
payments were principal payments and represent additional set-offs against the purchase 
price of the property (F. of F. 21). 
3. The amount of damages suffered by Doms as a result of the encumbrances existing 
on Rossi Hills, the trial court concluded, was $83,000.00 (C. of L. 19). However, Doms 
submits that the trial court abused its discretion in this award, and the damages suffered by 
Doms as a result of the encumbrances should be $166,050.00 (See Point III, infra), 
4. Prejudgment interest under U.C.A. § 15-1-1 should be awarded to Doms at the rate 
of 10% per annum, on all amounts received by Plaintiffs pursuant to the Rossi Hills 
transaction from the date each such payment was received to the entry of judgment by the 
trial court on remand. Bjork v. April Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977), cert. 
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denied. 431 U.S. 930 (1977); Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co.. 88 P. 1003, 1006-07 (Utah 
1907). 
5. Prejudgment interest on the amount of damages ultimately awarded to Doms 
should also be awarded from March 23,1982, the date the warranty deed was delivered, to 
the final entry of judgment by the trial court on remand. Bjork. supra; Fell, supra.19 
6. All attorney's fees and costs should be awarded to Doms, plus prejudgment interest 
on the award of attorney's fees (See Point V, infra). 
POINT in 
IF RESCISSION IS DENIED. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY 
AWARDING DOMS ONLY ONE-HALF THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES 
FOUND BY THE EXPERT APPRAISER. JERRY WEBBER. AS A 
RESULT OF THE ENCUMBRANCES ON ROSSI HELLS. 
A. The proper measure of damages is the "benefit of the bargain" rule. 
The trial court correctly ruled that damages should be measured as of the date of 
Plaintiffs' breach of contract, which occurred on March 23,1982, the date the warranty deed 
was delivered (C. of L. 13). Soderberg v. Holt. 46 P.2d 428, 434 (Utah 1935).20 The trial 
court also correctly ruled that the proper measure of damages under Utah law is the 
difference in value of the property without any encumbrances minus the value of the 
property with the encumbrances, which is simply the "benefit of the bargain" rule (C. of L. 
15). Young Electric Sign Co. v. United Standard West. 755 P.2d 162, 164 (Utah 1988); 
19
 See also Uintah Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co.. 546 P.2d 885 (Utah 1976); 
Gillespie v. Blood. 17 P.2d 822 (Utah 1932); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. Love. 196 P. 305 
(Utah 1921); Wheatlev v. Oregon Short Line R. Co.. 162 P. 86 (Utah 1916); Railroad v. 
Board of Education. 99 P. 263 (Utah 1909); East Canyon Land & Stock Co. v. Davis & 
Weber Counties Canal Co.. 238 P. 280 (Utah 1925). 
20
 This rule is simply the general rule of law followed throughout the country in breach 
of contract actions. See, e.g.. Sagebrush Development. Inc. v. Moehrke. 604 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 
1979); McCoy v. Rilev. 771 P.2d 25 (ColoApp. 1989); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 74. 
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Smith & Boyer, Survey of the Law of Property. Ch. 19, p. 313 (2d ed. 1971). The benefit 
of the bargain" rule, and thus the same measure of damages, is also used to determine 
Doms' damages suffered as a result of Plaintiffs' misrepresentations. Dugan v. Jones, 615 
P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980). 
B. Damages must be determined with all encumbrances in place and as they 
existed in March of 1982, 
The trial court correctly ruled that damages should be measured with all the 
encumbrances in place and as they existed on March 23, 1982, the date the warranty deed 
was delivered to Doms and the contract thereby breached by Plaintiffs (C. of L. 14). Lyman 
Grazing Association v. Smith. 473 P.2d 905, 907 (Utah 1970); Merrill v. Bailev & Sons Co., 
106 P.2d 255, 259 (Utah 1940).21 
C. The trial court should have awarded the $166,050 in damages found by the 
appraiser, Jerry Webber, because it represents the only determination based 
on assumptions and conditions permitted by law. 
An expert real estate appraiser, Jerry R. Webber, compiled an extensive appraisal 
report totaling 112 pages (including 37 pages of addenda), in which Webber appraised the 
fair market value of Rossi Hills in March of 1982 both with and without the encumbrances 
found by the trial court to exist on Rossi Hills (Ex. 88D). Webber calculated that the fair 
market value of Rossi Hills in March of 1982 without considering any encumbrances of any 
kind on the property was $276,750.00, which corresponds exactly to the purchase price 
actually paid for the property. This calculation was based on a maximum of ten residential 
21
 See ajso Carson v. Elliott. 728 P.2d 778 (Idaho App. 1986); Warsaw v. Chicago 
Metallic Ceilings. Inc.. 676 P.2d 584 (Cal. 1984); Dver v. Compere. 73 P.2d 1356 (N.M. 
1937); 28 C.J.S. Easements §§ 96-97; 2 G. Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law 
of Real Property § 426 (repl. ed. 1980). 
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units (five duplexes) which could be built on the property, with a valuation of $27,675.00 per 
unit (R. 7863-64; Ex. 88D, p. 55). 
Webber also calculated the fair market value of Rossi Hills in March of 1982 based 
upon the assumptions and conditions that the loop road and all other encroachments on the 
property are legal and enforceable by law, and cannot be relocated or removed in any way. 
Webber calculated that a maximum of four residential units (two duplexes) could be 
developed on the property under these assumptions and conditions. With the same 
valuation of $27,675.00 per unit, Webber calculated the fair market value of Rossi Hills in 
March of 1982 with all the encumbrances in place and as they existed at that time to be 
$110,700.00. (R. 7848-49, 7864, 7866, 7870, 8208-09; Ex. 88D, pp. 38-39, 55, 75; Add. I to 
Ex. 88D, H 10). Unlike Plaintiffs' appraisal (See Point III. E, infra), this appraisal did not 
assume that any of McHenry Avenue, a platted but undeveloped Park City street, would be 
vacated and could be utilized as part of the development (R. 8197). 
Applying the correct law as set forth by the trial court in Conclusions of Law 13-15, 
the damages suffered by Doms as a result of the encumbrances on Rossi Hills in March of 
1982 should be $166,050.00, which represents the difference in the fair market value of the 
property without any encumbrances ($276,750.00) minus the value of the property with the 
encumbrances ($110,700.00). As will be discussed, infra, this figure of $166,050.00 represents 
the only determination of damages received by the trial court as evidence which was based 
on assumptions and conditions permitted by law. 
Examination of Exhibit 89D (Add. 24) reveals further evidence which supports 
Webber's conclusion that the fair market value of Rossi Hills in March of 1982 with all of 
the encumbrances in place was $110,700.00. The diagonal lines, drawn by Webber, and the 
blacked-out loop road show that the buildable area has been reduced by approximately sixty 
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percent. Sixty percent of the purchase price of $276,750.00 equals $166,050.00, which is 
exactly the same figure calculated by Webber to be the damages based upon the number of 
residential units which could be built on the property. Thus, Doms submits that Webber's 
appraisal of the damages at $166,050.00 is right on the money. 
D. The trial court should have excluded or disregarded the testimony and appraisal 
report of Plaintiffs' appraiser as a sanction against Plaintiffs for violating 
discovery rules. 
On or about March 10,1989, Doms served Requests for Production of Documents on 
all four Plaintiffs (R. 1310-11). Request No. 1 in each of the separate Requests for 
Production of Documents served on all four Plaintiffs was to produce all documents or 
physical evidence intended to be introduced at trial (Add. 25). 
Plaintiffs called two witnesses after Webber testified: Steve Deckert, a land use 
planner for Alliance Engineering; and Leroy J. Pia, a real estate appraiser. During 
Deckert's testimony, Plaintiffs introduced and moved to admit Exhibit 98P, a preliminary 
sketch prepared by Deckert in August of 1980 for a potential purchaser of Rossi Hills not 
involved in this lawsuit. This was the first time Doms had ever seen Exhibit 98P, and Doms 
therefore objected and moved to exclude it as a sanction for violation of discovery rules (R. 
8062). The trial court admitted Exhibit 98P over Doms' objection and allowed Deckert to 
testify in regard to it (R. 8063). 
Plaintiffs' next witness was Pia, the real estate appraiser. Before Pia testified, Doms 
objected and moved to exclude the testimony of Pia and his appraisal report (Exhibit 91P), 
on the grounds that Plaintiffs had just provided Exhibit 91P to Doms that morning of trial, 
August 22, 1990. Doms had provided Webber's appraisal report to Plaintiffs on July 20, 
1990, almost five weeks earlier, and in return had been provided a three-page document 
(Exhibit 100P) purporting to be the appraisal of Pia. However, that morning at trial, 
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Plaintiffs gave Doms a 40-50 page appraisal report (Exhibit 91P) dated April 17. 1990. 
Doms argued that this was a clear violation of discovery rules, and Pia's testimony and 
appraisal report should be excluded by the trial court as a sanction against Plaintiffs. (R. 
8139-40, 8165-66). The trial court ruled it would allow the testimony of Pia and admitted 
Exhibit 91P with the reservation that the trial court reserved the right to strike the testimony 
and the appraisal report (R. 8141, 8166). 
The trial court did not strike the testimony or appraisal report of Pia, but rather 
entered a finding of fact regarding Pia's appraisal of the value of Rossi Hills in March of 
1982 (F. of F. 29). Doms submits that the trial court erred and should have excluded or 
disregarded the testimony of Pia and his appraisal report, based upon the following 
evidence: 
1. Pia testified that Exhibit 91P was not an "appraisal report," but rather was 
really his "file memorandum and notes," which was something he would not have 
provided to Doms if requested (R. 8162-63). 
2. Pia testified that Plaintiffs requested that he not prepare a full written 
appraisal report, but he had to have adequate notes (R. 8164). 
3. Pia testified that the "normal" procedure would have been for Plaintiffs to 
ask for a full appraisal report, but Plaintiffs specifically asked him not to do the 
"normal" thing (R. 8164, 8224). 
4. Pia testified that Plaintiffs directed him to proceed in that manner in April 
of 1990 (four months before trial); didn't tell Pia why; and he didn't question the 
Plaintiffs in regard to their direction (R. 8225-26). 
5. Pia testified that he had gone over Exhibit 91P with Plaintiffs at least two to 
three weeks before the trial (R. 8165, 8227). 
6. Pia testified that Plaintiffs had directed him to prepare Exhibit 9 IP in its 
final form, with pictures of Rossi Hills in it, the day before Pia testified (R. 
8165, 8226). 
7. Pia testified he would have prepared a more extensive full appraisal report 
except for the specific directions from Plaintiffs (R. 8228). 
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E. The trial court should have disregarded the testimony and appraisal report of 
Plaintiffs' appraiser because his opinions were based on assumptions and 
conditions not permitted by law. 
Notwithstanding the trial court's refusal to sanction Plaintiffs, the trial court should still 
have disregarded the testimony and appraisal report of Pia because Pia's valuation of Rossi 
Hills in March of 1982 with the encumbrances on the property was based upon assumptions 
and conditions not permitted under Utah law and/or Park City ordinances. Doms submits 
that the following evidence clearly establishes that Pia's appraisal of the property is 
essentially worthless and should have been disregarded by the trial court: 
1. Pia based his valuations of Rossi Hills in March of 1982 on an "earlier 
rendering" of Exhibit 98P, Deckert's 14-unit rough draft sketch of a proposal for 
high-densitv development of Rossi Hills in August of 1980 (Ex. 91P, pp. 30-33; 
R. 8229-30). 
2. Deckert testified that Exhibit 98P has 14 units based on three four-plexes 
and one duplex, and that four-plexes could not be built on Rossi Hills in 1982 
under Park City zoning ordinances because it was located in an HR-1 zone (R. 
8070, 8073). 
3. Deckert testified that Exhibit 98P disregards the loop road and has a new 
twenty-four foot paved road in a different location (R. 8075-76). 
4. Deckert testified that Exhibit 98P requires one-half of McHenrv Avenue to 
be vacated by Park City, as well as one-half of another platted road (R. 8076). 
5. Deckert testified that he did not know if there was sufficient total land area 
on Rossi Hills to build fourteen units without using one-half of McHenrv 
Avenue, since twenty feet would be lost if one-half of McHenry was not vacated 
by Park City (R. 8093-95). 
6. Deckert testified that Exhibit 98P disregards the loop road as it currently 
exists, and he did not know whether the easement holders would give permission 
to do this (R. 8099). 
7. Deckert testified that Exhibit 98P was drafted for the highest density possible 
under a conditional use review (R. 8100). 
8. Deckert testified that Exhibit 98P could not have been built in March of 1982 
without a zoning change by the Park City Planning Commission, because it is a 
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Planned Unit Development which was not permitted in HR-1 zoning in 1982 (R. 
8101-02). 
9. Deckert testified that Exhibit 98P does not provide parking for any of the 
residents of Ontario Avenue whose property abuts Rossi Hills and who have 
used the loop road for parking (R. 8103). 
10. Deckert testified that the sheds and fences encroaching on Rossi Hills 
would have to be moved and rebuilt because the new access road would be 
graded three to four feet lower (R. 8106-07). 
11. Deckert testified that virtually all the encroachments, including the loop 
road, would have to be moved or altered for Exhibit 98P to be developed (R. 
8107). 
12. Pia testified that two of the main assumptions and limiting conditions he 
used (which were different than those used by Webber) were that the loop road 
could be disregarded and a new road moved to the west boundary of the 
property, and that one-half of McHenry Avenue could be used for development 
(R. 8190-91). 
13. The valuations of Rossi Hills contained in Pia's appraisal report were based 
upon the assumption that the sheds, outbuildings and fences encroaching on 
Rossi Hills are illegal and would have to be removed upon request (Ex. 91P, p. 
39). Of course, the trial court ultimately ruled these encroachments were 
prescriptive easements and thus completely legal. 
14. Pia further testified that he was aware of the following in regard to Exhibit 
98P, an earlier rendering of which he based all of his valuations of Rossi Hills: 
(a) Exhibit 98P includes a lot not part of Rossi Hills: (b) McHenrv Avenue 
would have to be vacated by Park City: (c) the loop road would have to be 
disregarded and a new road built along the western boundary of the property: 
(d) the sheds would have to be lowered or altered from their present position: 
(e) the fences would have to be lifted and replaced: (f) the retaining wall at the 
south end would have to be moved or changed: (g) the deck on the structure at 
the north end would have to be moved or changed (R. 8230-31). 
15. Pia testified that Exhibit 98P required that aU of the encumbrances on Rossi 
Hills would have to be altered or changed in some form (R. 8231). 
16. Pia admitted that Webber's appraisal was the only one submitted to the 
trial court which leaves the loop road in place and respects all the easements 
and encumbrances in their present location (R. 8232). 
17. Pia admitted that he did not have an opinion as to the value of Rossi Hills 
with all the easements and encumbrances in place, and that he did not attempt 
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to determine the value unless McHenry Avenue was vacated by Park City (R. 
8236, 8241). 
18. Pia admitted that he did not have an opinion as to the value of Rossi Hills 
if the loop road had to be left in its present configuration (R. 8238). 
19. Pia admitted that he talked to Ella Sorensen, one of the Ontario Avenue 
residents whose property abuts Rossi Hills, and she told Pia she would not 
voluntarily remove her shed and fences (R. 8244). 
20. Pia admitted that the residents to the south of Rossi Hills have been 
adamantly opposed to high-density development in that area since the early 
1980's, and they would have opposed any such attempt at development in 1982 
(R. 8247). 
F. If rescission is denied, the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and 
remanded with directions to enter judgment that Poms suffered $166,050>00 in 
damages as a result of the encumbrances on Rossi Hills, 
It is apparent that the trial court arbitrarily cut the amount of damages found by 
Webber as a result of the encumbrances on the property in half, and ruled that Poms had 
suffered $83.000.00 in damages rather than $166.050.00 (C. of L. 19; Judgment, H 4). The 
judgment of the trial court was arbitrary and constitutes an abuse of discretion because it 
is manifestly unjust and was unduly influenced by evidence which should have been 
completely disregarded by the trial court. Maybey v. Kay Peterson Const. Co.. 682 P.2d 287 
(Utah 1984). 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RULING THAT POMS' COUNTERCLAIM 
AGAINST THE ESTATE OF D.C. ANDERSON. AS IT RELATES TO THE 
REMEDY OF DAMAGES, IS TIME-BARRED BY THE PROBATE "NONCLAIM" 
PROVISIONS OF U.C.A. SS 75-3-801 AND 75-3-803. 
A. Poms' causes of action against the Estate of D.C. Anderson are not "claims" under 
the Uniform Probate Code, and therefore need not have been filed against the estate 
pursuant to Sections 75-3-801 and 75-3-803. 
Sections 75-3-801 and 75-3-803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code (U.C.A. §§ 75-3-
801 and 803 (1975)), in effect during the times in question, provided that a "claim" against 
a decedent's estate must be filed within three months after the date of the first publication 
of notice to creditors (Add. 26). Relying on § 75-3-803, commonly referred to as a probate 
"nonclaim" statute, the trial court ruled that Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim against 
Ellen Anderson, as Personal Representative of the Estate of D.C. Anderson, as the 
Counterclaim relates to the remedy of damages, is time-barred by the three-month filing 
limitation for claims against an estate (C. of L. 48; Judg. H 14). 
U.C.A. § 75-1-201(4) (Add. 26) defines "claims" against an estate as " liabilities of the 
decedent.. . and liabilities of the estate which arise at or after the death of the decedent." 
The Utah Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of the predecessors to this section and 
§ 75-3-803 in the case of In re Estate of Sharp. 537 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1975). The Court held 
that an equitable action against an estate is not a claim within the meaning of the above 
statutes, and that a "claim . . . refers to debts or demands against the decedent which might 
have been enforced in his lifetime, by personal actions for the recovery of money; and upon 
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which only a money judgment could have been rendered." 537 P.2d at 1037 (emphasis 
added).22 
In the instant case, Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim sought rescission of the 
Rossi Hills transaction, which has been clearly defined by the Utah Supreme Court as an 
equitable remedy. Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987).23 
In addition, if this Court denies rescission, Doms' alternative remedy of damages is still 
not a "claim" which had to be filed against the estate. The refusal to grant Doms rescission 
of the contract does not change the fact that the nature of his action was an action in equity. 
Moreover, a "claim" must be one "upon which only a money judgment could have been 
rendered." In re Estate of Sharp, supra, at 537 P.2d 1037 (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, §§ 75-1-201(4) and 75-3-803 require that for a debt or demand to be 
considered a "claim" under these statutes, it must "arise" from a "liability" of the decedent 
or his estate. In the instant case, no such "liability" will "arise" unless this Court declares it 
to be such by reversing the judgment of the trial court and entering a judgment against the 
Estate of D.C. Anderson. 
In Point VIII of Plaintiffs' opening brief, Plaintiffs erroneously argue that the Estate 
of D.C. Anderson must be paid the full amount due as a "one-half owner" of the trust deed 
note without any "deduction, setoff or other charge" from Doms' Second Amended 
22
 In accord Bradshaw v. McBride. 649 P.2d 74, 77 (Utah 1982); In re Estate of Malliet 
649 P.2d 18 (Utah 1982); In re Estate of Peterson, 716 P.2d 801 (Utah 1986); Forsvth v. 
Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah 1980). See also Reed v. Sixth Judicial District Court 
341 P.2d 100 (Nev. 1959); Wright v. Universal Tire. Inc.. 577 S.W.2d 194 (Tenn. App. 1978), 
cert, denied 1979; Bank of California v. Connolly. I l l Cal. Rptr. 468 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 
1974). 
23
 See also Horton v. Horton. 695 P.2d 102, 105 (Utah 1984) (action to avoid a deed is 
one in equity); Baker v. Patee, 684 P.2d 632, 636 (Utah 1984) (action demanding 
cancellation of a deed is one in equity). 
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Counterclaim. Plaintiffs mistakenly rely on the two very old decisions by the Utah Supreme 
Court: Rockhill v. Creer. 189 P. 668 (Utah 1920); and Halloran Judge Trust Co. v. Heath, 
258 P. 342 (Utah 1927). In re Estate of Sharp and Bradshaw v. McBride, supra, applying 
the relevant provisions of the Uniform Probate Code, have clearly overruled or superseded 
Rockhill and Halloran-Judge. 
B. Notwithstanding the application of § 75-3-803 to Poms' remedy of damages. Poms is 
still entitled to a set-off for the damages against the purchase price of Rossi Hills. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim against the 
Estate of D.C. Anderson is barred by the nonclaim provisions of § 75-3-803, as it relates to 
the remedy of damages, Doms is still entitled to a set-off against the purchase price of Rossi 
Hills for all damages suffered by Doms. In Jacobsen v. Bunker, 699 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1985), 
the Utah Supreme Court, relying on Rule 13(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Add. 
27) and two of its previous decisions,24 held that "if a defendant had a counterclaim that 
otherwise would have been barred by a statute of limitations, the counterclaim could be set-
off against the plaintiffs claim, notwithstanding the statute of limitations." 699 P.2d at 1210 
(emphasis added).25 
C. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and remanded with directions to 
enter judgment against the Estate of D.C. Anderson. 
The trial court erred in its ruling dismissing Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim 
against the Estate of D.C. Anderson as it relates to the remedy of damages (C. of L. 48; 
Judg. H 14). In addition, if rescission is granted, this remedy cannot be barred by the 
24
 See Salt Lake City v. Telluride Power Co.. 17 P.2d 281 (Utah 1932); Stewart Livestock 
Co. v. Ostler. 144 P.2d 276 (Utah 1943). 
25
 See also Peoples National Bank v. National Bank of Commerce. 420 P.2d 208 (Wash. 
1966); In re Estate of Massie. 353 N.W.2d 735 (Neb. 1984); Pay Less Drug Stores v. 
Bechdolt, 155 Cal. Rptr. 58 (Cal. App. 3 Dist. 1979). 
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nonclaim provisions because rescission is an equitable remedy and clearly not a "claim" 
under the Uniform Probate Code.26 The judgment of the trial court should therefore be 
reversed and remanded with the directions to enter judgment against the Estate of D.C. 
Anderson, regardless of whether that judgment is for rescission of the Rossi Hills transaction 
or for damages. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO AWARD 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND APPROPRIATE COSTS TO POMS, 
A. Doms is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs for sustaining his 
title to Rossi Hills against Plaintiffs' foreclosure and quiet title actions. 
Plaintiffs' foreclosure action in the main case (Civil No. 8339) and quiet title action in 
Count 2 of the tax sale case (Civil No. 10066) have assailed and disputed Doms' title to 
Rossi Hills, and the attorney's fees and costs incurred by Doms are in regard to sustaining 
his title to Rossi Hills against these actions by Plaintiffs. In Forrer v. Sather, 595 P.2d 1306 
(Utah 1979), citing its previous decision in Van Cott v. Jacklin, 226 P. 460, 463 (Utah 1924), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated the following: 
This court has further approved as an additional element of damages for 
breach of the covenants of warranty and quiet enjoyment, the recovery of a 
reasonable sum as attorney fees that plaintiff has paid or has become legally 
obligated to pay, together with the costs, in attempting to sustain the title to the 
premises conveyed. 
595 P.2d at 308 (footnote omitted and emphasis added). 
In the instant case, Plaintiffs themselves, rather than a third party, are the ones 
assailing and disputing Doms' title. Thus, it is a fortiori that Doms is entitled to an award 
26
 The trial court even acknowledged in open court that rescission would not be subject 
to the nonclaim provisions of the Uniform Probate Code (R. 7986-87). 
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of reasonable attorney's fees and costs based upon the rationale of Forrer and Van Cott 
supra. 
B. Poms is entitled to an award of his out-of-pocket attorney's fees as consequential 
damages flowing from Plaintiffs' breach of contract. 
In Canyon Country Store v. Bracev, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that attorney's fees may be properly awarded as consequential damages flowing 
from a breach of contract. The Court recognized this as a "legitimate theory of damages," 
which "must be based on the prevailing party's actual losses, i.e., its out-of-pocket expenses 
for legal counsel." 781 P.2d at 420. 
All of Doms' legal fees constitute actual losses to Doms and out-of-pocket expenses 
paid by him, and are consequential damages suffered by Doms flowing from Plaintiffs' 
breach of contract. Doms is entitled to an award of these out-of-pocket attorney's fees. 
C. Doms is entitled to prejudgment interest on any awards of attorney's fees. 
Utah case law holds that it is appropriate to award prejudgment interest on an award 
of attorney's fees.27 Therefore, Doms should be awarded prejudgment interest on any 
awards of attorney's fees in the instant case. 
D. Doms is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred on this 
appeal. 
Utah case law holds that when a party entitled to attorney's fees for the trial of an 
action prevails on appeal, that party is also entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs 
27
 See, e ^ , First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feed Yards Inc.. 653 P.2d 591 (Utah 
1982); Jorgensen v. John Clav & Co.. 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983); P.A.D.D. v. Gravstone 
Pines Homeowners Ass'n.. 789 P.2d 52 (Utah App. 1990); Vasels v. LoGuidice. 740 P.2d 
1375 (Utah App. 1987). 
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incurred on the appeal. Therefore, Doms should be awarded reasonable attorney's fees 
and costs in regard to prosecution of this appeal. 
E. Doms is entitled to an award of appropriate costs, including costs of depositions. 
The trial court awarded Doms a total of only $101.50 in costs, and only for the 
prosecution of his Second Amended Counterclaim (F. of F. 60; C. of L. 56; Judg. H 25). 
Doms filed a Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements with the trial court requesting 
$5,913.81 (R. 5619-23), and an affidavit regarding travel expenses requesting $2,701.22 
(Attorney's Fee Ex. 2D). Thus, the costs and expenses claimed by Doms totalled $8,615.03. 
Doms submits that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the paltry amount 
of $101.50 to Doms for his costs in the instant case. In particular, the depositions taken by 
Doms were clearly taken in good faith and were essential for the development and 
presentation of the case, and should be taxable as costs. See Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 
771, 774 (Utah 1980); Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507, 512 
(Utah App. 1988). 
F. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and remanded with directions to 
award Doms attorney's fees and costs consistent with this Court's decision. 
The trial court erred in its ruling that Doms is not entitled to attorney's fees (F. of F. 
58; C. of L. 55; Judg. H 23). On remand, the trial court should be directed to determine the 
amount of attorney's fees and appropriate costs which should be awarded to Doms. Doms' 
counsel, Larry R. Keller and Craig L. Boorman, filed affidavits regarding attorney's fees with 
the trial court. Keller's affidavit established that Doms incurred out-of-pocket and 
reasonable attorney's fees to him of $70,822.75 as of the date of the affidavit (R. 5663-5716). 
28
 See, e ^ Management Servs. v. Development Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 408-09 (Utah 
1980); Brown v. Richards. 840 P.2d 143, 156 (Utah App. 1992). 
48 
Boorman's affidavit established that Doms incurred additional out-of-pocket and reasonable 
attorney's fees for his services of $79,330.00 as of the date of the affidavit (R. 5624-62). 
Thus, the total amount of attorney's fees incurred by Doms as of the dates of these 
respective affidavits was $150,152.75. On remand, the trial court would need to determine 
additional attorney's fees and costs incurred by Doms subsequent to those already claimed 
and submitted to the trial court as set forth above. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS TO PLAINTIFFS. 
On December 31, 1991, the trial court held a hearing on attorney's fees and costs, 
which included the submission of affidavits and other documentation, the testimony of the 
parties, and oral argument by the parties regarding awards of attorney's fees and costs (R. 
6360-6540). Plaintiffs' counsel, James A. Mcintosh and Irving H. Biele, submitted affidavits 
and other documents requesting a total of $300,659.57 in attorney's fees up to the date of 
the hearing (Attorney's Fees Exs. IP, 3P, 4P, 5P, 7P; R. 6408-09). Plaintiffs also requested 
costs and disbursements in the total amount of $26,272.44 (Ex. 2 and Ex. 7 attached to 
Attorney's Fee Ex. 3P). Thus, Plaintiffs requested a total amount of $326,932.01 as 
attorney's fees and costs through December 30, 1991. These exorbitant amounts are 
representative of the "stubbornly litigious" posture taken by Plaintiffs throughout the history 
of this case. As a comparison, Doms' counsel requested less than one-half the amount 
requested by Plaintiffs' counsel (See Point V, supra). 
With the exception of amounts awarded pursuant to previous orders of the trial court 
regarding discovery sanctions and setting aside the default judgment (See subpoints E and 
F, infra), all of the attorney's fees and costs awarded to Plaintiffs by the trial court are based 
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on the erroneous legal conclusion that Doms was in default under the trust deed and trust 
deed note (See Point II, supra). The trial court entered numerous Findings of Fact 
prepared by Plaintiffs, which are not Findings of Fact at all, but are rather Conclusions of 
Law. This Court should disregard the erroneous labels attached to these findings, look to 
the substance, and review them for legal correctness. Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 433 
(Utah 1993). These include Findings of Fact 61, 63, 64(b), and 65-71. In actuality, the trial 
court made no findings of fact which support the amounts of attorney's fees awarded to 
Plaintiffs, and therefore all of such awards constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial 
court. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988); Brown v. Richards, 840 
P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992); Matter of Estate of Quinn. 830 P.2d 282 (Utah App. 1992). 
In addition to the Conclusions of Law erroneously set forth as Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law 51-53 and WI 19-21 of the Judgment are also in error, and all of these 
rulings by the trial court should be reversed pursuant to the arguments set forth below. 
A. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs incurred in Civil No, 8339, 
the main case. 
Plaintiffs have no statutory claim to attorney's fees, and the trust deed and trust deed 
note contain the only possible contractual provisions upon which Plaintiffs can make a claim 
for attorney's fees and costs in the main case. See Turtle Management. Inc. v. Haggis 
Management. Inc.. 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982); Canyon Country Store v. Bracev, 781 P.2d 
414, 419 (Utah 1989). An award based upon a contract must be "in accordance with the 
terms of the parties' agreement," and "a party is entitled only to those fees attributable to 
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the successful vindication of contractual rights within the terms of their agreement." Travner 
v. Cushing. 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984).29 
Plaintiffs have absolutely no legal basis to claim an award of attorney's fees or costs 
because they have utterly failed to vindicate any of their contractual rights within the terms 
of the trust deed and trust deed note. Doms was excused from performance and never in 
default under the trust deed and trust deed note, and Plaintiffs are the losing party on their 
complaint for foreclosure. 
Furthermore, even assuming, arguendo, that Doms was in default under the trust deed 
and trust deed note, Plaintiffs would still not be entitled to any of the attorney's fees 
requested in the affidavits of Plaintiffs' counsel. The Utah Supreme Court has directly ruled 
that even if a plaintiff successfully forecloses and is awarded attorney's fees spent in the 
foreclosure pursuant to the express provisions of the contract documents, the plaintiff cannot 
recover attorney's fees for the defense of a counterclaim. Travner v. Cushing, supra, at 688 
P.2d 858, note 6; Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981); 
Stubbs v. Hemmert. 567 P.2d 168,171 (Utah 1977). Furthermore, if a party fails to submit 
sufficient proof which allows the trial court to determine the portion of fees spent in 
prosecuting the complaint versus the portion spent in defending against the counterclaim, 
no attorney's fees should be awarded. Cox, supra, at 627 P.2d 66. 
In the instant case. Plaintiffs' counsel either admitted in their affidavits or in their 
testimony at the hearing on attorney's fees that all of their requested fees were incurred 
defending against Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim in the main case. (Attorney's Fees 
Exs. 3P, 5P; R. 5903-06, 6382-84, 6418, 6433). 
29
 See also Turtle Management, Inc., supra: Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 
1977). 
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Therefore, the trial court's awards of $12,300.00 to Mcintosh and $10,000.00 to Biele, 
as attorney's fees for their prosecution of the foreclosure complaint, constitute clear legal 
error and must be reversed (See F. of F. 70(a)(iv); 70(b)(iv)). 
B. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs incurred in Civil No. 10066, 
the tax sale case. 
Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs in the tax sale case for the 
same reasons set forth above in subpoint A in regard to the main case. The only possible 
contractual basis upon which Plaintiffs can make a claim for attorney's fees and costs in the 
tax sale case are the provisions of the trust deed and trust deed note. Since Doms was 
excused from performance and not in default under the trust deed and trust deed note, 
Plaintiffs have absolutely no basis upon which to claim attorney's fees or costs. 
Furthermore, it would clearly violate basic principles of equity to award Plaintiffs any 
attorney's fees or costs in regard to the tax sale case. At a hearing held before the trial 
court on March 20, 1990, Plaintiffs, Doms, Domcoy and Summit County (the parties to the 
tax sale case) entered into a stipulation in open court at the suggestion of the trial court that 
the tax sale would be declared void and Plaintiffs' lien declared valid as evidenced by their 
trust deed and trust deed note (R. 7060-72). 
The stipulation of the parties was set forth in an Order issued by the trial court (R. 
3968-78), which is reflected in Conclusions of Law 42 and 43 and H 16 of the Judgment. 
Doms would never have stipulated to the suggestion of the trial court that a simple solution 
was to declare the tax sale void and Plaintiffs' lien valid, if Doms had had any idea that the 
trial court would subsequently award attorney's fees to Plaintiffs as to Count 1 of the tax sale 
case. It is simply unconscionable for Plaintiffs to even request attorney's fees and costs in 
regard to the tax sale case. 
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In addition, and perhaps the most important fact is that Count 1 was against Summit 
County and not against Poms. Poms had absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with the 
manner in which the tax sale was conducted by Summit County. If any party is liable for the 
alleged attorney's fees incurred by Plaintiffs in Count 1 of the tax sale case, it is Summit 
County, not Poms. Poms cannot be held responsible for any alleged failures of Summit 
County to provide Plaintiffs with adequate notice of the tax sale of the property. 
It should also be pointed out that Plaintiffs failed completely on Counts 2 and 3 of 
their Complaint in the tax sale case. Count 2 was Plaintiffs' action to quiet title to Rossi 
Hills, and Count 3 was their action against Summit County, which was dismissed on motion 
for summary judgment by Summit County early in the tax sale case (Supp. R. 169-70). 
The trial court awarded Plaintiffs $5,245.00 for Mcintosh's attorney's fees in the 
"lawsuit to set aside tax sale" (F. of F. 70(a)(i)), and $1,050.00 for Biele's attorney's fees for 
exactly the same thing (F. of F. 70(b)(ii)). These rulings by the trial court are clearly in 
error and must be reversed. 
C. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs incurred in their Petition for 
an Interlocutory Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, 
On or about February 6, 1989, Plaintiffs filed a Petition for Permission to File an 
Interlocutory Appeal in the Utah Supreme Court, requesting permission to appeal an Order 
of the trial court denying Plaintiff Jeanne Scott's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of In Personam 
Jurisdiction (Add. 17). Plaintiffs' Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal was denied by the 
Utah Supreme Court on March 9. 1989 (Add. 18). 
The trial court awarded Plaintiffs $2,730.00 for Mcintosh's attorney's fees incurred in 
regard to the Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal (F. of F. 70(a)(ii)). This award by the 
trial court constitutes clear legal error and must be reversed. First and foremost. Plaintiffs 
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lost on their petition and cannot possibly make a legitimate claim for attorney's fees. 
Secondly, Plaintiffs are not the prevailing party in this lawsuit, and have no statutory or 
contractual basis upon which to make a claim for attorney's fees for filing this petition. 
Next, this petition was filed in defense of Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim, and as 
already pointed out in subpoint A, supra. Plaintiffs cannot recover attorney's fees or costs 
incurred in defense of Doms' Counterclaim. 
Finally, it is the prerogative of the Supreme Court to award fees on matters it decides, 
not the trial court. 
D, Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs incurred in their Petition for 
an Extraordinary Writ to the Utah Supreme Court. 
On or about June 23,1989, Plaintiffs filed a Petition for an Extraordinary Writ in the 
Utah Supreme Court, in which Plaintiffs sought an extraordinary writ to restrain the trial 
court from proceeding with the trial against Jeanne Scott and Ellen Anderson, personally, 
on exactly the same in personam jurisdiction grounds argued by Plaintiffs in their earlier 
Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal (Add. 19). On July 31. 1989, the Supreme Court filed 
an Amended Minute Entry denying Plaintiffs' Petition for an Extraordinary Writ on the 
grounds the trial court had jurisdiction over Jeanne Scott and Ellen Anderson because they 
were grantors on the warranty deed conveying Rossi Hills and because both were proper 
parties to Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim pursuant to Rules 13 and 19. U.R.C.P. 
(Add. 20). 
For exactly the same reasons as set forth immediately above in regard to Plaintiffs' 
Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal, the trial court's awards of attorney's fees to Plaintiffs 
for the Petition for an Extraordinary Writ are clearly in error and must be reversed. The 
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trial court awarded Plaintiffs $2,160.00 for Mcintosh's fees for the Petition (F. of F. 
70(a)(iii)), and $2,740.00 for Biele's fees for the same thing (F. of F. 70(b)(iii)). 
E. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs pursuant to their motions for 
sanctions in regard to Poms' objections to discovery requests. 
In February and March of 1989, Plaintiffs served Doms with Requests for Production 
of Documents and Requests for Admissions (R. 1213-15; 1222-24). In March of 1989, Doms 
served his responses to these discovery requests (R. 1341-42). Doms made full or partial 
objections to many of Plaintiffs' requests on the grounds they were not relevant to the 
subject matter of the pending action; not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence; and they constituted harassment, annoyance, oppression and would 
create an undue burden or expense. 
A typical example of the inappropriate and oppressive nature of Plaintiffs' requests 
is Request No. 12 of Plaintiffs' Request for Production of Documents, which requested 
Doms to attempt to locate thousands of irrelevant documents: 
12. All diaries, journals, or other records kept by you from the 
period of time commencing January 1, 1978, and continuing to the 
date of your deposition, and which refer to, reflect upon, discuss, or 
relate to any purchases or sales of property by you, your wife, Michael 
R. McCoy, Mr. McCoy's wife, or any partnership, joint venture or 
other business relationship between you and Mr. McCoy, or any other 
third parties for the years from January 1, 1975, through the date of 
your deposition. 
On April 21,1989, Plaintiffs filed a motion for sanctions against Doms with voluminous 
supporting memoranda (R. 1401-1539). Doms filed a memorandum in opposition to 
Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions, which included numerous exhibits (R. 1574-1674). 
On June 22, 1989, the trial court issued a Minute Entry granting Plaintiffs' motion for 
sanctions "to the extent that the discovery sought relates to real property transactions (as 
opposed to personalty),11 and granting Plaintiffs "reasonable attorney fees . . . to be 
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determined at trial" (R. 1739; Add. 28). The trial court subsequently entered an Order 
regarding this Minute Entry ruling (R. 2329-33). 
Doms was surprised by the ruling of the trial court, because the trial court did not 
allow an opportunity for a hearing before awarding attorney's fees and expenses as required 
by Rule 37(a)(4), U.R.C.P. (Add. 27). Rule 37 of the Utah Rules is patterned after and 
virtually identical to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Respected authorities 
point out that under Rule 37(a)(4) of the Federal Rules, a court must allow an opportunity 
for a hearing before awarding expenses and attorney's fees.30 
All of Doms' objections were "substantially justified11 under Rule 37(a)(4), and 
therefore Plaintiffs were not entitled to any awards of attorney's fees or expenses. If the 
dispute over discovery between the parties is genuine, about which reasonable men could 
differ, then sanctions under Rule 37(a)(4) are inappropriate.31 Furthermore, Doms was 
in fact the prevailing party, at least in part, in regard to many of Plaintiffs' discovery requests 
because Doms' objections to Plaintiffs' requests regarding personal property were sustained 
in the trial court's Minute Entry ruling. Pursuant to Rule 37(a)(4), Doms is entitled to an 
award of attorney's fees and expenses in regard to these objections, and/or the reasonable 
expenses incurred by both Plaintiffs and Doms should be apportioned because Plaintiffs' 
motion was granted in part and denied in part. 
Under Rule 37(a)(4), the trial court is required to make findings and rule on each 
discovery request and objection thereto, in order to sufficiently identify the expenses or 
30
 See 8 C. WRIGHT AND A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2288 
(1970); 4A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 37.02[10] (1988). 
31
 See Advisory Committee Note to the 1970 Amendment to Rule 37(a), F.R.C.P.; 8 C. 
WRIGHT AND A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2288 (1970); 4A 
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 37.02[10] (1988). 
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attorney's fees to which a party is entitled. Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 
P.2d 950, 965-66 (Utah App. 1989). Such findings were never made by the trial court, and 
the award of attorney's fees to Plaintiffs ultimately made by the trial court must be reversed 
and remanded. 
Doms pointed out all of the foregoing case law and authority to the trial court in a 
motion for a hearing on the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Plaintiffs (R. 1740-42, 
1948-67). Contemporaneously with this motion for a hearing, Doms filed a motion for 
clarification of the trial court's Minute Entry ruling of June 22, 1989, and a motion for 
extension of time to respond to Plaintiffs' discovery requests (R. 1746-66, 1767-71). Before 
Doms even had the opportunity to file his reply memorandum to Plaintiffs' responsive 
memoranda, the trial court issued another Minute Entry ruling on August 10,1989, in which 
all of Doms' motions were denied and additional attorney's fees were granted to Plaintiffs' 
to be determined at trial (R. 1968; Add. 29). This Minute Entry ruling was later issued as 
an Order of the trial court (R. 2362-70). Doms submits it was clearly inappropriate for the 
trial court to further sanction Doms in regard to his motion for hearing and motion for 
clarification (especially since the requested hearing is required by Rule 37(a)(4)), and 
therefore Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or expenses in regard to these 
motions. 
The trial court awarded Plaintiffs $4,750.00 pursuant to the June 22 and August 10, 
1989, Minute Entry rulings (F. of F. 70(a)(v)). This award constitutes an abuse of discretion 
by the trial court and must be reversed. 
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F. Poms is entitled to a refund of a substantial amount of the attorney's fees and costs 
paid to Plaintiffs as a condition of the trial court setting aside the default judgment 
The trial court set aside the default judgment against Doms on the conditions that 
Doms pay attorney's fees to Plaintiffs pursuant to affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs' counsel, 
and obtain new counsel (R. 126-27). Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit and a supplemental 
affidavit in support of attorney's fees and costs in the total amount of $4,467.60 (R. 29-33, 
60-63; Add. 30). 
Doms paid the $4,467.60 pursuant to the Order of the trial court to comply with the 
conditions of setting aside the default judgment (R. 76-78). The trial court subsequently 
ordered that the amount of attorney's fees to which Plaintiffs were entitled would be decided 
by the trial court at a final disposition of the case on its merits (R. 245-47; Add. 12). 
Plaintiffs are entitled only to those attorney's fees and costs directly incurred in 
obtaining the default judgment and the setting aside of the default judgment.32 An 
examination of Plaintiffs' affidavit and supplemental affidavit of attorney's fees and costs 
clearly reveals that Doms should receive a substantial refund of the $4,467.60 he paid to 
have the default judgment set aside. The trial court awarded the full $4,467.60 to Plaintiffs, 
thus allowing them to keep the money they had already been paid by Doms (F. of F. 
70(b)(i)). This ruling must be reversed and remanded with directions to award Plaintiffs 
only these attorney's fees and costs incurred in regard to the default judgment. 
32
 See, e ^ 10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2700 (1983); Annotation, 3 A.L.R. FED. 956 (1970); Nichiro Gvogvo Kaisha 
v. Norman. 606 P.2d 401, 403 (Alaska 1980); Weitz v. Yankoskv. 409 P.2d 700, 706-07 (Cal. 
1966). 
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G. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and remanded. 
The trial court awarded Plaintiffs a total of $27,185.00 in attorney's fees for the 
services of Mcintosh, $13,790.00 in attorney's fees for the services of Biele, and $358.20 in 
costs (C. of L. 51-53; Judg. KH 19-21). Plaintiffs are not entitled to any of these awards of 
attorney's fees and costs, and these rulings of the trial court should be reversed. 
POINT VII 
POMS' CAUSE OF ACTION IN HIS COUNTERCLAIMS ALLEGING 
BREACH OF THE WARRANTIES AND COVENANTS IN THE WARRANTY DEED IS 
NOT BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
A. The applicable statute of limitations is the six-year limitation contained in U.C.A. § 
78-12-23(2). 
U.C.A. § 78-12-23(2) provides for a six-year statute of limitations for "an action upon 
any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing.'1 The Utah 
Supreme Court has established in a consistent line of cases that the statute of limitations 
applicable to a cause of action for breach of the warranties and covenants in a warranty 
deed pursuant to U.C.A. § 57-1-12 is the six-year period contained in § 78-12-23(2). 
Christiansen v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co.. 590 P.2d 1251, 1252 (Utah 1979).33 
B. Poms' original Counterclaim was filed less than six years after Plaintiffs' breach of 
the warranties and covenants in the warranty deed. 
Doms' original "Answer and Counterclaim" was filed on January 29, 1988 (R. 41-44). 
This original Counterclaim contained Doms' cause of action for Plaintiffs' breach of the 
warranties and covenants in the warranty deed, and sought rescission of the Rossi Hills 
transaction. Plaintiffs' breach of the warranties and covenants in the warranty deed occurred 
33
 See also Soderberg v. Holt 46 P.2d 428 (Utah 1935); East Canyon Land & Stock Co. 
v. Davis & Weber Counties Canal Co., 238 P. 280 (Utah 1925). 
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On March 23,1982, the date the warranty deed was delivered (See Point II. B, supra). The 
period of time from March 23, 1982, to January 29, 1988, is less than six years. 
Unbeknownst to Doms, a default judgment (R. 34-40) was entered against Doms on 
January 21, 1988, eight days before Doms' Answer and Counterclaim was filed. However, 
the trial court subsequently set aside the default judgment against Doms upon payment by 
Doms of all of Plaintiffs' attorney's fees incurred in the action to that date (R. 126-27). 
49 CJ.S. Judgments § 306 states the universally accepted rule that M[w]here a judgment 
is vacated or set aside by a valid order or judgment, it is entirely destroyed and the rights 
of the parties are left as though no such judgment had ever been entered" (emphasis 
added). Thus, when the trial court set aside the default judgment against Doms, it was 
deemed under the law to have never been entered. Doms' original Counterclaim was 
therefore filed within the six-year limitation period, and his cause of action for Plaintiffs' 
breach of the warranties and covenants in the warranty deed is not time-barred. 
C. Doms' counterclaims are deemed to "relate back" to June 6,1985, the date Plaintiffs' 
Complaint was filed. 
The Utah Supreme Court set forth the "relation back" doctrine in regard to 
counterclaims in Doxev-Layton Company v. Clark. 548 P.2d 902 (Utah 1976): 
[A] counterclaim which arises out of a transaction alleged in the complaint and 
is in existence, at the time the complaint is filed, and is not then barred by a 
statute of limitations, will not be barred by a running of the statutory time 
thereafter. The statute will be suspended until the counterclaim is filed. 
548 P.2d at 906 (footnote omitted and emphasis added). 
In accord Beehive Security Thrift & Loan v. Hyde. 405 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1965); Moffitt 
v. Barr. 837 P.2d 572, 574-75 (Utah App. 1992). 
Doms' counterclaims clearly "arise out of the transaction" alleged in Plaintiffs' 
Complaint (See Point II, supra). The holding in Doxey-Lavton reflects the rule governing 
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compulsory counterclaims under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 13(a) provides 
that a counterclaim is compulsory if the counterclaim "arises out of the transaction or 
occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing parties' claim" (Add. 27). Case law 
and authorities have universally given this language a broad realistic interpretation, and held 
that any claim that is logically related to another claim that is being sued upon is properly 
the basis for a compulsory counterclaim.34 
It is clear under Utah law that Doms' counterclaims are deemed to "relate back" to 
June 6, 1985, the date Plaintiffs' Complaint to foreclose against Rossi Hills was filed. 
Therefore, since the period of time from June 6, 1985, to any of the three counterclaims 
filed by Doms in 1988 is far less than six years, Doms' counterclaims are not barred by the 
statute of limitations, as erroneously argued in Point II of Plaintiffs' opening brief. 
D. The "relation back" doctrine applies to Ellen Anderson and Jeanne Scott. 
Plaintiffs also erroneously argue that the "relation back" doctrine does not apply to 
Ellen Anderson and Jeanne Scott because they were first added as involuntary Plaintiffs to 
this action in Doms' Amended Counterclaim, which was filed June 15, 1988. The Utah 
Supreme Court has stated that generally Rule 15(c), U.R.C.P. (Add. 27), which provides that 
amendments to pleadings relate back to the date of the original pleading, will not apply to 
an amendment which adds new parties to those in the original pleading. Doxey-Layton, 
supra, at 548 P.2d 906. However, the Court goes on to explain the exception to this general 
rule: 
There is an exception to this rule. The exception operates where there is a 
relation back, as to both plaintiff and defendant, when new and old parties have 
34
 See, e ^ 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 13.13 (2d ed. 1983); 6 C. WRIGHT, A. 
MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1410 (2d ed. 1990); Todaro 
v. Gardner. 285 P.2d 839, 842 (Utah 1955). 
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an identity of interest; so it can be assumed or proved the relation back is not 
prejudicial. The rationale underpinning this exception is one which obstructs a 
mechanical use of a statute of limitations; to prevent adjudication of a claim. 
Such is particularly valid where, as here, the parties in interest were sufficiently 
alerted to the proceedings, or were involved in them unofficially, from an early 
stage. 
548 P.2d at 906 (emphasis added). 
The Court subsequently defined "identity of interest" as used in the above context to 
mean that parties are so closely related that "notice of the action against one serves to 
provide notice of the action to the other." Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 
214, 217 (Utah 1984).35 In the instant case, Ellen Anderson, as Personal Representative 
of the Estate of D.C. Anderson, and Dan Scott are the original Plaintiffs. Ellen Anderson, 
personally, and Jeanne Scott were added as parties in Doms' Amended Counterclaim, and 
these two parties clearly have an "identity of interest" with the original two Plaintiffs. All 
four of the Plaintiffs executed the warranty deed conveying Rossi Hills and therefore became 
personally liable to Doms for their breach of the warranties and covenants in the warranty 
deed. Furthermore, Ellen Anderson personally owned an interest in Rossi Hills at the time 
of the sale, and is the Personal Representative of D.C. Anderson's estate, and in that 
capacity is an original Plaintiff. Ellen Anderson was the wife of the late D.C. Anderson and 
Jeanne Scott is the wife of Dan Scott. 
Plaintiffs mistakenly rely on Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co. of New York, 761 P.2d 581 
(Utah App. 1988), and Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., supra. These two cases are 
factually inapposite to the facts of the instant case, as both involve third-party complaints 
for indemnification rather than counterclaims; there was no "identity of interest" between the 
35
 See ajso Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94, 98 (Utah 1981); Ringwood v. Foreign Auto 
Works. Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1359-60 (Utah App. 1990). 
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original parties and the added parties; and the claims involving the added parties were not 
comparable in theory or damages to those of the original parties. 
Plaintiffs also mistakenly rely on Schiavone v. Fortune. 477 U.S. 21 (1986). Schiavone 
mechanically applied a four-factor test for applying "relation back" under Rule 15(c) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This four-factor test is set forth in a lengthy second 
sentence to Rule 15(c). 477 U.S. at 24, note 5. This lengthy second sentence contained in 
the Federal Rules has not been adopted as part of Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules. Thus, the 
technical test applied under the Federal Rules is not applicable in Utah. The Utah Supreme 
Court has made it clear that it has rejected this mechanical application to prevent 
adjudication of a claim. Doxey-Layton, supra, at 548 P.2d 906. 
Finally, even if the statute of limitations were held by this Court to apply to Ellen 
Anderson and Jeanne Scott, this ruling would not affect in any way Doms' right to rescission 
and return of all money paid under the contract; or, in the alternative, his right to damages. 
The judgment would simply be against Ellen Anderson, as Personal Representative of the 
Estate of D.C. Anderson, and Dan Scott, rather than against all four of the Plaintiffs. 
E. Doms claims in his Second Amended Counterclaim are entitled to be set-off against 
Plaintiffs* claims in their Complaint notwithstanding the statute of limitations. 
As already covered in Point IV. B of this brief, supra, Doms' claims against Plaintiffs, 
whether Doms prevails on rescission or his alternative remedy of damages, are entitled to 
be set-off against Plaintiffs' claims in their Complaint regardless of whether Doms' Counter-
claim is barred by the statute of limitations. See Jacobsen v. Bunker, supra, at 699 P.2d 
1210. 
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POINT vm 
IF RESCISSION IS DENIED. THE DOCTRINE OF ELECTION OF 
REMEDIES DOES NOT PRECLUDE POMS' REMEDY OF DAMAGES. 
A. Poms' remedy of damages is clearly allowed by the applicable Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Under Utah law, a party has not been required to "elect remedies" as erroneously 
claimed by Plaintiffs since at least the adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on 
January 1, 1950 (See Add. 27). Rule 8(a)(2) provides that a party may demand judgment 
for the relief to which he is entitled, and that "[r]elief in the alternative or of several 
different types may be demanded." Rule 8(e)(2) further provides that "[a] party may also 
state as many separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether 
based on legal or on equitable grounds or on both." 
Furthermore, Rule 18(a) provides that a party "may join either as independent or as 
alternate claims as many claims either legal or equitable or both as he may have against an 
opposing party." Finally, Rule 54(c)(1) provides that "every final judgment shall grant the 
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not 
demanded such relief in his pleadings." 
B, Poms' remedy of damages is clearly allowed by Utah case law interpreting the 
applicable Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The argument now advanced by Plaintiffs in Point III of their opening brief was 
rejected by the Utah Supreme Court 31 years ago in Smoot v. Lund, 369 P.2d 933 (Utah 
1962). In Smoot the Court held that a party is not required to elect which remedy he 
wishes to proceed on during the trial of the case. The Court cited Rules 18(a) and 8(e)(2), 
U.R.C.P., and held that ft[t]hey show a clear purpose to eliminate rigidity of rules and 
technical objections as to the form or nomenclature for claims for relief." 369 P.2d at 935. 
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That same year, the Court also held as follows in Rosander v. Larsen, 376 P.2d 146 (Utah 
1962): 
Rule 8(e) of our Rules of Civil Procedure permits either party to plead in the 
alternative, either in one count or defense, or in separate counts or defenses. 
To require a party to make an election between the alternative counts or 
defenses, particularly at the pretrial stage of the proceedings, would be to 
emasculate the rule and render it meaningless. 
376 P.2d at 146 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added).36 
As pointed out by the Utah Supreme Court in Roval Resources, supra, (cited by 
Plaintiffs on page 22 of their opening brief), the doctrine of election of remedies does not 
prevent recourse to any particular remedy, but operates only "to prevent double redress for 
a single wrong." 603 P.2d at 796. 
POINT IX 
PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING TO ATTACK THE VALIDITY OF THE 
WARRANTY DEED CONVEYING ROSSI HILLS FROM DOMCOY TO POMS, 
WHICH IS A VALID DEED VESTING TITLE TO THE PROPERTY IN POMS, 
A. Plaintiffs lack standing and cannot collaterally attack the warranty deed from 
Domcoy to Poms, 
Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. (the closely held corporation formed by Doms and McCoy 
in 1981 primarily to develop real property), conveyed Rossi Hills to Doms by warranty deed 
dated August 26, 1988 (Ex. 17P; Add. 16). In Point IV of their opening brief, Plaintiffs 
attack this conveyance based upon an erroneous interpretation of certain provisions of the 
former Utah Business Corporation Act. However, Plaintiffs cannot be heard to attack the 
validity of this conveyance because they are strangers to the deed and lack standing. 
In accord Royal Resources. Inc. v. Gibralter Financial Corp., 603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah 
1979); Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah. 671 P.2d 772, 778 (Utah 1983); Robert 
Langston. Ltd. v. McOuarrie. 741 P.2d 554, 556 (Utah App. 1987), cert denied. 765 P.2d 
1277 (Utah 1987). 
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Under Utah law, even a grantor cannot attack or impeach his own deed unless there 
is fraud, duress, mistake, or the like attributable to the grantee. Barlow Society v. 
Commercial Security Bank. 723 P.2d 398, 401 (Utah 1986); Desert Centers. Inc. v. Glen 
Canvon. Inc.. 356 P.2d 286, 287 (Utah 1960). A deed which is voidable for some defect 
cannot be collaterally attacked by a stranger to the deed. This is the general rule of law 
accepted throughout the country.37 
Furthermore, other jurisdictions have construed their statutes regarding disposition of 
corporate assets (similar to former U.C.A. § 16-10-74, relied upon by Plaintiffs), and held 
that only stockholders and creditors of a corporation have standing to object to a transfer 
of corporate assets.38 
B. Domcov had clear power and authority to convey Rossi Hills to Poms under Utah 
statutory and case law. 
Notwithstanding Plaintiffs' lack of standing to attack the warranty deed conveying 
Rossi Hills from Domcoy to Doms, provisions of the former Utah Business Corporation Act, 
See, £&, 26 CJ.S. Deeds § 69; 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 188; Saltzman v. Ahern. 306 
So.2d 537, 539 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 1975); Eugene Pioneer Cemetery Ass'n v. Spencer Butte 
Lodge No. 9. 363 P.2d 1083,1100 (Ore. 1961); Sailer v. Mercer County. 26 N.W.2d 137, 139 
(N.D. 1947); Tillaux v. Tillaux. 47 P. 691, 692 (Cal. 1897); La Mar v. La Mar. 28 P.2d 63, 
65 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1933); Faus v. Pacific Electrical Railway Co.. 303 P.2d 814 (Cal. App. 
2 Dist. 1956); Huntoon v. Southern Trust & Commerce Bank. 290 P. 86 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 
1930); Book v. Book. 208 P. 474, 476 (Colo. 1922); Meiners v. Texas Osage Cooperative 
Royalty Pool. 309 S.W.2d 898 (Tex.Civ.App. 1958); Chronos Land Co. v. Crichton. 91 So. 
408 (La. 1922); Gulf Land & Development Co. v. McRaney. 197 So.2d 212 (Miss. 1967). 
38
 See, e ^ , Gunther v. Thompson. 296 P. 611, 612 (Cal. 1931); Solorza v. Park Water 
Co.. 195 P.2d 523, 527 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1948); Johnson v. Elliot. 218 P.2d 703, 707-08 
(Mont. 1950); Greene v. Reconstruction Finance Corp.. 100 F.2d 34, 36-37 (1st Cir. 1938) 
(interpreting Delaware law); St. Louis Railroad v. Terre Haute Railroad. 145 U.S. 393, 403 
(1892) (interpreting Illinois law). See also Hatch v. Lucky Bill Min. Co.. 71 P. 865, 866 
(Utah 1903) (stockholder may ratify or repudiate voidable act of a corporation); Houston 
v. Utah Lake Land. Water & Power Co.. 187 P. 174, 177 (Utah 1919) (directors of a 
dissolved corporation are trustees for the stockholders and creditors). 
66 
regarding the authority of a dissolved corporation to protect its rights and wind up its affairs, 
in effect at that time, clearly provided Domcoy with the power and authority to make this 
conveyance to Doms. See U.C.A. §§ 16-10-100 and 16-10-101 (1984) (Add. 31).39 
Doms and McCoy, as tenants in common, conveyed Rossi Hills to Domcoy by warranty 
deed dated August 20, 1983 (Ex. 16P; Add. 8). The two corporate officers of Domcoy at 
that time were McCoy as president and Doms as secretary/treasurer; and the directors were 
Doms and his wife, and McCoy and his wife (Exs. 3IP, 32P). In March of 1985. McCoy and 
his wife irrevocably tendered all their voting rights in their shares of Domcoy stock to Doms 
and resigned from the corporation (R. 7187, 7189, 7517-18; Ex. 78D; Add. 9). Prior to this, 
Doms' wife, who was never involved in the business of Domcoy, had also resigned from 
Domcoy (R. 7189). Doms became the only officer and director of Domcoy and still is the 
only officer and director to this date (R. 7189-91, 7519-20). Domcoy became the "alter ego" 
of Doms, and was merely the "bare legal title holder" of Rossi Hills for Doms, who was the 
equitable owner. See Belnap v. Blain. 575 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah 1978); Barlow Society v. 
Commercial Security Bank. 723 P.2d 398, 401 (Utah 1986). 
On December 31, 1986, Doms allowed Domcoy to be involuntarily dissolved by the 
Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial Code for failure to file annual reports 
because Doms was the only remaining officer and director of Domcoy, and Domcoy 
therefore no longer had the minimum number of officers and directors required by Utah law 
and the Certificate of Incorporation of Domcoy (Ex. 7P; R. 3115). 
See also Falconaero Enterprise, Inc. v. Valley Investment Co., 395 P.2d 915, 916 (Utah 
1964) (dissolution of a corporation does not preclude it from maintaining a quiet title action 
under §§ 16-10-100 and 16-10-101); Johnson v. National Public Service Insurance Co., 536 
P.2d 138, 141 (Utah 1975) (Crockett, J., concurring) (officers of a defunct corporation can 
wind up its affairs by making necessary transfers of corporate property). 
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By August of 1988, when Domcov deeded Rossi Hills to Poms, Domcov was no longer 
conducting any business except "winding up" its affairs as a dissolved corporation (R. 3117, 
3187). Domcoy's conveyance of Rossi Hills to Doms was done solely to protect the 
remedies, rights and claims of Domcoy and Doms with respect to Rossi Hills, and also to 
,!wind up" the affairs of Domcoy (R. 3117, 3187). 
In Point IV of their opening brief, Plaintiffs mistakenly rely on former U.C.A. § 16-10-
74 (1961) (Add. 31). The "corporate authority" called for in § 16-10-74 for the disposition 
of corporation assets was satisfied in the conveyance of Rossi Hills from Domcoy to Doms. 
Domcoy had no board of directors which could adopt a resolution regarding the transfer of 
Rossi Hills, and Doms was the only shareholder entitled to vote because McCoy and his wife 
had irrevocably tendered their voting rights in their shares of Domcov stock to Doms in 
March of 1985. Therefore, any attempt to comply with the technical statutory requirements 
of § 16-10-74 would have been an exercise in futility, and is not required under Utah law.40 
Furthermore, Doms had the requisite corporate authority to execute the warranty deed 
conveying Rossi Hills from Domcoy to Doms pursuant to the By-Laws of Domcoy and the 
First Meeting of the Board of Directors of Domcoy (Exs. 32P, 38P; R. 7185, 7202). 
Plaintiffs mistakenly rely on Houston v. Utah Lake Land, Water & Power Co., 187 P. 
174 (Utah 1919), and Farr v. Brinkerhoff, 829 P.2d 117 (Utah App. 1992). These cases are 
clearly factually inapposite to the instant case. In Houston, the president of the company 
acted unilaterally "not to wind up the affairs of the company, but to enlarge and extend its 
40
 See, e ^ Lockhart v. Equitable Realty Co.. 657 P.2d 1333, 1335-36 (Utah 1983) 
(mortgagee does not have to go through "idle and fruitless11 procedure of foreclosure when 
the security has been lost). 
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field of operation." 187 P. at 176. The company had a functioning board of directors, but 
the president continued to do business as a going concern. 
In Fair, the company also had a board of directors and shareholders entitled to vote 
regarding approval of the transaction in question. Furthermore, Fair did not involve a 
dissolved corporation that was winding up its affairs. 
C. The warranty deed from Domcov to Poms is a valid conveyance vesting title to Rossi 
Hills in Poms. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that the warranty deed transferring Rossi Hills 
from Domcoy to Doms is a valid deed which transferred title to the property to Doms, and 
the trial court correctly entered a Conclusion of Law to this effect (C. of L. 44). Moreover, 
by Utah statute and case law, the warranty deed from Domcoy to Doms is presumed to be 
valid, and this presumption can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the 
contrary. U.C.A. § 57-4a-4 (Add. 32); Barlow Society v. Commercial Security Bank, 723 P.2d 
398, 399 (Utah 1986); Baker v. Pattee. 684 P.2d 632, 635 (Utah 1984). 
D. McCoy had no ownership interest in Rossi Hills when the sheriffs sale pursuant to 
the default judgment against McCoy was conducted, and Plaintiffs acquired no 
ownership interest in the property from the sheriffs sale. 
Plaintiffs also make the erroneous argument in Point IV of their opening brief that 
Doms could only assert a one-half interest in Rossi Hills because Plaintiffs had reacquired 
McCoy's one-half interest in the property at the sheriffs sale conducted pursuant to the 
default judgment entered against McCoy. 
Plaintiffs' argument obviously fails for the simple reason that McCoy had no ownership 
interest whatsoever in Rossi Hills at the time the sheriffs sale was conducted. The sheriffs 
sale only sold whatever right, title and interest McCoy had in Rossi Hills, if any, and this fact 
is clearly reflected in the "Corrected Sheriff's Deed" acquired by Plaintiffs after the sheriffs 
69 
sale (Add. 33). The sheriffs sale of McCoy's non-existent interest in Rossi Hills was held 
on December 12, 1988, and the original sheriffs deed and corrected sheriffs deed bear the 
date of June 26, 1989. McCoy clearly had no ownership interest whatsoever in Rossi Hills 
in December of 1988 or at any time thereafter, and therefore Plaintiffs' argument that Doms 
could only assert a one-half interest in Rossi Hills is clearly erroneous. 
POINT X 
DOMS IS PROSECUTING HIS COUNTERCLAIM AS THE REAL 
PARTY IN INTEREST, AND ROSSI HILLS WAS NOT PURCHASED 
AS PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY BY DOMS AND MCCOY AS A PARTNERSHIP, 
A. Doms is prosecuting his Second Amended Counterclaim as the real party in interest 
Plaintiffs filed their foreclosure complaint in June of 1985 against Doms and McCoy 
in their capacity as individuals and sought judgment against each of them personally. 
Plaintiffs have obtained a default judgment against McCoy and reduced it to a deficiency 
judgment for the full amount of their claim. Plaintiffs continue to seek a judgment against 
Doms individually for the full amount of their claim. 
Doms has counterclaimed in his individual capacity against Plaintiffs to rescind the 
Rossi Hills transaction or, in the alternative, to recover damages. McCoy has been 
"defaulted out" of this lawsuit, and Doms is the only party left in this lawsuit who can assert 
a counterclaim against Plaintiffs. Furthermore, Doms is the sole owner and fee simple title 
holder of Rossi Hills pursuant to the warranty deed conveying the property from Domcoy 
to Doms on August 26, 1988 (See Point DC, supra). Therefore, Doms is clearly the real 
party in interest under Rule 17(a), U.R.C.P. (Add. 27), to prosecute his Second Amended 
Counterclaim against Plaintiffs. In fact, Doms is the only party in interest. 
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B. Doms and McCoy did not purchase Rossi Hills as a partnership under the facts and 
the law, and Rossi Hills was never partnership property. 
Plaintiffs erroneously argue in Point V of their opening brief that Doms and McCoy 
were a partnership and acquired Rossi Hills as partnership property. Plaintiffs' argument 
is based solely on a reference by Doms to McCoy as his "partner" while Doms was testifying 
at trial (R. 7628). This reference by Doms was simply a layman's term for his business 
relationship with McCoy. Doms clarified this reference by testifying there was never a 
formal partnership agreement creating a partnership between Doms and McCoy, and he and 
McCoy were never formal partners (R. 7204, 7628). 
The facts of the instant case clearly establish that Doms and McCoy did not purchase 
Rossi Hills as a partnership. None of the documents of transfer of Rossi Hills (the warranty 
deed, trust deed and trust deed note) or preliminary transfer documents (earnest money 
agreement, buyer's statement, seller's statement, title insurance and commitment for title 
insurance) contain any reference to Doms and McCoy as a partnership or mention a 
partnership name of any kind. Doms and McCoy purchased Rossi Hills as individual tenants 
in common, not as a partnership (Exs. IP, 2P). 
Furthermore. Plaintiffs did not sue Doms and McCoy as a partnership, and did not 
obtain or ever attempt to obtain a judgment against Doms and McCoy as a partnership. 
The fact that Doms and McCoy acquired Rossi Hills in March of 1982 as tenants in 
common does not establish a partnership between Doms and McCoy under Utah law (See 
U.C.A. § 48-1-4(2); Add. 34). In fact, Rossi Hills was not acquired with partnership funds, 
but rather with the individual funds of Doms and McCoy (See Exs. 21P, 22P). Moreover, 
Rossi Hills was not acquired in a partnership name. Rossi Hills was simply never 
partnership property of Doms and McCoy (See U.C.A. § 48-1-5; Add. 34). 
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Plaintiffs mistakenly rely on Kemp v. Murray. 680 P.2d 758 (Utah 1984). Kemp has 
no application to the instant case because Doms and McCoy were not a partnership when 
they acquired Rossi Hills, and Doms is not counterclaiming against Plaintiffs as a partner 
of McCoy. 
Even assuming, arguendo, there was ever a partnership between Doms and McCoy, 
any such alleged partnership was clearly terminated in May of 1982, and the trial court so 
stated in open court (R. 7629-30). 
POINT XI 
DOMS IS PROSECUTING HIS COUNTERCLAIM AS AN 
"IMMEDIATE GRANTEE" UNDER THE WARRANTY DEED 
FROM PLAINTIFFS. NOT AS A "REMOTE GRANTEE." 
In Point VI of their opening brief, Plaintiffs erroneously argue that Doms is 
counterclaiming against Plaintiffs as a "remote grantee," and therefore cannot maintain his 
Second Amended Counterclaim against Plaintiffs because the covenant against encumbranc-
es does not "run with the land." This argument is clearly without merit for the simple reason 
that Doms is counterclaiming against Plaintiffs as an "original" or "immediate grantee," not 
as a "remote grantee." 
Doms' cause of action for breach of the covenants in the warranty deed arises from 
the original warranty deed executed by Plaintiffs dated March 10, 1982, not from the 
subsequent deeds conveying the property to Domcoy and then from Domcoy back to Doms. 
Doms is being sued by Plaintiffs as an immediate grantee, and in turn Doms is counterclaim-
ing against Plaintiffs as an immediate grantee. 
Moreover, Doms has always remained the true owner of Rossi Hills. Domcoy merely 
held the bare legal title for the benefit of Doms, who has always been the equitable title 
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holder. Belnap v. Blain. 575 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah 1978); Barlow Society v. Commercial 
Security Bank. 723 P.2d 398, 401 (Utah 1986). 
Plaintiffs make the nonsensical argument that Doms should have sued Domcoy, which 
in turn should have sued Doms, who then could sue Plaintiffs. In other words. Plaintiffs 
argue that Doms should have been required to sue himself twice before he could maintain 
an action against Plaintiffs. A grantee cannot take through himself and become a remote 
grantee. A remote grantee refers to a third-person who takes through the original or 
immediate grantee. 
In addition, even assuming, arguendo, that Doms could somehow be considered a 
remote grantee, this would not provide grounds for dismissal of Doms' Second Amended 
Counterclaim. As already established in Point I of this brief, supra. Plaintiffs also breached 
the covenant of general warranty of title when they delivered the warranty deed to Rossi 
Hills in March of 1982. Utah case law clearly holds that the covenant of general warranty 
of title runs with the land, and thus a remote grantee can bring an action on this covenant. 
East Canvon Land & Stock Co. v. Davis & Weber Counties Canal Co.. 238 P. 280, 281 
(Utah 1925); Van Cott v. Jacklin. 226 P. 460 (Utah 1924). 
Finally, Doms' cause of action for misrepresentation in his Second Amended 
Counterclaim, and his requested remedy of rescission of the Rossi Hills transaction or, in the 
alternative, for damages, is not dependent upon the covenants in the warranty deed and 
therefore is not affected by Doms' status as either an immediate or a remote grantee under 
the warranty deed. 
73 
POINT XII 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS ALREADY RULED THAT JEANNE SCOTT AND 
ELLEN ANDERSON ARE PROPERLY JOINED AS INVOLUNTARY PLAINTIFFS 
BECAUSE THEY ARE NECESSARY PARTIES UNDER RULE 19(a), U.R.C.P. 
After hearing and considering the arguments of Plaintiffs and Doms regarding the 
issue of whether or not Jeanne Scott and Ellen Anderson should be joined as involuntary 
Plaintiffs, the trial court issued an Order on July 5, 1988 (R. 248-50), joining them because 
they are necessary parties under Rule 19, U.R.C.P. (Add. 27). 
Plaintiffs subsequently filed a Petition for an Extraordinary Writ in the Utah Supreme 
Court on or about June 23, 1989, in which they requested that the Court issue an 
extraordinary writ restraining and prohibiting the trial court and the judges thereof from 
proceeding any further in the trial, and to compel the trial court to dismiss Ellen Anderson 
and Jeanne Scott from the lawsuit (Add. 19). The Utah Supreme Court, in an Amended 
Minute Entry dated July 31, 1989 (Add. 20), issued the following ruling: 
The petition for an extraordinary writ is denied because the district court has 
jurisdiction over both petitioners inasmuch as they were grantors on the deed, 
and both are proper parties to the counterclaim for rescission under U.R.C.P. 
# 13 and 19 . . . (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has already ruled on the issue now raised in Points VI. A 
and IX of Plaintiffs' opening brief. Therefore, Doms respectfully submits that it would be 
inappropriate for this Court to substitute a different judgment for that of the Utah Supreme 
Court in regard to this issue, as the matter is now stare decisis. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments set forth in this brief, Doms requests that this Court 
reverse the judgment of the trial court and rescind the Rossi Hills transaction. The 
judgment of rescission should revest title in the Plaintiffs, who held title to Rossi Hills prior 
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to the sale, and order the return of all money received by Plaintiffs pursuant to the Rossi 
Hills transaction, plus prejudgment interest on all such amounts. 
If rescission is denied, the trial court should be directed to enter a judgment that 
Doms must pay the purchase price of the property, with a set-off to Doms for all amounts 
received by Plaintiffs toward the purchase price and for any damages suffered by Doms as 
a result of Plaintiffs' breach of the warranties and covenants in the warranty deed. Doms 
is further entitled to prejudgment interest on all amounts received by Plaintiffs from the date 
each amount was received, and prejudgment interest on the damages for the encumbrances 
from the date the warranty deed was delivered. 
On remand, the trial court should be directed to determine the amount of attorney's 
fees and appropriate costs which should be awarded to Doms as the prevailing party in this 
lawsuit. The judgment of the trial court awarding attorney's fees and costs to Plaintiffs 
should be reversed in its entirety; and on remand the trial court should be directed to 
determine the amount of attorney's fees overpaid to Plaintiffs in regard to the default 
judgment, which should be refunded to Doms. 
DATED this £7~ day of / ^ ^ f e e ^ ^ , 1993. 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
and Cross-Appellant Eugene E. Doms 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal : 
representative of the Estate of : 
D. C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON : 
personally, DAN SCOTT and : 
JEANNE SCOTT, : 
Plaintiffs : 
vs. ; 
MICHAEL R. McCOY and EUGENE : 
E. DOMS, : 
Defendants : 
ELLEN ANDERSON as personal : 
representative of the Estate of : 
D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON : 
personally, DAN SCOTT and : 
JEANNE SCOTT, s 
Third-party Plaintiffs : 
vs. : 
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, : 
Third-party Defendant 
SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
NO 
Fit'ED"" 
I <•'-:. 2 : 1592 
C.er*> ^ 7 „dT"~r C^unry 
D«CJ-/Csrit **r 
Civil No. 8339 
: (Judge John A. Rokich) 
CONSOLIDATED HEADING CONTINUED ON NEXT 3PAGE 
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ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal : 
representative of the Estate of : 
D. C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and : 
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee, : 
Plaintiffs : 
vs. : 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate : 
and politic of the State of : 
Utah; BLAKE L. FRAZIER, in his : 
official capacity as Summit : 
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS : 
REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah : 
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS; : 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC., a j 
Utah corporation; EUGENE E. : 
DOMS; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS s 
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1, j 
2, 3, 4, and 5, : 
Defendants : 
: Civil No. 10066 
: (Judge John A. Rokich) 
Trial in the above-entitled matter came before the Court April 
17, 18, and 19, 1990, and August 21, 22, 23, and 24, 1990. An 
evidentiary hearing dealing with the issues of attorney fees and 
costs was held on December 31, 1991. At all times, Plaintiffs were 
represented by James A. Mcintosh, Esq., and Irving H. Biele, Esq.. 
Defendant Eugene E. Doms was represented by Larry R. Keller, Esq., 
and Craig L. Boorman, Esq.. Third-Party Defendant, Summit County 
Title Company, was represented by Brant H. Wall, Esq.. After 
hearing the oral testimony of witnesses, reviewing such documentary 
evidence as was admitted, memoranda filed by counsel herein, 
considering the oral argument of counsel, and good cause appearing, 
the Court having heretofore on September 9, 1991, signed certain 
"Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" and "Judgment;" the 
parties having filed certain motions to amend the said Findings, 
Conclusions, and Judgment; the Court thereafter on May 6, 1992, 
having signed certain documents entitled "Amended Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law," "Amended Judgment," and heaving further 
signed those certain documents entitled "Supplement to Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law," and "Supplement to Judgment;" which 
supplemental documents pertain primarily to the issue of attorney 
fees and Court costs; the Court desiring to consolidate the said 
amended and supplemental pleadings; hereby enters its "Second 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" as follows: 
SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs in this case, as grantors, conveyed to 
Defendant Eugene E. Doms and one Michael R. McCoy, pursuant to a 
form Warranty deed upon which the word "Special" was typed, Lots 
in Block 58 and 59, Park City Survey, State of Utah, and more 
particularly described in Plaintiffs1 Exhibit IP as follows: 
PARCEL NO. 1: All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 
25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32, Block 58, 
Park City Survey, according to the amended plat 
thereof, as filed and of record in the office 
of the Summit County Recorder. 
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City 
Survey, according to the amended plat thereof, 
as filed and of record in the office of the 
Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom 
any portion located within the railroad rights 
of way as described in those certain documents 
recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page 
401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, 
and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, 
records of Summit County, Utah. 
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, 
according to the Amended Plat thereof, as filed 
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and of record in the office of the Summit 
County Recorder, excepting therefrom any 
portion located within the railroad rights of 
way as described in those certain documents 
recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page 
401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, 
and Entry No. 13 610 in Book H at Page 373, 
records of Summit County, Utah. 
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and 
water lines over the Southerly five feet and Northerly five 
feet of the following described Lots. 
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City 
Survey according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of 
record in the office of the Summit County Records. 
The property so described shall be referred to hereafter as 
the "Rossie Hills Property." 
2. The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase dated 
November 12, 1981 (see Defendant's Exhibit 63D) , is a valid 
contract for the sale of the Rossie Hills Property, and 
specifically states that the conveyance of said property is to be 
by "Warranty Deed." 
3. All subsequent documents of sale involving the parties 
in this action leading up to the transfer of the Rossie Hills 
Property by the aforementioned Warranty Deed referred to the 
documents of transfer as a "Warranty Deed." 
4. The aforementioned Warranty Deed, executed by all four 
of the Plaintiffs in this matter as grantors did not have the word 
"Special" typed at the top of the document at the time the grantors 
executed said Deed nor was it on the Deed when said Deed was 
delivered to Defendant Doms on March 23, 1982. 
5. Said Warranty Deed did not contain any of the language 
which could lead the Court to the conclusion that it may have been 
a "Special Warranty Deed," even if such were officially recognized 
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under Utah law, 
6. Said Warranty deed contained no exceptions or limiting 
language with regard to certain encumbrances and easements which 
shall be hereafter discussed in these Findings. 
7. Access to the Rossie Hills Property at the *time Doms and 
McCoy purchased the property was via a graded right-of-way 
extending in a northeasterly direction from the old rail right-of-
way south of Block 59 as shown in Defendant's Exhibit 77D. 
8. After accessing the Rossie Hills property, the roadway 
continued to Lot 21 of Block 58, made a loop through what was 
designated as McHenry Avenue and Lots 24 and 25. This roadway will 
hereafter be designated as the loop road. (See Defendant's Exhibit 
77D.) 
9. The loop road which is approximately 10-15 feet wide has 
been in use for in excess of 40 years. 
10. Said loop road has been used openly, notoriously, 
continuously, and adversely by the residents who reside on Ontario 
Avenue and whose rear property borders, or intrudes upon the Rossie 
Hills property, for a period in excess of 40 years as of the date 
of March 23, 1982, the date of delivery of the Warranty Deed by 
grantors to Defendant doms. Such use was for ingress and egress 
to the rear of their property, and for parking. 
11. Along the westerly boundaries of the lots in Block 58 are 
encroachments such as sheds, fences and decks owned and used by 
adjoining property owners to the west. (See Defendant's Exhibit 
77D.) 
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12. The encroachments protrude from 12-16 feet onto the 
Rossie Hills Property. 
13. These encroachments, including the backyard areas 
bordered by said fences, had been used openly, notoriously, 
continuously and adversely for a period in excess of twenty years 
as of March 23, 1982, by the aforementioned property owners, and 
such use continues through present time. 
14. At the time of the delivery of the Deed to the Rossie 
Hills Property, Plaintiffs had knowledge of the aforementioned 
encroachments, either directly or through the knowledge of their 
agent, Mike Sloan. 
15. Plaintiffs made no effort to remove or extinguish the 
aforesaid encumbrances prior to the delivery of the Deed to 
Defendant Doms, or at any time thereafter. 
16. Plaintiffs made no effort to quiet title to the Rossie 
Hills Property and cause McHenry Avenue to be vacated; therefore, 
Plaintiffs made no effort to mitigate Defendant's damages as such 
damages related to these aforementioned encumbrances. 
17. The purchase price for the rossie Hills Property was the 
amount of Two Hundred Seventy-Six Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($276,750.00). (See Defendant's Exhibit 69D.) 
18. The Plaintiffs received the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars 
($10,000.00) as earnest money in the aforementioned transaction, 
and a down payment of Seventy-Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($72,500.00), leaving a balance due on the purchase price of One 
Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars 
($194,250.00). 
-6-
19. In consideration for the transfer of the Rossie Hills 
property by Warranty Deed, Defendant Doms and one Michael R. McCoy 
executed a Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed dated March 10, 1982. 
(See Plaintiffs1 Exhibits 2P and 3P.) Said Trust Deed Note was in 
the amount of One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two 'Hundred Fifty 
Dollars (!$194,250.00) and called for interest payments monthly up 
to and including January 10,1 985. The Note also provided that the 
entire unpaid principal, together with interest, was due on January 
25, 1985. 
20. The amount of each monthly payment was to be Two Thousand 
Two Hundred Sixty-Six and 25/100 Dollars ($2,266.25). 
21. Said Trust Deed Note provided that "each payment shall 
be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the 
reduction of principal." 
22. Plaintiffs received the sum of Seventy-Two Thousand Five 
Hundred Twenty and 25/100 Dollars ($72,520.25) as monthly payments 
pursuant to the aforementioned Trust Deed Note. (See Plaintiffs1 
Exhibit 6P.) 
23. The property conveyed to Eugene E. Doms and Michael R. 
McCoy was located in a platted subdivision. 
24. The Rossie Hills Property as platted showed that the lots 
in Block 58 and 59 were accessible by McHenry Avenue. (See 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 99P.) 
25. The recorded plat of the Rossie Hills Property was not 
a true reflection of the actual physical layout of the land because 
of the contour and fact that McHenry Avenue was never constructed 
as a roadway. 
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26. The Rossie Hills Property was purchased for residential 
development. 
27. At the time the Rossie Hills property was purchased, it 
was zoned HR-1, which allowed historical uses and allowed single, 
duplex and tri-plex dwellings to be constructed uponfcthe property. 
28. The utilization of all of the Rossie Hills Property is 
affected by the contour of the land, the loop road, encroachments 
and McHenry Avenue being undeveloped. 
29. Plaintiffs1 appraiser, Mr. Pia, concluded that as of 
March 10, 1982, the value of the Rossie Hills Property subject to 
the loop road and encroachments was around Two Hundred Fifty 
Thousand Dollars ($250,000.00). 
30. Defendant Doms1 appraiser, Mr. Webber, concluded that as 
of March 10, 1982, the value of the Rossie Hills property was One 
Hundred Sixty-Six Thousand Dollars ($166,000.00) if the 
encumbrances and loop road can be relocated and One Hundred Ten 
Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars ($110,700.00) if the loop road and 
encumbrances cannot be relocated. 
31. McHenry Avenue had not been vacated by Park City or by 
a judicial determination. 
32. Plaintiffs did not or could not have conveyed good and 
marketable title to any part of McHenry Avenue at the time of the 
execution of the warranty Deed to Doms and McCoy. 
33. Defendant Doms met with Mike Sloan, a real estate agent, 
in the fall of 1981 to discuss the sale and purchase of the Rossie 
Hills Property. 
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34. Defendant Doms also met with Dewey Anderson, one of the 
sellers of the Rossie Hills Property, once before Doms and McCoy 
purchased the property. 
35. Both Sloan and Anderson represented that the property was 
a prime piece of development property and its highest and best use 
would be as an integrated development with the two adjoining 
parcels referred to as Block 62 and the Slipper parcel. 
36. Defendant Doms and McCoy purchased an interest in the 
Slipper parcel in October of 1982. 
37. The Slipper parcel was purchased by Doms and McCoy to 
further the integrated development of the three parcels and to 
equalize their position with the developers of the Slipper parcel 
and Block 62. 
38. In October of 1982, Doms engaged Mr. Gerald H. Kinghorn, 
an attorney, for the specific purpose of closing the purchase of 
the Slipper parcel and continuing the negotiations with the owners 
of Block 62 for the purpose of developing the three parcels as an 
integrated development. 
39. Prior to Doms1 purchase of the rossie Hills Property, 
Doms was shown a preliminary site plan for the development of the 
three parcels of property prepared by the architect, Mr. Richard 
Kohler. 
40. Doms knew or should have known at the time he purchased 
the Rossie Hills Property and the Slipper parcel that the 
integrated development of the three parcels had failed because of 
the problems with the Rossie Hills property and the inability of 
the parties to reach an agreement as to credits for each parcel. 
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41. Doms walked the Rossie Hills property with Mr. Sloan in 
the fall of 1981 and knew that there were roads and sheds on the 
property. 
42. Mr. Sloan informed Defendant doms that the encroachments 
would not affect development and an access road to* the property 
would be in the same place as the loop road. 
43. Doms had actual notice of the easement encroachments for 
the first time sometime between October 22, 1981, and November 7, 
1981, and had further notice during 1982 and up and through 1984. 
44. Doms did not give notice of his intent to rescind until 
January of 1985, and said notice was by way of a settlement offer 
in lieu of making the One Hundred Ninety Four Thousand Two Hundred 
Fifty Dollar ($194,250.00) payment due on January 25, 1985. Said 
settlement offer in January of 1985 was an offer made to Plaintiffs 
through Defendant Doms1 attorney, Gerald H. Kinghorn, in which 
Defendant Doms offered to deed back the property to Plaintiffs in 
return for Plaintiffs1 cancellation of the aforementioned Trust 
Deed Note. 
45. Plaintiffs did not respond to said settlement offer, but 
rather filed a Complaint to foreclose on the property in June of 
1985. 
46. Doms1 purchase of Slipper parcel, the negotiations to 
develop the three parcels as an integrated development, the 
subsequent negotiations about credits and defining the problems 
with the Rossie Hills property, affirm the fact that Doms had 
personal knowledge of the road and encroachments no later than 
October of 1982. 
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47. It was not until Plaintiffs1 action to foreclose was 
filed that Defendant Doms filed his Amended Counterclaim in June 
of 1988 seeking to rescind the Warranty Deed. 
48. Defendant Doms failed to file his claim for damages 
against the Estate of D.C. Anderson within three months after the 
date of the first publication of Notice to Creditors as provided 
in Section 75-3-803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
49. The Original Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment signed 
on September 9, 1991, were filed in the office of the Summit County 
Clerk on October 22, 1991, which the court finds is the date of 
Entry. 
50. The Original Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment were not 
"final" because there were several issues to be decided which the 
Court had not included in the said documents, which consisted of 
several items including determination of attorney fees and costs. 
51. The Court does not believe it should interfere with the 
agreements entered into by the client and the attorney for services 
to be rendered when the attorneys, as in this case, have fully 
apprised the clients of the fees and costs at the outset of the 
case. 
52. The attorneys for plaintiffs and defendant have kept 
detailed records of the time spent in the prosecution of this case 
and have billed regularly so that the client was always aware of 
what was transpiring in the case. 
53. The Courtfs decision as to fees and costs is not to be 
construed as negating the client's obligation to pay the attorneys 
in accordance with the terms of the attorney-client agreement. 
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54. The Court finds that the "Earnest Money Receipt and Offer 
to Purchase" which was signed by some of the parties in November 
1981 was merged into the later Warranty Deed dated March 10, 1982. 
Espinoza v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 346 (Utah 1979). 
(a) The said Warranty Deed did not provide for payment 
of attorney fees in an action based upon breach of warranties 
contained in the said Deed. 
55. The Court finds that purchasers of real estate are not 
entitled to attorney fees absent an express agreement providing 
therefore, unless the purchaser commences a separate action against 
third parties to remove encumbrances. George A. Lowe Co. v. 
Simmons Warehouse Co., 39 Utah 395, 117 Pac. 874 (1911). 
(a) Doms has not commenced a separate action against 
third parties to remove encumbrances. 
56. The Court finds the plaintiffs1 complaint in foreclosure 
as well as all other actions by the plaintiffs were not instituted 
or prosecuted in bad faith. 
57. The Counsel for plaintiffs and Doms aggressively and 
zealously presented their cases and neither party acted in bad 
faith. 
58. The Court finds that Doms is not entitled to attorney 
fees. 
59. The defendant Doms is not entitled to any prejudgment 
interest on the $83,000.00 damages. 
60. Doms is entitled to the following costs for the 
prosecution of his Second Amended Counterclaim: 
(a) Service of process on Jeanne Scott $ 12.00 
(b) Service of process on Ellen Anderson $ 12.75 
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(c) Service of trial subpoena: Mike Sloan $ 24.75 
(d) Witness fees: Elden and Ella Sorensen $ 34.00 
(e) Recording fee for corrected Sheriff's $ 18.00 
Deed 
(f) The said costs awarded to Doms total- $101.50 
61. The issue of plaintiffs being entitled to attorney fees 
and costs can be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs because the 
provisions contained in the Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed provided 
that all costs and expenses of collection including reasonable 
attorney fees can be charged against the maker. 
62. The Court finds that counsel for the plaintiffs and 
defendant have expended many hours in the prosecution of this case 
and their time sheets so reflect. 
63. The Court finds that hourly rates charged by counsel for 
plaintiffs and defendant were reasonable. 
64. The Court finds that Plaintiffs1 counsel, James A. 
Mcintosh, at page 12 of his affidavit dated December 6, 1991, 
states, "Most of the services rendered were in connection with the 
Second Amended Counterclaim." 
(a) The time spent on collection of the Note and 
foreclosure action by plaintiffs1 counsel was nominal in comparison 
to all the hours expended in this case. 
(b) The Court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to 
recover attorney fees for the time spent on the collection of the 
Trust Deed Note and the Trust Deed foreclosure action but not for 
any time spent in defending against any of the causes of action in 
the Second Amended Counterclaim. 
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65. The Court finds the plaintiffs are entitled to attorney 
fees for legal services incurred in the prosecution of the 
collection of the Note foreclosure action, the motion to set aside 
default, to compel sanctions, setting aside the tax sale, 
intermediate appeal and petition for extraordinary writ to the Utah 
Supreme Court, 
66. In addressing the issue of these fees, the Court will 
take into consideration the effect of the attorney fees awarded the 
plaintiffs by Judge Pat B. Brian in the amount of $4,467.60 as a 
condition of setting aside the Default Judgment against Doms. 
67. The Court will also make an award to plaintiffs based 
upon Judge J. Dennis Frederick's ruling that plaintiffs were 
entitled to a reasonable fee for bringing a motion to compel and 
for sanctions before the court. 
68. The criteria for the Courtfs decision awarding attorney 
fees is set forth in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 
(Utah 1988). 
69. The Court understands the amount in controversy can be 
a factor in determining a reasonable fee, but the Court is not 
putting much reliance on this factor. 
70. The Court finds the plaintiffs should be awarded attorney 
fees as follows: 
(a) FOR PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL, JAMES A, MCINTOSH, ESQ,: 
(i) Lawsuit to set aside tax sale $ 5,245.00 
(ii) Petition for intermediate appeal $ 2,730.00 
(iii) Petition for extraordinary writ $ 2,160.00 
(iv) For the foreclosure complaint $12,300.00 
(v) For the motion to compel and for 
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sanctions as per Judge Frederick's 
minute entries $ 4,750.00 
(vi) The total amount to be awarded for 
Mr. Mcintosh's fees is $27,185.00 
(b) FOR PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL IRVING H. BIELE, ESQ,: 
(i) Motion to set aside default $ 4,467.00 
(This amount has already been 
paid by Doms) 
(ii) Lawsuit to set aside tax sale $ 1,050.00 
(iii) Petition for extraordinary writ 
and mandamus $ 2,740.00 
(iv) For the foreclosure complaint $10,000.00 
(v) The total amount to be awarded 
for Mr. Biele's fees is $13,790.00 
71. The Court finds the plaintiffs are entitled to the 
following costs: 
(a) Summit County Clerk — filing Complaint $ 50.00 
(b) Richie Zabriskie — fee for service 
of Third-Party Summons and Complaint $ 16.50 
(c) Summit County Clerk — filing fee for 
Complaint in Civil No. 10066 $ 75.00 
(d) Richie Zabriskie — fee for service 
of process in Civil No. 10066 on Domcoy 
Enterprises Inc. $ 24.70 
(e) Utah Supreme Court — docketing fee 
for filing Petition for Intermediate 
Appeal $125.00 
(f) Utah Supreme Court — filing fee for 
Petition for Extraordinary Writ of 
Prohibition $ 50.00 
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(g) Summit County Clerk — fee for 
certification of order $ 3.50 
(h) Steve Deckert — witness fee for 
attending trial $ 30.00 
(i) LeRoy J. Pia — witness fee 
to attend trial $ 50.00 
(j) The total amount of the said costs 
to be awarded to the plaintiffs is $358.20 
72. The Trust Deed Note dated March 10, 1982, provides for 
payment of interest in the amount of fourteen percent (14%) per 
annum prior to default, eighteen percent (18%) per annum after 
default. 
SECOND AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Deed which transferred the Rossie Hills property was 
a Warranty Deed under Utah law and conveyed with it all of the 
statutory warranties and covenants contained in U.C.A. Section 57-
1-12. 
2. The loop road, sheds, fences, backyard areas bordered by 
said fences, and decks are encroachments and constitute 
encumbrances upon the property. 
3. Said encumbrances existed on the Rossie Hills property 
on the date of the delivery of the Deed, which was March 23, 1982. 
4. Said encumbrances constitute a breach of the statutory 
covenants contained in the Warranty Deed pursuant to U.C.A. Section 
57-1-12. 
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5. The aforesaid statutory covenants contained in the 
Warranty Deed were breached upon the delivery of the Warranty Deed 
to Defendant Doms on March 23, 1982. 
6. The Warranty Deed, Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed 
prepared at the same time do not constitute a single contract. 
7. The Court believes that the law applicable to this case 
is: The acceptance of the Deed completes the execution of the 
contract, and the Deed become final and conclusive evidence of the 
contract under which it is executed (84 A.L.R. 1009). 
8. The Court concludes that the Utah case of Reese Howell 
Companv v. Brown. 48 Utah 142, 158 P. 684, 689 (1916), sets forth 
the controlling law which must be applied in the instant case 
regarding the issue as to whether or not the Warranty Deed, Note 
and Trust Deed constitutes a single contract. 
9. The fact that a Trust Deed and Note were executed at the 
same time does not make them part of the contract to purchase the 
property. The Trust Deed and Note are documents executed to secure 
the payment of the property, and have no bearing upon whether the 
property is free and clear of encumbrances. 
10. Defendant Doms1 remedy in this case is for a breach of 
the statutory covenants of warranty. 
11. The utilization of the Rossie Hills Property is adversely 
affected by the encroachments and loop road to the extent that the 
value of the property is diminished. 
12. Defendant Doms has been damaged by virtue of Plaintiffs1 
breach. 
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13. Defendant Doms1 damages should be measured as of the date 
of the breach, which is March 23, 1982, the date of the delivery 
of the Deed. 
14. Said damages should be measured with all of the 
encumbrances in place and as they existed on March 23, 1982. 
15. The proper measure of damages under Utah law is the 
difference in the value of the property without any encumbrances 
minus the value of the property with the encumbrances. 
16. The loop road does have a beneficial value for the 
development of the Rossie Hills Property. 
17. Under Utah law, it was the Plaintiffs1 burden and 
obligation to mitigate the damages suffered by Defendant doms 
because Plaintiffs were in breach of the statutory covenants 
contained in the Deed at the time the Deed was delivered. 
18. Plaintiffs had the obligation of quieting title to the 
Rossie Hills property and causing McHenry Avenue to be vacated; and 
if Plaintiffs had done so, Defendant Doms1 damages would have been 
mitigated. 
19. As a result of the encumbrances existing on the Rossie 
Hills Property on March 23, 1982, Defendant Doms has suffered 
damages in the sum of Eighty-Three Thousand Dollars ($83,000.00). 
20. Defendant Doms is entitled to an offset against the Two 
Hundred Seventy=Six Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars 
($276,750.00) purchase price of the property, in the amount of 
Eighty-Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($82,500.00), which 
represents the earnest money payment of Ten Thousand Dollars 
($10,000.00) and the down payment of Seventy-Two Thousand Five 
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Hundred Dollars ($72,500.00). 
21. The remaining balance due after said offset of Eighty-
Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($82,500.00) is One Hundred 
Ninety-Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00) , which 
represents the principal balance of the Trust Deed Note as of the 
date of the execution of said Note and the Trust Deed. 
22. Defendant Doms is further entitled to an additional 
offset of Eighty-Three Thousand Dollars ($83,000.00), which 
represents the damages suffered by Defendant Doms as a result of 
the encumbrances on the property as set forth above. 
23. Therefore, the remaining unpaid balance under the Trust 
Deed Note and Trust Deed was One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($111,250.00) as of March 23, 1982, the date 
of the delivery of the Warranty Deed. 
24. From April 0, 1982 through January 10, 1985, monthly 
interest payments under the Trust Deed Note were received by 
Plaintiffs on an unpaid principal balance of One Hundred Ninety-
Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00), rather than 
One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars 
($111,250.00), which the court has concluded was the unpaid balance 
due under the Trust Deed Note at that time. 
25. under the terms of the Trust Deed Note, the amount 
actually due in monthly interest payments on the un paid principal 
balance of one Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars 
(111,250.00) was Forty-One Thousand Five Hundred Thirty-Three and 
44/100 Dollars ($41,533.44). 
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26. Since Plaintiffs received monthly interest payments in 
the amount of Seventy-Two Thousand Five Hundred Twenty and 25/100 
Dollars ($72,520.25), Defendant Doms is further entitled to an 
additional off-set of Thirty Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-Six and 
81/100 Dollars ($30,986.81), which represents the difference 
between the interest paid on One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00) and the interest which was 
actually due on One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($111,250.00) for the same period. 
27. Therefore, the remaining unpaid principal balance due 
under the Trust Deed Note is Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-
Three and 19/100 Dollars ($80,263.19), as of January 25, 1985, the 
date said principal amount was due under the terms of the Trust 
Deed Note. 
28. Inasmuch as Defendant Doms1 damages were not determined 
and a Judgment has not been entered for said damages, Plaintiffs1 
action for a judgment of foreclosure is premature. 
29. Without the necessity of refiling this action to 
foreclose the Trust Deed, the Court will require Plaintiffs to give 
Defendant Doms a Notice of Default and Defendant Doms shall have 
the right to pay the entire amount due under the terms of the Trust 
Deed Note and Trust Deed, together with costs and attorney fees, 
as determined ny the Court, within 90 days from receipt of the 
Notice of Default. The giving of the Notice of Default shall not 
take place until after the Judgment is entered and notice can be 
served on Defendant Doms and/or his attorney. Service on the 
Defendant Doms may be made by mailing the said notice to the 
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Defendants last known address. 
30. The Court recognizes that there are two options by which 
to foreclose a note and trust deed, administratively or judicially. 
Due to the circumstances in this case, the failure of Plaintiffs 
to ascertain damages prior to proceeding with the foreclosure 
action, Defendant Doms should be given 90 days1 notice to satisfy 
the Note before Plaintiffs can proceed with the foreclosure action. 
31. Plaintiffs are entitled to interest on the unpaid balance 
of Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-Three and 19/100 Dollars 
($80,263.19) from January 25, 1985, the date the unpaid principal 
balance was due under the terms of the Trust Deed Note. The 
interest rate to be used in determining the amount due Plaintiffs 
as interest on said unpaid principal balance shall be fourteen 
percent (14%) per annum. 
32. If Defendant Doms fails to pay the balance due and owing 
after notice, Plaintiffs shall have Judgment of foreclosure upon 
filing an affidavit that Defendant Doms has failed to pay. The 
Plaintiffs will have the sole option at their discretion to a 
Judgment of foreclosure based either on the administrative 
foreclosure proceedings set forth in Sections 57-1-23 et. seg., 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, or the judicial foreclosure 
proceedings provided in Sections 78-37-1 et. seg. . 
33. In regard to the issue of whether or not Defendant Doms 
was entitled to rescind the contract, the Court concludes that 
Defendant Doms was bound to take remedial action after the Fall of 
1981 which the Court determined to be the date he was made aware 
of the encroachments and loop road, and which was prior to the 
008894 
purchase of the Slipper parcel. 
34. It was not necessary for Defendant Doms to obtain a legal 
opinion that the loop road was a prescriptive easement or that the 
shed and fences had a legal basis for being on the Rossie Hills 
Property before he could make his tender to rescind.* 
35. Once Defendant Doms knew of the road and the 
encumbrances, he should have taken action within a reasonable time 
to notify the sellers of his intent to rescind the transaction. 
36. The Court concludes that the case of Eaeter v. West and 
North Properties, 758 P.2d 361 (Ore. App. 1988), is not applicable 
to this case in that Eaeter stands for the proposition, among 
others, that an unmaintained dirt road that showed little use and 
brush and trees had to be removed to drive on it was not so open 
or notorious that purchasers would be chargeable with knowledge of 
its existence. 
37. Eaeter is readily distinguishable from the facts of the 
instant case because there is not question that the road in this 
case has been used and was being used. 
38. The Eaeter case is applicable to the instant case in the 
sense that it stands for the proposition that the person seeking 
to rescind the contract must do so promptly after obtaining 
knowledge of the facts constituting the grounds for rescind so long 
as he acts within a reasonable time. 
39. Defendant Doms did not act within a reasonable time after 
he obtained knowledge that the loop road and the encroachments were 
upon the Rossie Hills Property. 
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40. The Court concludes that Defendant Doms waited an 
unreasonable amount of time to seek rescission; therefore, 
rescission is not the appropriate remedy in this case and is barred 
by the doctrine of laches. 
41. Defendant Doms presented insufficient evidence to carry 
the burden of proof that Plaintiffs committed fraud and 
misrepresentation in this matter. 
42. With regard to Civil No. 10066, and Count I of 
Plaintiffs1 Complaint contained therein, pursuant to Stipulation 
of the parties and a previous Order of the court, the May 27, 1987, 
Tax Sale of the Rossie Hills Property by Summit County should be 
declared to be null and void. 
43. The foregoing Conclusion of Law shall be deemed not to 
affect the Trust Deed dated March 10, 1982, in any adverse manner 
by the said tax sale. The rights, title, liens and interest of the 
Plaintiffs and Defendant Eugene E. Doms and Domcoy Enterprises, 
Inc. , a Utah corporation, shall not be deemed to be affected by the 
said tax sale. The Court's previous Order invalidating the tax 
sale does not in and of itself either validate or invalidate any 
subsequent deeds issued regarding the Rossie Hill Property. 
44. The Warranty Deed dated August 26, 1988, in which Domcoy 
Enterprises, Inc., as grantor, conveyed the Rossie Hills Property 
to Defendant Doms, as grantee, is a valid Deed which transferred 
legal title to Defendant Doms. 
45. In regard to Count II of Plaintiffs1 Complaint in Civil 
No. 10066, title to the Rossie Hills Property should be quieted in 
Defendant Doms, subject to Plaintiffs1 right to foreclose as 
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previously set forth in these Conclusions of Law. 
46. In regard to Count III of Plaintiffs' Complaint in Civil 
NO. 10066, said Count III has been previously dismissed by the 
Court on Motion of Summit County. 
47. In regard to Plaintiffs1 Third-Party Complaint against 
Third-Party Defendant Summit County Title Company in Civil No. 
8339, said Third-Party Complaint has been previously dismissed by 
the Court on Motion of said parties. 
48. Defendant doms1 Second Amended Counterclaim seeking 
damages against Plaintiff Ellen Anderson as Personal Representative 
of the Estate of D.C. Anderson is barred by the three-month filing 
period limitation for claims against an estate pursuant to Section 
75-3-803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, as said section relates 
to the issues of damages. 
49. This Court has in personam jurisdiction over Plaintiff 
Jeanne Scott pursuant to a ruling by the Utah Supreme Court 
contained in an Amended Minute Entry denying Plaintiffs1 Petition 
for an Extraordinary Writ under Rule 65B(B)4, Supreme Court Case 
No. 890269. In said Amended Minute Entry, dated July 31, 1989, the 
Utah Supreme Court denied said Petition for an Extraordinary Writ, 
and ruled that this Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff Jeanne 
Scott because she was a grantor on the Warranty Deed, and is a 
proper party to Defendant Doms1 Second Amended Counterclaim under 
Rules 13 and 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
50. Plaintiffs1 remaining objections to the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, and Judgment dated September 9, 1991, are 
denied. 
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51. The plaintiffs should be awarded attorney fees of 
$27,185.00 for services rendered by plaintiffs1 counsel, James A. 
Mcintosh, Esq. 
52. The plaintiffs should be awarded attorney fees of 
$13,790.00 for services rendered by plaintiffs' counsel, Irving H. 
Biele, Esq. 
53. The plaintiffs should be awarded $358.20 for costs which 
they have incurred in these proceedings. 
54. The plaintiffs should be awarded interest of fourteen 
percent (14%) per annum on all principal amounts the court has 
determined were due and owing on the Trust Deed Note dated March 
10, 1982, both before and after default. 
55. The defendant Doms should not be awarded any attorney 
fees for services rendered by his counsel in either Civil No. 83 39 
or Civil No. 10066. 
56. The defendant Doms should not be awarded any prejudgment 
interest on the $83,000.00 damages described in the original 
Judgment dated September 9, 1991. 
57. The defendant Doms should be awarded $101.50 for costs 
for prosecution of the Second Amended Counterclaim. 
DATED this /6 day of June 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
9JL A - < 
HONORABLE JOHN A. 
-©^strict Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of May, 1992, a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was hand delivered to the following: 
Larry R. Keller, Esq. 
257 East 200 South, Suite 340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH 
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ADDENDUM 2 
IRVING H. BIELE, - 2- — No. 0317 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
3 33 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-2506 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ. — No. 2194 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
A Utah Professional Law Corporation 
Suite 14, Intrade Bldg. South 
1399 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
Telephone: (801) 487-7834 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate of 
D. C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON 
personally, DAN SCOTT and 
JEANNE SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs : 
vs. : 
MICHAEL R. McCOY and EUGENE : 
E. DOMS, : 
Defendants : 
ELLEN ANDERSON as personal : 
representative of the Estate of : 
D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON : 
personally, DAN SCOTT and : 
JEANNE SCOTT, : 
Third-party Plaintiffs : 
V S . J 
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, a : 
Utah corporation, : 
Third-party Defendant : 
SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT 
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! Cierk i; ^ jraxit wur.ty . 
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: Civil No. 8339 
: (Judge John A. Rokich) 
CONSOLIDATED HEADING CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE 
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ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal : 
representative of the Estate of : 
D. C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and : 
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee, : 
Plaintiffs j 
vs. : 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate : 
and politic of the State of : 
Utah; BLAKE L. FRAZIER, in his : 
official capacity as Summit : 
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS : 
REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah : 
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS; : 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC., a s 
Utah corporation; EUGENE E. : 
DOMS; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS ; 
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1, j 
2, 3, 4, and 5, : 
Defendants : 
: Civil No. 10066 
: (Judge John A. Rokich) 
Based upon the Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, entered contemporaneously herein, it is hereby ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. In regard to Civil No. 8339 and Count II of Plaintiffs1 
Complaint in Civil No. 10066, title to the property which is the 
subject of the above-entitled matters is quieted in Defendant 
Eugene E. Doms, subject to the right of Plaintiffs, Ellen Anderson, 
as Personal Representative of the Estate of D.C. Anderson, and Dan 
Scott, to foreclose their Trust Deed against said property as 
hereinafter set forth in this Judgment. Said property is more 
particularly described as follows: 
PARCEL NO. 1: All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 
25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32, Block 58, 
Park City Survey, according to the amended plat 
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thereof, as filed and of record in the office 
of the Summit County Recorder. 
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City 
Survey, according to the amended plat thereof, 
as filed and of record in the office of the 
Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom 
any portion located within the railroad rights 
of way as described in those certain documents 
recorded as Entry No. 817 6 in Book C at Page 
401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, 
and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, 
records of Summit County, Utah. 
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, 
according to the Amended Plat thereof, as filed 
and of record in the office of the Summit 
County Recorder, excepting therefrom any 
portion located within the railroad rights of 
way as described in those certain documents 
recorded as Entry No. 817 6 in Book C at Page 
401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, 
and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, 
records of Summit County, Utah. 
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and 
water lines over the Southerly five feet and Northerly five 
feet of the following described Lots. 
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City 
Survey according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of 
record in the office of the Summit County Records. 
2. Plaintiffs1 Complaint for foreclosure in Civil No. 8339 
is premature, in as much as Defendant Doms1 damages were not 
determined and a Judgment has not been entered for said damages. 
3. Defendant Doms is awarded Judgment in Civil No. 8339 on 
his Second Amended Counterclaim for damages for breach of 
warranties and covenants against encumbrances contained in the 
Warranty Deed conveying the Rossie Hills property, pursuant to 
U.C.A. Section 57-1-12, 
4. Defendant Doms is awarded damages for said breach of the 
warranties and covenants against encumbrances in the amount of 
Eighty-Three Thousand Dollars ($83,000.00). 
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5. The original principal balance due from Defendant Doms 
to Plaintiffs Ellen Anderson, as Personal Representative of the 
Estate of D.C. Anderson, and Dan Scott, on the Trust Deed Note and 
Trust Deed held by said Plaintiffs was One Hundred Ninety-Four 
Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250,00), as of the date 
of the execution of said Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed. 
6. Said amount of One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00) due under said Trust Deed Note 
and Trust Deed shall be offset by the Eighty-Three Thousand Dollars 
($83,000.00) which the Court has awarded Defendant Doms as damages 
for breach of the warranties and covenants against encumbrances. 
7. Therefore, the remaining unpaid principal balance due 
from Defendant Doms to said Plaintiffs under the Trust Deed Note 
and Trust Deed was One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($111,250.00) as of March 23, 1982, the date of delivery 
of the Warranty Deed. 
8. Since Plaintiffs received monthly interest payments in 
the amount of Seventy-Two Thousand Five Hundred Twenty and 25/100 
Dollars ($72,520.25), Defendant Doms is further entitled to an 
additional off-set of Thirty Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-Six and 
81/100 Dollars ($30,986.81), which represents the difference 
between the interest paid on One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00) and the interest which was 
actually due on One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($111,250.00) for the same period. 
9. Therefore, the remaining unpaid principal balance due 
under the Trust Deed Note is Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-
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Three and 19/100 Dollars ($80,263.19), as of January 25, 1985, the 
date said principal amount was due under the terms of the Trust 
Deed Note. 
10. Without the necessity of refiling this action to 
foreclose the Trust Deed, the Court will require said Plaintiffs 
to give Defendant Doms a Notice of Default and Defendant Doms shall 
have the right to pay the entire amount due under the terms of the 
Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed, together with costs and attorney 
fees, as determined by the Court, within 90 days form receipt of 
the Notice of Default. The giving of the Notice of Default shall 
not take place until after the Judgment is entered and notice can 
be served on Defendant Doms and/or his attorney. Service on the 
Defendant Doms may be made by mailing the said notice to the 
Defendant's last known address. 
11. Said Plaintiffs are entitled to interest on the unpaid 
balance of Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-Three and 19/100 
Dollars ($80,2 63.19) from January 25, 1985, the date the unpaid 
principal balance was due under the terms of the Trust Deed Note. 
The interest rate to be used in determining the amount due 
Plaintiffs as interest on said unpaid principal balance shall be 
fourteen percent (14%) per annum. 
12. If Defendant Doms fails to pay the balance due and owing 
after notice, said Plaintiffs shall have Judgment of foreclosure 
upon filing an affidavit that Defendant Doms has failed to pay. 
The Plaintiffs will have the sole option at their discretion to a 
Judgment of foreclosure based either on the administrative 
foreclosure proceedings set forth in Sections 57-1-23 et. seg., 
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Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, or the judicial foreclosure 
proceedings provided in Sections 78-37-1 et. seg. . 
13. Defendant Doms is not entitled to the remedy of 
rescission of the transaction conveying the aforementioned property 
because the remedy of rescission is barred by the doctrine of 
laches. 
14. Defendant Doms1 Second Amended Counterclaim, as it 
relates to the remedy of damages, is dismissed as against Plaintiff 
Ellen Anderson, as Personal Representative of the Estate of D.C. 
Anderson, as said claim is barred by the three-month filing period 
limitation for claims against an estate pursuant to Section 75-3-
803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
15. Defendant Doms1 causes of action relating to fraud and 
misrepresentation in Civil No. 83 39 are dismissed, the Court 
finding no cause therefore. 
16. In regard to Count I of Plaintiffs1 Complaint in Civil 
No. 10066, and pursuant to Stipulation of the parties and a 
previous Order of the Court, the May 27, 1987, tax sale of the 
Rossie Hills property by Summit County is declared to be null and 
void. 
17. In regard to Count III of Plaintiffs1 Complaint in Civil 
No. 10066, said Count III has been previously dismissed by the 
Court on Motion of Defendant Summit County. 
18. In regard to Plaintiffs1 Third Party-Complaint against 
Third-Party Defendant Summit County title Company in Civil No. 
8339, said Third-Party Complaint has been previously dismissed by 
the Court on Motion of said parties. 
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19. The plaintiffs are hereby awarded $27,185.00 in attorney 
fees for services rendered by plaintiffs1 counsel, James A. 
Mcintosh, Esq. 
20. The plaintiffs are hereby awarded $13,790.00 in attorney 
fees for services rendered by plaintiffs1 counsel, Irving H. Biele, 
Esq. 
21. The plaintiffs are hereby awarded $358.20 for costs which 
they have incurred in these proceedings. 
22. The plaintiffs are hereby awarded interest at the rate 
of fourteen percent (14%) per annum on all principal amounts which 
this court has determined were due and owing by the defendant Doms 
pursuant to the terms of the Trust Deed Note dated March 10, 1982, 
both before and after default in payment by the said defendant. 
23. The defendant Doms is not entitled to any attorney fees 
for services rendered by his counsel in either Civil No. 83 3 9 or 
Civil No. 10066. 
24. The defendant Eugene E. Doms is not entitled to any 
prejudgment interest on the $83,000.00 damages. 
25. The defendant Doms is hereby awarded $101.50 for costs 
for prosecution of the Second Amended Counterclaim. 
DATED this /(- day of June 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH -* : 
-District Court Judge 
\ * . \ COUNTY/*/ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of May, 1992, a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT 
was hand delivered to the following: 
Larry R. Keller, Esq. 
257 East 200 South, Suite 340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH 
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ADDENDUM 3 
Recorded at Request of 
at M. Fee Paid JL 
RFO* 
1}EE_ v „ » 
$ J 7* 00 
INDEXED 
lUMMJICX). TITLE r* rage ,C/..Z. 
c\ •fCORDEt 
!/ 
by Pa*e Ref.: , , 
2850 Ocean Park Boulevard, Suic^ 300 
Dep. Book 
Mail tax notice
 f n
 G r a n t e e / M . McCoy Aririrps* Santa tenica, California 90405 
(SPECIAL) 
WARRANTY DEED 
DeWAYNE C. ANDERSON aka D.C. ANDERSON aka DEWEY D.C. ANDERSON and EIIEN R. 
ANDERSON, his wife, and DAN SCOTT and JEANNE SCOTT , his wife, grantors 
of Park City, Utah , County of Sunmit , State of Utah, hereby 
CONVEY and W A R R A N T to 
EUGENE E. DQMS and MICHAEL R. McCOY, as tenants in canton 
0f Santa Monica, California 
TEN AND NO/100 
(and other good and valuable considerations) 
the following described tract of land in Sunmit 
State of Utah: 
SEE ADDENDUM ATTACHED TO AND MADE A PART HEREOF: 
grantee 
for the sum of 
— DOLLARS, 
Count,), 
INDEXED: -
C M -N10?v: . ^ > ~ — 
( : . r • . 
. 7 J:-= 
^T TO THE GENERAL PROPERTY TAXES FOR THE YEAR 1982 AND THEREAFTER, AND 
ANY SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS NOW DUE OR TO BECOME DUE. 
EXCEPTING ALL OIL, GAS AND/OR OTHER MINERALS WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY RESERVED. 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor , this 
, A. D. 19 82 
10th day of 
March 
Signed in the Presence of 
D ^ SCOTT y «. 
pCOTT (Jeanne) 
y /, „ / 
Qe^lAYNE C . ANDERSON a k a D . C . ANDERSON a k a 
/ ( ( ( u / . \ ( . ill H(« T*™y n (' *?J l 
EUiEN P . ANDERSON 
DEWEY D . C . ANDhK&ui 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of SunmL 
March , A. D. 19 82 On the fium^^/fa* 
personally apjb£are< 
DEWEY D.OJ ANl 
the^Sfn^S^tPf^the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that t n e v executed the 
same. \\ aL
 s ,, n » j u 
_ Mel JWOTWWC C. ANDERSON , aka D.C. ANDERSON , aka 
iCN'ana EtjJEN W. ANDERSON, h i s wife , 
—fA&icJs-y 
My commission expires. 9-28-82 
Notary Public. 
.Residing fa p a r k c i t y > u t a h 
BLANK #101—WARHANTV D I E D — <£ GEM PTG co - J J S so aeoo EAST — »ALT LAKE CITY 
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ADDEM)UM 
/ 
PARCEL NO. 1: All of Lots 17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31, 
and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, according to the 
amended plat thereof, as filed and of record in the office 
of the Summit County Recorder. 
' PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City Survey, according 
to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of record in the 
office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any 
portion located within the railroad rights of way as described 
in those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book 
C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, and 
Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Summit County, 
Utah. 
' PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, according to the 
Amended Plat thereof, as filed and of record in the office of 
the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any portion 
located within the County Recorder, excepting therefrom any 
portion located within the railroad rights of way as described 
in those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book 
C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, and 
Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Summit County, 
Utah. 
*' Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and water lines 
over the Southerly five feet and Northerly five feet of the following 
described Lots. 
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City Survey according 
to the amended plat thereof as filed and of record in the office of the Summit 
County Records. 
B00KM215 PAGERS 
STATE OF WYOfflQsIG • ) 
COUNTY OF MiPAxuLiM. ) 
*y of /&&___ 
appeared before me DAN SCOTT a^xSSW'&pTT the signers of the within instrument, 
who duly acknowledged t o me *a5kt„the^cexebjited the same. 
On the cPP^yt-^cL day of ^Ac£$sfcf~- ' A.D., 1982 personally^ 
My Ccrrmission expi res : r ': • ' \ \ /«
 % _ 
My Commission expires J s n u 2 r y M ? 8 | \ , ^ » I ^ QjJ^fJxu^uu Si
 m p ( ^ u ^ 
' wULA- / c Notary Rabllc 
B00KM2l5PAGEi4"9 
v: 'c
 # c '
f f
- / Residing a t : /}fJLluL(u>^ ClJ<uj r*w-«? 
ADDENDUM 4 
"THIS IS A IECAUY BINL _^1 NTRACT, IF NOT UNOERSTOOO, St W< ,j •ETINT.AOVICE. 
*&&&&• .EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND OFFER TO PURCHASE. 
: ^fcfijft IN CONSIDERATION OP your urteaunt ^ r « u effurte to prcacat thie offer* «o the Scllcr^ f/wa ;<*?<<• HC. Z ^ , - * • ' i ' ». L " 
» £ & b f . * P ~ i - ~ * r~ aa . M ~ , -ney A . ' — W a e - ^ T t S r ^ ^ O i. ^ > ^ ' - r X / y ^ r ^ V ^ ' - — ' * ''DOLLARS 
7i . 
11 in the form ol 
t ' IO aCCUfC end apply Om the purtJUM i ol the prav i i i r actuated at: * \ * \ ' ( «•» ]^.~l J f u > '* T—» ' > V_^» • s .7* * > n J ' ^ Z. /? 
i — 
_£L&± 
y.i-T- ,:~ w X IT*' /*-r- /.-/ A'/./f -P 
JSTstrJ 
I includinc «ny of the following I U « I ii U ^ I M H attached to ihe"premiaett Plocaomc and Iweiine l i t iwie i end i 4 « i » m n i including noker ind oil u n k i . V I M * nceiert. t *d • « • * • « • 
1 « l i l t r i i light fieturca aaciodinc kwlo* lata room fitturet. roller laedca, curtain icOe end li»iurc*. Venetian Ul.ndi, «tndow end door tciecnt. Itm»t|w«, i l l inrooe i *d Meet, ind »*» 
l M M r f iaturu I I U » I 
/ ^ W // ^>tS/w /**: ,-7~ •County S u u of_ 
e i m  t i t * aet r  
The following; pcnonal i f u w i i r ifceil tiao be. included u p a " 0/ *•« |)ra|Mnr pwt«M«M«i. yv/# 
/>/" f-T+*-->:**/, T U IM«I p)«M«h(M pi.»« .1 ' « -* •^"'^7 " ^ ^  "*• > ^ 
Ut«ll U p»y«»W »» loliewi « • • v » v / > . wfcicn nvxtMMi* ik* tior^«jk»cr»b««i ii«PMtu. receipt oJ watch u bcrcbr MirwwicUtciJ by yow: 
. » ! • < • M l k r i p c a t x i . u U ; I . /;;; -^ --° Uclivcnr o< dccii ur final remttci U « MI« WIIKJ* abali b> on Of Uio»#
 N / ^ ' / < ^ v . m , ^ y t a^ t ..>>i month ' " " " • ' t 
» ^X-7-"v»^*— ' , y / i >"^' .•*«.%/-•*• ^ y-^ -v;. >Oi..-^V^. >?/A/ ^ ' ^ </r <}*:/. -77^*-~i / /.' . 
^ S)"jr- ^/A,/?.-**' '/'*J,'T T£' /$,+ --si .'.y /"i-r Sj*/•< *r SXn'~- ,/x>*t - *- "• -7—. 
« jrs*T*\rr, J, .) , v / J enr^ /)^,.r /^ Tr' J)*m #**>> —e' * As> ."*T>*//. ^ ^ ; /A . . r . . ' '*S-'// ^C ' 
. f>+-~r~.K. //r- -r:. ^ - / A ' / -rs >=5bvx ^y^r>?v».-.— .-^ .V ^T.-».-^^ /^ ^>o % ^ , " —>/'..'" 
« ^ , ^ . ^ ' ^ » - /JxA .^-^ /r /?ff / i /^ A.£/**~r* <?s><L,. +\._. J. * (*//££ :&7) WW. 
/' 
_ j O f t t h « f with i i t u n M 11 *4»4: 9 fOv»tM. R M M M I , th*t bwr«r »i •»• option, ai an? M O M . mar pay a««oynia in t i c c u o( tho montblr 
<• parmanta upon th« unpad balanct. awbatct to th« i iauut iOM oi any t*on«a«« •» CPMtrttt by th« bwyar h e m n aaawwod. Inur ta i " ^ ^ mr P«r annwm on the wnpani pomona ol iK* 
1 iwrchaM P I K I 10 b< iiwlwocj >n U M pnarnbtd payotanu and ahall b t f in a« ai data of poaaauipn which ahall be on or a»«<»—yy^A* ^ ^ V i o w ^ * . ^ n , M t ^  UJM and dcatrwction 
•W of r<rop€Mv. ind urtcnaf i ol .•iawiancc thall be born br ih« Mllcr until daw of > — a n i o n at «vhich <•«• proncny uaca. icnta. tnayranca. intctait and other tapenaca 01 the property ihall 
I Ua proraied n ot date ot |W*M« I>W« .Ml other taeci and all aecceecaonie. a»ori«««ea. chattel licna and.other liena, ancwotorancei or cHartai i ta i iwi the property oi any natwra inall 
• Uc paid by ihc acllcr caccpi^ A/ -• > /£* 
Tht followinc ipccul impurer««nu art included in ihtt aale: Sewer £J—Connetud Q. Sepnc Tank inU/or Ceupool Q . Sidewalk Q Curb iAd Cutter Q Special Sireet 
4 / H i v i A l Q - Special Street L.%h*i»c Q . Cwlmary Waaer i d t y Q . Other (UaBakuniiy Syateea Q . Private Q (Le«end. Yea (a ) No ( 0 ) . 
•« CONTR^CJ.OP <A«.S 0«> IN3TRUU£NT Of CONVrfANCf TO 0C MAOB ON TM8 APPROVED FORM OP TH* UTAH SECURITIES COJUX4ISSION IN THE NAME OP 
?, . J a y i from date hereo/. and unlcaa m 17 Thie payment u rcreivcj *nd olltt * made iwbieci to the written acceptance *f the teller tndoned Hereon w i t h i n ^ 
H approved the return of the money herein receipted ahall cancel thie offer without uaceaee «• the u n d e r l i n e d ageiu. 
•9 In the eyeru ibe purchatci faila to pay the balance at* aaid purchaae prate «r coeapleie aeid purchaae aa herein provided, (he amounit paid hereon ih l l t . ai the option of the 
•0
 v acllcr be retained aa Wcjuidittd ind agreed daeufca. 
' • • It u undcrttood and l i f t e d that the icreu wt i two in thie receipt cemalitutc the cHtire Prelianoary Conudct between the pwrchaocp* and the acllcr. and that no verbal i iaicmcM 
• I made by anyone relative to ifc.i iranaacuon mall be conairued to be a pan of thit tranaaction unloa incorpvrated in writine hcrcin.^if ly fv inhcr i | f t r d that tarcution oi the final 
) contract ahall throe.aw «hu tarneit Money Receipt and Oflei to Purchaae. rL^0^^^' y ^ ^ S j / 
- /~" *"/--' T- •• A^^/ iy^- - . ' • * • '&« i.^y'^-
 r ^o.^^^/^-ry ^ 
* Mrutcr Cimnany / / • ' ^^ 
• f W« do hereby airee to carry out tnJ fulf i l l the tcrcaa and condiuona apeciiMd above, and the taller a«r«ea to furnteh food and markciabie tuit « n h ibat rut broufhi to date or it 
• 4 St IUr ' i option a policy of m U maurancc m the name of the purvheecr and to ouke final ronveyance by warranty deed — 
• 7 t.i U.« «vf«t of talc ui other than ttei property, aeller wil l provide evidence of title or n « h i to Mi l or leaae. If either party f u l l ao to da. he i | M i | I O pay »|l aapeiuea oi cniorcwi<. 
•a t k u . ( ' i f w w or of m r »'<»« n>t.i>t ewi w< m i K.««cfc thereof. inclueUni a rt i ioniPie anurner a lee *> .m . , ( * , 
t rhe MlUr i c r t u »n cuntidetmon ol I I M alfortt of the agent in procurmt a purchaaer. to pay M M I agent a tummunon m* m*-\ v"** ' «^  "- of the talc price. 
0 In the event M I U I hai «m«Md mio a I I M I A ( contract with any other team ane) ia>d contract »i preacntly elfecuve.ytlua parairaph wiU»"Ue o/ no f o i u or affect 
, /s//*/*>/ 
7b.t. 
J&&L 
Seikr / 
O^AJ 3 C . ^ rr 
PALS 
/ n ' s s / „ y . ^ o (LA 
?-'• 
' ' ' • • ^ • J 
U (State law u q u i f t i bruaiM io iwm«.ii <oe«i ol ibu comiaci Oearm| i l l «. (n*iu>«i <e U»?«« a id Mliar Oepenuant upon t*e metood uecd. » w • »M lollow.A 
R E C E I P T 
M t i c k n o w l i d i y receipt of a iinal i^py of the forcfomt iirecracnc bcarmf i l l ••enatuiai H I U el 
U I peiMin«llr ciuMd • l i x i l (^r t w «M t f i i w o i M ' t i«»* * i b t i ' i « f »'l . .«« i i»« i i io be me.ieu to n i J ] Sellei ^ FwrcKaier un 
? i*> br »tquie«id «a»l i»d M»W»A i tct ipi n i i n c M d h t i t io 
ADDENDUM 5 
FCJ: >IO. 1914 
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 
Space Above This Line For Recorder's Use 
TRUST DEED 
With Assignment of Rents 
THIS TRUST DEED, made this . .!?.!•!>. day of !****. , 19...??. 
between ?^"?$L.^...!r!?^ 
... as TRUSTOR, 
whose address is 2 8 5 0 0 c e a n P a r k Blvd. , Suite 300, Santa Monica, Ca l i f . , 90405 
(Stratt and number) (City) (SUU) 
3 £ * 5 ? . . S 9 ! ^ , as TRUSTEE,' and 
D.C.:..W0EPSCN as to an unuivklaLi c m - h a l f intaraat and QrStf 9CCOT aa t o an 
« * y ^ . . . ^ . . M « « t
 § a s BENEFICIARY, 
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, 
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in $ ™ * t 
County, State of Utah: 
VBStZL NO. 1: A l l o f Lota 17 ,13 ,19 ,20 ,21 ,22 ,23 ,24 ,25 ,26 ,27 ,23 ,29 ,30 ,31 
anU 32, ULock 52, lla£k City Survey, according to tha is . . . . . . 
1** pUt thereof, aa filad and of record in tha offioe of the 
{ itorrlt Country i;acor»jttr. 
PFulCX IK>. 2: ;U cf icze 3.7 ar .^ 13, .'lock 3P, ?ar* City '\ir»' ', »r-rn!iftg 
t.. ch* -n> • '••' »3iU. ••••*r.-oi,f :n r l 1-V Vi} <*' - *jnrr I- ^he 
- • f ~ *•" <*-<: "u:—-4t: ''o..~>r *l • wV*- >\vr*».ti^; t-'^r^ftrja 
any portion looatad vdthin tha railroad rights of way as 
caocribo'l in tlicnc certain docunants rooordad as Sttry NO. 
317f» in Deck C at Pug* 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book n at 
Page 326, and Entry Mo. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, reoorda 
of 8nnnit County, Utah. 
PJURCEL NO, 3i All of lo t IB, Block 59, Park City Surety, according to tha 
taandad Plat tharaof, aa f i led and of raoocd in tha offloa of 
tho Surodt County Raoortar, adapting tharefran any portion 
located vdthin tha railroad riguta of way aa IIBM.MJI Men in 
those certain docunanta DM ran lad aa Btatry No. 8176 in Book C 
at Page 401, fctry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, and Entry 
No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, reoorda of Sunslt county, Utah. 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of 
way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, 
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon 
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a pro-
194,250.00 , . 
missory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $ , made by 
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein 
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of 
each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as 
hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory 
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums 
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest 
thereon as herein provided. 
TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED TRUSTOR AGREES 
1 To keep said properly in
 Cood condition and repair not to remove or demolish an\ building thereon, to 
complete or restore promptly and in «oo<| and workmanlike manner anv buildup win, I, mav he constructed 
damaged or destroyed thereon, to complv with all law> »•••vcnani.*. ami n^ t ru l ion , .ill,-, tin- N.II.1 properlx. not 
to commitor permit waMr tin reof. not to commit, suffer ur permit am act upon said properly m violation ..( law. tr 
do all other arts which from the character or use of said property ma\ he reasonably iuvcs»arv. the specific 
enumerations herein not excluding the general. and. if tin- loan M I tired hereby or anv pari I hereof is being oh 
lamed for the purpose of financing construction of improvements on sari property Trustor luriher agrees 
(a) To commence construction promptly and Us pursue same with re.wmaMe diligence \»> completion 
in accordance with plans and |«cifications satisfactory to Beneficiary, and 
(b) To allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at all times durum conslmclion 
Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed l»v Knicficiarv. selling forth fads SIIMMIIIK a default 
by Trustor under this numbered paragraph. »* authorized to accept as true and conclusive all latts and state 
ments therein, and to act thereon hereunder. 
2. To provide and maintain insurance, of such Ivpe or types and amounts as limeiici.irv may require on 
the improvemenl.s now existing or hereafter erect*"*! or placed on said propcriv Sm h iiiMir.iiio- -ball be tarried 
in companies approved bv Iteneiici.trv with loss payable clau.es o> l.ivor o| .oid MI l.-rm .«». epi.ibl, i,. Iteoelu tarv 
In event of loss. Trustor shall give iniuiedi.iie notice lo Item-In i.irv who ioi\ make pro..I ot |..ss .mil e.u b insurance 
company concerned is hereby authorized and directed lo make p.ivmciil lor <au h Ins-, dire* ilv i.. It. uelici.iry 
instead of lo Trustor and liciichciarv i«untly. and Ibe insurant c pro* inU. or anv part thereol. mav be applied 
by Beneficiary, at its option, to reduction ot the indebtedness hereby secured or to the restoration or repair ot 
the property damaged 
3. To deliver to, pay for and maintain with llenefnuirv until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full, 
such evidence of title as lieueficiary mav require, including abstract* ot title or polities ••! tub- insurance and 
any extensions or renewals thereof «,r supplements thereto 
4. To appear in and defend any action or proceeding pur|>orting to aflect Ibe security hereof, the title to 
said property, or the rights or |x»wers of Beneficiary or Trustee, and should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to 
also appear in or defend anv such action or proceeding, to pay all costs and expenses, including cost of evi-
dence of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee 
^fijp To pay at least 10 days before delinquency all taxes and assessments affecting said property, including 
all iissessments upon water company stock and all rents, assessments and charges for water, appurtenant to or 
used in connection with said property; to pay, when due. all encumbrances, charges. an-J liens with interest, 
on said property or any part thereof, which at any time appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay all costs. 
fees, and expenses of this Trust. 
6. Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or 
Trustee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing 
Trustor from any obligation hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may 
deem necessary to protect the security hereof, Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon said 
property for such purposes; commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the 
security hereof or the rights of powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay. purchase, contest, or compromise any 
encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto; and in ex-
ercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem 
necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable fees. 
7. To pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, 
with interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum until paid, and the repay* 
inent thereof shall be secured hereby. 
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT: 
8. Should said property or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement 
or condemnation proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other manner. Beneficiary shall be 
entitled to all compensation, awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its option 
to commence, appear in and prosecute in its own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compro-
mise or settlement, in connection with such taking or damage. All such compensation, awards, damages, rights 
of action and proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of fire and other insurance affecting said property, 
•re hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may. after deducting therefrom all its expenses, including attorney's fees, 
apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby. Trustor agrees to execute such further assignments of any 
compensation, award, damages, and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require. 
9. At any time and from time to time upon writtten request of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and pre-
sentation of this Trust Deed and the note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation and 
retention), without affecting the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby. 
Trustee may (a) consent to the making of any map or plat of said property; (b) join in granting any ease-
ment or creating any restriction thereon; (c) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed 
or the lien or charge thereof; (d) reconvey, without warranty, ull or any part of said property. The grantee in 
any reconveyance may bo described as "the person or persons entitled thereto", and the recitals therein of any 
matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's 
fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph. 
10. As additional security. Trustor hereby assigns Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all 
rents, issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by this Trust Deed and of any personal property 
located thereon. Until Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the per-
formance of any agreement hereunder. Trustor shall have the right to collect all such rents, issues, royalties, 
and profits earned prior to default as they become due and payable If Trustor shall default as aforesaid. 
Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without 
taking possession of the property affected hereby, to collect all rents, royalties, issues, and profits. Failure or 
discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from time to time to collect any such moneys shall not in any 
manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to collect the same. 
Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall be. or be construed to 
be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a 
subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option. 
11. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder. Beneficiary may at any time without notice, either in 
gerson, by agent, or by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of eneficiary as such receiver), and without regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby 
secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any part thereof, in its own name sue for or 
otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, leas 
costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness 
secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may determine. 
12. The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collecton of such rents, issues, and 
profits or the proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking 6r 
damage of said property, and the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any 
default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice 
Iff The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate aa 
a waiver of such right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other 
or subsequent default. 
14. Time is of the essence hereof Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness ••cured here-
by or in the performance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due 
and payable at the option of Beneficiary In the event of such default. Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee 
to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause said property to be sold to satisfy the obligations 
hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said property or some part or 
parcel thereof is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all documenU evidencing 
expenditures secured hereby. 
15. After the lapse of such tL as may then be required by law following recordation of said notice of 
default, and notice of default and notice of sale having been given as then required *, law, Trustee, without demand 
on Trustor, shall sell said property on the date and at the time and place designated in said notice of sale, either as 
a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to 
direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known lots or parcels, shall be sold), at public 
auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States at the time of 
sale. The person conducting the sale may. for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to 
time until it shall be completed and, in every case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration 
thereof by such person at the time and place last appointed for the sale, provided, if the sale is postponed 
for longer than one day beyond the day designated in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the 
same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed con-
veying said property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The recitals in the 
Deed of any matters or facta shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Bene-
ficiary, may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and 
expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's 
fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; 
(3) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 10% per annum from date 
of expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any. to the person or persona 
legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County 
Clerk of the county in which the sale took place. 
16. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder. Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums 
secured hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law 
for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceed-
ing all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be 
fixed by the court. 
17. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County 
Recorder of each county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From 
the time the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to ail the powers, duties, authority 
and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and 
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law. 
18. This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to the benefit of. and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, 
devisees, adminstrators, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and 
several. The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured 
hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or 
neuter, and the singular number includes the plural. 
19. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public 
record as provided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other 
Trust Deed or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless 
brought by Trustee. 
20. This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah 
21. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale 
hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth. 
Signature of Trustor 
VXTZT1F . rOMB 
MICHAEL R. VtOJl 
(If Trustor an Individual) 
STATE OF UTAH, 
COUNTY OF&rai t •*• 
On the JWtft day of 'larch , A.D. 19...??., personally 
appeared before me HMOEM? .... LJCHB an£ HICtihEL R. rioOW 
the signer(s) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that ^ he..Y. executed the 
Notary Public residing at: 
My C o m ^ i o n Expires: g ^ j ^
 a t y # f J t a h 
(If Trustor a Corporation) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 
On the day of , A.D. 19 , personally 
appeared before me , who being by me duly sworn, 
says that he is the of 
the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument was 
signed in behalf of said corporation by authonly of its by-laws (or by authority of a resolution 
of its board of directors) and said acknowledged 
to me that said corporation executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Public residing at: 
REQUEST FOR FULL RECONVEYANCE 
(To be used only when indebtedness secured hereby has been paid in full) 
TO: TRUSTEE. 
The undersigned is the legal owner and holder of the note and all other indebtedness securea 
by the within Trust Deed. Said note, together with all other indebtedness secured by said Trust 
Deed has been fully paid and satisfied; and you are hereby requested and directed, on payment 
to you of any sums owing to you under the terms of said Trust Deed, to cancel said note above 
mentioned, and all other evidences of indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed delivered to you 
herewith, together with the said Trust Deed, and to reconvev, without warranty, to the parties 
designated by the terms of said Trust Deed, all the estate now held by you thereunder. 
Dated , 19 ... . 
Mail reconveyance to 
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ADDENDUM 6 
TRUST DEED NOTE 
OO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: When paid, this note, with Trust Deed securing same, must be surrendered 
'to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made. 
I 194,250.00 p .^. . .?ity? .Utah 
March 10,
 1S> 82 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of 
D.C. ANDERSON as to an undivided one-half interest and DAN SCOTT as to an 
undivided 1/2 interest 
together with interest from date at the rate of *P^.^'™?. per cent (™.:9...%) per annum on 
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows: 
TWD THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SIXTY SIX AND 25/100 Dollars ($2,266.25) towards 
interest only on the 10th day of April, 1982, and a like amount to interest 
on the 10th day of each and every month thereafter to and including January 
10, 1985. 
The entire unpaid principal, together with interest is due on January 25, 1985. 
/ 
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal. Any 
l installment not paid when due si 
cent (.18.J1%) per annum until paid. 
such shall bear interest thereafter at the rate of..?r.~A~?:. per 
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in 
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its 
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and 
payable. 
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with 
or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including 
a reasonable attorney's fee. 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand 
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals, 
waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other pro-
visions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution. 
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith. 
B L A N K N O . 8 1 3 © O E M »»TG. CO. — 321s so. aeoo EAST — SALT LAKE CITY 
ADDENDUM 7 
VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY 
ESCROW DEPARTMENT 
P.O. BOX 450 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110 
(801)481-5396 
April 6, 1990 
Nygard, Coke & Vincent 
Irving H. Biele 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103-1215 
Re: Contract # 001-00624 
Dear Mr. Biele: 
Enclosed is a History of the payments received on the 
above contract in 1982, 1983, and 1984, and a History showing 
no payments were received in 1985. 
I have verified at the bottom of each of the Histories 
that they are a true and correct statement of the payments we 
received. 
If you need anything further, please contact me. 
Very truly yours, 
)yceK,raig 
Assistant Vice President 
jc 
Enclosures 
u r i i o m rrrrrMTQAi n c n n e i r IMCI I D A M P C rnDDADATinKi 
|RESS l^21^S^—L.^^.J.!.!l g:":::TA H?m.CA...9.QlL I 9 i ? j Ps .B&j 3 fc.?4 , AL -»*. o ~ 
ER OR PAYEE. ise-yAMOERSON.—AN0..45AJJ-SCaT-T - 3 .5^ ' 
RESS .*g^...S.T....MAE.YS...DE...SL...C....U.TAE .8M.Q.6. _ 
:RIPTION: NOTE....JL. REAL ESTATE CONTRACT OTHER _ 
:UMENT DATED..., i ± ? . _ <9.L2..
 O R IS. AMT. $.. . ^ . ' B ^ B A L , l ^ ^ ^ O . 00 ^ ^ 18 . 0 % Raid fo 3-10- „ 6 
In monthly pvmts commencing 4-10-82 in*the amount of $2,266.25 as interst or 
ipal. Interest,. etc., payable.?£SJrt ^ ^ ^ ^ . 
35 
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_-jtes£**\9. 
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(We) hereby acknowledge receipt of all documents described above and of all %umt collected thereon by the VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, and 
f release said bank from all further liability for said collection. 
THE VALLEY BANKS 
ESCROW INTEREST INCOME STATEMENT 
ESCROW « 0524 / ORDER S 10-Q0S24 
THE VALLEY BANKS 
P.O. BOX 450 
TRUST DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84: 
ELLEN ANDERSON 
DAN SCOTT 
2134 ST MARYS DRIVE 
SLC UTAH 341 OB 
FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF EACH INSTALLMENT RECEIVED ON YOUR ESCROW 
FOR THE YEAR tee&, THIS REPORT WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH DETAILS OF 
INTEREST INCOME FOR THE YEAR. lASE KEEP THIS FOR YOUR RECORDS. 
NOTE: IF YOU HAVE SOLD/PURCHASED THIS ESCROW DURING THE PAST YEAR, PLEASE 
INCLUDE ONLY THOSE PAYMENTS WHICH YOU ACTUALLY RECEIVED OR PAID. 
CURRENT YEAR PAYMENTS: 
- • - -OUE-
1 . 12/10 
2 . 01/10 
3 . 02/10 
4. 03/10 
5. 04/10 
6. 05/10 
7 . 06/10 
8. 07/10 
9 . 08/10 
10. 09/10 
1 1 . 10/10 
-PAH— 
03/08 
04/27 
04/27 
07/08 
07/08 
08/16 
06/16 
10/24 
10/24 
12/15 
12/15 
-AFIDUNT 
2266,25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
-INTEREST— 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2264.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
-RESERVES— • 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
o.oo 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
•PENALTIES-- -PRINCIPAL-
COO 
COO 
coo 
0.00 
coo 
0,00 
coo 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
coo 
0.00 
0,00 
ceo 
0.00 
0.00 
coo 
0.00 
coo 
o.o-:: 
-NEW PRINC.-
194250.00 
1**250.00 
194250.00 
194250.00 
194250.00 
194250.00 
194250.00 
194250,00 
194250,00 
1-4250,00 
194250.00 
-NEW UNPAID-
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
O.CO 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
coo 
0.00 
TOTALS: 24928.75 24928.75 0.00 0.00 COO 
TOTAL INTEREST INCOME FOR THE YEAR: 245 
I certify that the above l i s t i 
of payments is a true and corr 
statement. ^ 
THE VALLEY BAhKS 
E S C R O W H I S T O R Y P R I N T 
ESCROW » 06.24 / ORDER « 10-00624 A3 OF 1 2 / 3 1 7 8 4 % ' 
2 , SELLER INFORRATIOH: 
1. LAST HATE*..,ANDERSON 
2. FIRST NAPE...ELLEN 
3. ADDRESS-1....DAN SCOTT 
4. ADDRESS-2....2134 ST KARYS DRIVE 
5. CITY ST ZIP..SLC UTAH 34108 
3. BUYER INFORMATION; 
1 . LAST NAHE....DGRS 
2 . FIRST NAME...EUGENE E 
3 . ADDRESS-1....MICHAEL R MCCOY 
4 . ABDRESS-2... .PG BOX 3-614 
5 . CITY 3T E P . .MISSION VIEJQ CA 92690 
fEE INFORMATION: 
.AST NAME 
PERSON 
IVER KING BANK 
ffiCK » ' S : 1 :26786 
ftT CHECKING ACCT 
ECK * ' S : 1:26787 
INK OF COWERCE 
iECK u ' S : 1:26738 
iCROWFSES 
iECX tt'S: 1:26789 
-FIRST NADE-
ELLEN 
ACCOUNT NUHBER- •PWT A?!OUNT- -PENALTY-— 
ADVISORY) 0.00 
A D D R E S S — 
DAN SCOTT 
2134 3T MARTS DRIVE 
SLC UTAH MlOa 
PRQ3PECT0R3»73022233 144.31 0.00 
2:32424 3:32428 4 J 3 2 4 3 2 5:37174 6:37178 7:3910? 8:40999 9:43649 10:49426 11:49430 
27 117545 ANDERSON 1055.22 0.00 
2:32425 3:32429 4:32433 5:37175 6:37179 7:39110 8:41000 9:43650 10:49427 11:49421 
4 SOUTH RAIN *0-0608-7 1055.22 0.00 
SHERIDAN UY 62801 
2:32426 3:32430 4:32434 5:37176 6:37180 7:39111 6:41001 9:43-651 10:49428 11:49432 
300018131 11.00 0.00 
2:32427 3:32431 4:32435 5:37177 6:37131 7:39112 8:41002 9:43652 10:49429 11:49433 
•?. EXCESS— 
0.00 
50.00 
0,00 
TOTAL; 2266.25 COO 100. t'V 
iTRACT INFORMATION: 
IDNTRACT D A T E . . . 0 3 / 1 0 / 8 2 
[NT BEGIN DATE. .03 /10 /82 
W BEGIN DATE. .04 /10 /82 
4. INITIAL ART... 
5. INTEREST RATE. 
6. UNPD INT 8EP..Y 
7. P+I AMOUNT.... 
194250.30 
.0000 1A 
££6o.O y> 
3 . PENALTY C0SE. .0 
9 . BEGIN YR BAL.. 194250 .00 
1 0 . BEGIN YR UNPD* 0 . 0 0 
• 1 . ESCROW CODE...0 
1 2 . NEXT DUE DATE. .11 /10 /33 
1 3 . NEXT LATE DATE.OO/00/00 
14. I I" PAID THRU,. 10/10/35 
(RENT YEAF: PAYMENTS: 
RJEi -i?AID» 
,/10 01/26 
!/10 04/16 
./10 04/16 
1/10 04/16 
J/10 06/21 
1/10 06/21 
;/10 07/16 
• 1 0 08/15 
710 10/01 
i/10 12/31 
710 12/31 
TOTALS: 
-AMOUNT 
2266.25 
2266.25 
226-6.25 
2266.25 
226-6.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
24928.75 
-INTEREST— • 
2266.25 
22.66-.25 
2266.25 
22.6-6.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
226.6.25 
2266.25 
24928.75 
-RESERVES— • 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-PEMALTIES-
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-PRINCIPLE-
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-NEU PRINC.-
194250,00 
194250.00 
194250.00 
194250.00 
194250.00 
194250.00 
194250.00 
194250.00 
194250.00 
194250.00 
194250.00 
-NEW UNF'AID-
0 . 0 0 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
ITROL INFORMATION: 
1. LOCKED ,N 
2. EXPLANATION.. 
SETUP DATE...12/03/82 
LAST CHANGE..05/30/85 
LAST COUPON..02/10/85 
PRINTED ON...02/10/84 
3 , EXF'IRE DATE. .01 /10 /85 
4 . EXPIRE CODE..00 
a • r L A G S * » » » + • » * 
£• NOTZS-1 
7» NQ7ES-2**»»*4 
I certify that the above l is t ing of 
payments is a true and correct statemen 
Vice President 
ESCROW « 0ec4 / ORDER « 10-00*24 AS OF i2/ai/85*» 
2. SELLER INFORMATION£ 
1. LAST NATE....ANDERSON 
2. FIRST HARE.*.ELLEN 
3. A0DRESB-1....MN SCOTT 
4. ADDRES3-2....2134 ST PIA3YS DRIVE 
5. CITY ST IIF..SLC UTAH B410B 
2- BUYER INFORPKTIGN: 
1, LAST MAPIE....D0I1S 
w'» HuL»hiS33~l»»»niAUnHcL "ft t.UuUl 
r ^ i ? y 
:
'AYEE INFQRItATIQH: 
-LAST HARE 
ANDERSON 
SILVER KIHC BANK 
VB&T CHECKING ACCT 
BANK OF CQHMERCE 
ESCROW FEES 
FIRST NAHE-
ELL54 DAN SCOTT 
2134 ST RARYS DRIVE 
err irra'J 4£«AIS 
4 SOUTH BAIN 
SHERIDAN WY S28C1 
*0-0<S0S-7 
300012131 
-PUT AFflUNT-
<ADVISORY) 
144*£1 
•» . ^ r c «•*»•» 
tf*d4J 
0.00 
0.00 
5.00 
i* 
tr,r: 
c/%
- • \ 
M.:;0 
,vju 
^ 3 * » ^ W> * V V 
CONTRACT DATE...03/10/52 
INT BEGIN DATE..03/10/82 
PUT BEGIN DATS..04/10/52 
4. INITIAL ART... 194250.00 
5. INTEREST RATE, 16,0000 
6. UNPD INT 3Er.,T 
7. P+I AiDUNT..., 2913,75 
3> PENALTY CDDS.,0 
9. BEGIN YR BAL.. 
10 . SESIN YR UNPD, 
1 1 . ESCROW C 0 D B . . . 0 
i n o n 4 ••»£• --•* '*\i1' ^Ar"'« **UC'P ***••"* 'Q* 
2URREH7 YEAR PAYnSHTS: 
0CKEI)...,...H 
2. EXPLANATION., 
SETUP DATE...12/03/32 
LAST CHANGE..06/21/84 
LAST COUPON..03/10/86 
PRINTED ON...02/22/25 .•' * ITL * £w"** * • • • • • 
I certify that there were no payments received 
in 19£ 
g, Assistant//ice President 
ADDENDUM 8 
j Eniry No 
~ZHL^Z 
REO(JcST OF W&T&N5TA7&7mf_ 
FEE WTJEN RECOFDED, J1AIL TO: 
^ L / 1 L i ) r f l / 4 ? W / / f Space Above for Recorder's Use 
ALAN SP8JGG3. SUMMIT CO. R£COA0 
RECORDED $£? 
—. at ^*y £ t j % 
2 DEPOSITION 
| EXHIBIT^' 
W A R R A N T Y D E E D 
MICHAEL R MC COY and EUGENE E. DOMS 
of Salt Lake ,State of Utah, 
hereby CONVEY and WARRANT to DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC 
, grantors 
of Salt Lake 
for the sum of 
, County of Salt Lake 
TEN 
. grantee 
fState of Utah, 
DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in Summit County, State of Utah, 
to-vit: 
PARCEL NO, 1: All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, 
according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of record in 
the office of the-Summit County Recorder. 
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City 
Survey, according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of 
record in the office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting 
therefrom any portion located within the railroad rights of way 
as described in those certain documents recorded as Entry No, 
817C in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 
326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Summit 
County, Utah. 
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, 
according to the Amended Plat thereof, as filed and of record in 
the office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any 
portion located within the railroad rights of way as described in 
those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at 
Page 401, Entry No, 13316 in Book H at Page 326, and Entry No. 
13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Summit County, Utah. 
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and water 
lines over the Southerly Five feet and Northerly five feet of the 
following described lots. 
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City Survey 
according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of record in the 
office of the Summit County Recorder. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this^pday of 0^^\ ,19$ 1 
Signal ill th<fltfr>s^ ac* of /^ /^ X 
opn 
JOCK ClO^CJO 
<** Vvvw 
..^*0L9.A? 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
County of *5 -L • ) . 
On the 1o dayv of ^ ^ } " ~ i 
personally appeared before* me £*-w>~^£-" 
the signer^ pf.. the ..above, instrument,/*bo duly acknowledged tg mert Vv 
that vhd»A executed the same. . / J S—-N. A > *< * ' "* 
Notary—Ptrt5Tj)c. •'. /• \ . 
My commission expires • U^T"<^gtf Residing in «5^ <~-£' ,> L>H— 
7> 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County cf Summit ) 
I. AJcn Spriga3. County Recorder in and for Summit County. State of Utah, 
do heieby certify thai the attachod aoffloregoing « a full, truo and ccxrect copy 
of ilial certain ^ 4 ^ ^ J £ T /^>U^A 
which anpoars of record in my office In Book ^ 7 <^ . Page J>S^<3-
being Entry Uz.^?-//e £\2-
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, t have hcrounto cat my hand and offered my 
officii S3al. this /^ -^Afay of CCc^^yc-*.*?-/? f ? 
,<£, M«- ^ - fry* - &*fZZj-
Suniin.i County Recorder (] 
ADDENDUM 9 
March 15, 1985 
Mr. Eugene E. Doms 
Domcoy Enterprises Inc. 
23276 South Pointe Dr. 
Suite 204 
Laguna Hills, CA 92653 
Dear Gene, 
Pursuant to our discussion and verbal agreement, I hereby irrevocably tender to 
you all voting rights for all my shares of stock in Domcoy Enterprises Inc, a Utah 
corporation. I willingly take this measure to ratify the indemnification 
agreement I exercised in your favor in the lawsuit commonly known as Park City 
Investors I v. Cen Corp., et al (or Park Avenue Central). 
This revocation of my voting rights is to allow you to freely make those business 
decisions necessary to insure the continuity and viability of Domcoy as a 
business entity in light of my current legal and business situation. 
This agreement will continue until you and I mutually agree to the return of my 
stock voting rights. 
Very Truly Yours, 
cc: Gerald H. Kinghorn, Esq. 
March 15, 1985 
Mr. Eugene E. Doms 
23276 South Pointe Dr. 
Suite 204 
Laguna Hills, CA 92653 
Dear Gene, 
In order to show my support of the business decisions of my husband, Michael 
R. McCoy, and per his request, I irrevocably tender my stock voting rights to 
you under the same terms as outlined in Michael's letter of March 15, 1985 in 
regards to this matter. 
Very Truly Yours, 
Marguerite McCoy 
cc: Gerald H. Klnghorn 
attch. 
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MICHAEL R. McCOY 
TAX ANO REAL ESTATE ATTORNEY 
88029 OOnOTHV OHWE • SUTE 102 • AGOUM HUS. CA 91301 
Eugene E. Doms 
PO Box 3614 
Mission Vie jo , CA 92690 
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ADDENDUM 10 
Edward S. Sweeney (3168) and 
J. Peter Mulhern (3667), of 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-1666 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON as personal 
representative of the estate of 
D. C. ANDERSON and DAN SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
EUGENE E. DOMS and MICHAEL R. 
McCOY, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. ? 3 3 C{ 
"«**M 
FILED-
Clark at Summit Counil 
=-T Offouty Ctar* — 
P l a i n t i f f s complain of Defendants and fo r cause of action a l lege: 
1 . P l a i n t i f f , El len Anderson, is a resident of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. El len Anderson became Personal Representative of the estate 
of D.C. Anderson by court order dated November 30, 1982. 
2. P l a i n t i f f , Dan Scot t , is a resident of Sheridan County, 
State of Wyoming. 
3. Defendants are both residents of Orange County, State of 
C a l i f o r n i a . 
4 . On or about March 10, 1982, defendants executed a Note 
pursuant t o which they promised t o pay "D.C. Anderson as to an undivided 
one-half i n t e r e s t , and Dan Scott as to an undivided one-half i n te res t " 
$194,250.00. A t rue and correct copy of that Note is attached hereto as 
OOOOOi 
Exhibit "A". The outstanding principal balance on that Note is 
$194,250.00 which principal balance is currently due and owing. Defendants 
have fai led and refused to pay p la int i f fs that amount. 
5. In addition to the principal due and owing under the Note 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A", interest payments of $2,266.25 per month 
for the months of November, 1984, December, 1984 and January, 1985 are now 
past due. Defendants have fai led and refused to make those interest 
payments to p l a i n t i f f s . Defendants are therefore indebted to p la int i f fs in 
the amount of $6,798.75 for past due interest payments. Defendants total 
indebtedness to p la int i f fs for the principal amount due under the Note 
together with past due interest payments is therefore $201,048.75. 
6. The Note attached hereto as Exhibit "A" provides that a l l 
past due payments under that Note shall bear interest at the rate of 
eighteen percent (18%) per annum. 
7. The Note attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is secured by a Trust 
Deed dated March 10, 1982. A true and correct copy of that Trust Deed is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "B". The Trust Deed attached hereto as Exhibit 
"B" covers the property in Summit County, State of Utah, which is ful ly 
described as follows: 
PARCEL NO. 1: 
All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 
29, 30, 31, and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, according to 
the amended plat thereof, as filed and of record in the 
office of the Summit County Recorder. 
PARCEL NO. 2: 
All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City Survey, according 
to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of record in the 
office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom 
any portion located within the railroad rights of way as 
described in those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 
"
2
" 000002 
8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at 
Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records 
of Summit County, Utah. 
PARCEL NO. 3: 
All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, according to the 
Amended Plat thereof, as filed and of record in the'office 
of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any 
portion located within the railroad rights of way as 
described in those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 
8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at 
Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records 
of Summit County, Utah. 
TOGETHER WITH AN EASEMENT FOR UTILITIES, INCLUDING SEWER AND 
WATER LINES OVER THE SOUTHERLY FIVE FEET AND NORTHERLY FIVE 
FEET OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED LOTS. 
All of Lot 14, and the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park 
City Survey according to the amended plat thereof as filed 
and of record in the office of the Summit County Records. 
8. Plaintiffs have elected to foreclose the Trust Deed Note and 
Trust Deed attached hereto as Exhibits "A" and "B" as a note and mortgage 
pursuant to paragraph 16 of the Trust Deed and the Utah Code. 
9. Other than the above captioned matter, plaintiffs have 
commenced no action to collect the sums owing from defendants. 
10. The Trust Deed and Note attached hereto provide that if the 
Note is collected by an attorney defendants will pay all costs of 
collection, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
11. Plaintiffs have had to retain an attorney and incur 
attorneys fees to collect the sums due from defendants. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for relief as follows: 
1. For a judgment against defendants, jointly and severally, in 
the sum of $201,048.75, together with interest thereon at 18% per annum 
from January 25, 1985 until paid. 
"
3
" 00000.* 
2. For costs inc lud ing reasonable at torney 's fees. 
3. For a determination that p l a i n t i f f s ' i n te res t in the subject 
property is superior t o the claims of a l l defendants. 
4. For declarat ion that the Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed 
attached hereto as Exhibi ts "A" and "B" are to be t reated as a note and 
mortgage and fo r an order author iz ing and d i rec t ing that they be 
immediately foreclosed and that the subject property, or so much thereof as 
may be necessary, be sold as provided by law to sa t i s f y the amounts prayed 
f o r , inc luding costs and at torney 's fees. 
5. For a judgment fo r any deficiency which may remain owing by 
defendants t o p l a i n t i f f s a f te r the property is sold and the proceeds duly 
applied t o the costs of sa le , at torney 's fees, costs of t h i s ac t ion , and 
the pr inc ipa l and in te res t remaining unpaid on the Note attached hereto as 
Exhibi t "A". 
6. For an order that a l l persons claiming an in teres t in the 
subject property have the r i g h t , upon producing sa t i s fac to ry proof of 
i n t e r e s t , to redeem the property w i th in the time provided by law for such 
redemption, and that a f te r the exp i ra t ion of the period of redemption as 
provided by law, defendants and a l l persons claiming by, through, or under 
them are forever barred and foreclosed of a l l r i g h t , t i t l e , and in te res t in 
and t o the subject proper ty . 
7. For such fu r the r r e l i e f as the Court deems j u s t . 
DATED th i s £k day of C ^ ^ z ^ 1985. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
T7PETER MULHEftN ^ ^ 
-
4
- 000004 
Pla in t i f fs 1 Address: 
Ellen Anderson 
2134 St. Mary's Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Dan Scott 
Box 297 
Dayton, Wyoming 82836 
S00G00 
Exhibit "A" 
TRUST DEED NOTE 
DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: When paid, this note, with Trust Deed securing same, must be surrendered 
to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made. 
$ i?i*250.00^ P ^ Ci^ ( JJt^ 
MarchJ.0,
 l% 82 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of 
D.C. ANDERSCN as to an undivided one-half interest and DAN SCOTT as to an 
undivided 1/2 interest 
.....9^..H^!™.J3^ (|. 194,250.00 ^ 
together with interest from date at the rate of .??5S15?i per cent (*7.!.P..%) per annum on 
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows: 
TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SIXTY SIX AND 25/100 Dollars ($2,266.25) towards 
interest only on the 10th day of April, 1982, and a lite arount to interest 
on the 10th day of each and every month thereafter to and including January 
10, 1985. 
The entire unpaid principal, together with interest is due on January 25, 1985. 
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal Any 
such installment not paid when due shall bear interest thereafter at the rate aiJES£32£!L per 
cent (.18—0.%) per annum until paid. 
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in 
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at ia 
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and 
payable. 
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with 
or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and sevtnlly, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including 
a reasonable attorney's fee. 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand 
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals, 
waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other pro-
visions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution. 
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith. 
• L A N K NO. 813 O O*M rro. co. — u t i »o i«oo BAST — SALT UAK« CITY 
000006 
* 
vaxxcy oeuus, a u n i s t 
" c /o "Dave"* Bennett * -"Tiiist "Sep... 
3rdjSouthL. West Tenple 
SIC, Utah 84111 
&v(^ yuxkU.JjTLE. 
l
"
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Exhibit "B" TRUST DEED 
With Assignment of Rents 
THIS TRUST DEED, made this ...iPth
 d a y o f March. % 1 9_82 
between S * 2 r o . . E ^ p Q ^ . . c ^ 
, as TRUSTOR, 
whose address is 2850 Ot»ari P^k 
(Stn*t and number) (City) (State) 
_ .SUM .^..CQCkTC
 t a s TRUSTEE,' and 
B*G*..flNBEESKM.m 
un4iviaed..i/2..i^terest. , as BENEFICIARY, 
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, 
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in Sunmit 
County, State of Utah: 
PARCEL NO. 1: Al l of Lots 17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31 
and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, according t o the amended 
p l a t thereof, as f i l e d and of record i n the o f f i ce of the 
SurmtLt County Recorder. 
PARCEL NO. 2 : A l l of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City Survey, according 
t o the amended plat thereof, as f i l e d and of record i n the 
o f f i ce of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom 
any portion located within the railroad rights of way as 
described in those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 
8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H a t 
Page 326, and a i t ry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records 
of Summit County, Utah. 
PARCEL NO. 3: A l l of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, according t o the 
Amended Plat thereof, as f i l e d and of record in the o f f i c e of 
the Sunmit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any portion 
located within the railroad r ights of way as described i n 
those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 i n Book C 
at Page 401, Bitry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, and Entry 
No. 13610 in Book H a t Page 373, records of Summit County, Utah. 
TOGETHER KETH AN EASEMENT FOR UTILITIES, INCLUDING SEWER AND WATER LINES OVER 
THE SOUTHERLY FIVE IEET AND NCKIHERLSf FIVE FEET OF TOE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED LOTS. 
A l l of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City Survey according 
t o the amended p l a t thereof as f i l e d and of record in the o f f i ce of the Sunmit 
County Records. 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of 
way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, 
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon 
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a pro-
missory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $ 19.4,250.00 , made by 
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein 
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of 
each agreement of* Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as 
hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory 
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums 
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest 
thereon as herein provided. 
•NOTE: Trustee must be a member of the Utah State Bar; a bank, building and loan association or savings 
and loan association authorized to do such business in Utah; a corporation authorized to do a trust business in 
Utah; or a title insurance or abstract company authorized to do such business in Utah. 
BOOKM .15. PA I k ^ 0 
2. iS • 
complete or restore promptly and in . and workmanlike manner any building which may he .ructed. 
damaged or destroyed thereon; to coo. with all laws, covenants and restrictions affecting said pi . .srty; noi 
to commit or permit waste thereof; not to commit, suffer or permit any act upon said property in,.vio1.itJu*(pf law; tn 
do all other acts which from the character or use of said property may be reasonably necessary, tne specific 
enumerations herein not excluding the general; and. if the loan sveured hereby or any part thereof u being ob-
tained for the purpose of financing construction of improvements on said property, Trustor further agrees: 
(a) To commence construction promptly and to pursue same with reasonable diligence Ui completion 
in accordance with plans and specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary, and 
(b) To allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at all times during construction. 
Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed by Beneficiary, setting forth facts showing a default 
by Trustor under this numbered paragraph, u authorized to accept as true and conclusive all fact* and state* 
menu therein, and to act thereon hereunder. 
2. To provide and maintain insurance, of such type or types and amount* an Beneficiary may require, on 
the improvements now existing or hereafter erected or placed on said |»n»periy. Such insurance »hall l>c carried 
in companies approved by Beneficiary with loss payable clause* in favor of and in form acceptable to Beneficiary. 
In event of loss. Trustor shall give immediate notice to Beneficiary, who may make proof of loss, and each insurance 
company concerned is hereby authorized and directed to make payment for such lt»«. directly to llrncficiary 
instead of to Trustor and Beneficiary jointly, and the insurance proceeds, or any part thereof, may be applied 
by Beneficiary, at its option, to reduction of the indebtedness hereby secured or to the restoration or repair ol 
the property damaged. 
3. To deliver to. pay for and maintain with Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full, 
such evidence of title as Beneficiary may require, including abstracu ot title or policies of title insurance and 
»ny extensions or renewals thereof or supplements thereto. 
4. To appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to 
said property, or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; and should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to 
also appear in or defend any such action or proceeding, to pay all costs and expenses, including cost of evi-
dence of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee. 
5. To pay at least 10 days before delinquency all taxes and assessment affecting said property, including 
all assessmenu upon water company stock and all rents, assessmenu and /charges for water, appurtenant to or 
used in connection with said property; to pay, when due. all encumbrances, charges, and liens with interest, 
on said property or any part thereof, which at any time appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay aU costa. 
fees, and expenses of this Trust. 
6. Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or 
Trustee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing 
Trustor from any obligation hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may 
deem necessary to protect the security hereof. Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon said 
property for such purposes; commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the 
security hereof or the rights of powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase, contest, or compromise any 
encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto; and in ex* 
ercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in iu absolute discretion it may deem 
necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable fees. 
7. To pay immediately and without demand ail sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, 
with interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10Tc) per annum until paid, and the repay-
ment thereof shall be secured hereby. 
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT: 
8. Should said property or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement 
or condemnation proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other manner. Beneficiary shall be 
entitled to all compensation, awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its option 
to commence, appear in and prosecute tn iu own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compro-
mise or settlement, in connection with such taking or damage. All such compensation, awards, damages, righta 
of action and proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of fire and other insurance affecting said property, 
are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may, after deducting therefrom all iu expenses, including attorney's fees, 
apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby. Trustor agrees to execute such further assignmenU of any 
compensation, award, damages, and righu of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require. 
9. At any time and from time to time upon writtten request of Beneficiary, payment of iU fees and pre* 
sentation of this Trust Deed and the note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation and 
retention), without affecting the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby. 
Trustee may (a) consent to the making of any map or plat of said property; (b) join in granting any ease* 
ment or creating any restriction thereon; (c) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed 
or the lien or charge thereof; (d) reconvey, without warranty, all or any part of said property. The grantee in 
any reconveyance may be described as "the person or persons entitled thereto", and the recitals therein of any 
matters or facU shall be conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof. Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's 
fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph. 
10. As additional security. Trustor hereby assigns Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all 
rents, issues, royalties, and profiU of the property affected by this Trust Deed and of any personal property 
located thereon. Until Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the per* 
formance of any agreement hereunder. Trustor shall have the right to collect all such renU. issues, royalties, 
and profiU earned prior to default as they become due and payable. If Trustor shall default as aforesaid. 
Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without 
taking possession of the property affected hereby, to collect all renU. royalties, issues, and profiU. Failure or 
discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from time to time to collect any such moneys shall not in any 
manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to collect the same. 
Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall be. or be construed to 
be. an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a 
subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option. 
11. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder. Beneficiary may at any time without notice, either in 
person, by agent, or by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of 
Beneficiary as such receiver), and without regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby 
secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any part thereof, in iU own name sue for or 
otherwise collect said renU. issues, and profiU. including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less 
costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness 
secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may determine. 
12. The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the col I eel on of such rents, issues, and 
profits, or the proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or 
damage of said property, and the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any 
default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice. 
13. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as 
a waiver of such right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other 
or subsequent default. 
14. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured here-
by or in the performance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due 
and payable at the option of Beneficiary. In the event of such default. Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee 
to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause said property to be sold to satisfy the obligations 
hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said property or some part or 
parcel thereof is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all documenU evidencing 
expenditures secured hereby. 
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15. After the lapse of such time a n. -hen be required by law following the recordation of said tee of 
default, and notice of default and notice of SA.^ having been given as then required by law, Trustee! without demand 
on Trustor, shall sell said property on the date and at the lime and place designated in »aid notice of sale, either as 
a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to 
direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known lots or parcels, shall be sold), at public 
auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States at the time of 
sale. The person conducting the sale may. for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to 
time until it shall be completed and. in every case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration 
thereof by such person at the time and place last appointed for the sale; provided, if the sale is postponed 
for longer than one day beyond the day designated in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the 
U I M manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed con* 
veying said property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The recitals in the 
Deed of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Bene-
ficiary, may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and 
expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's 
fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; 
(3) ail sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 10% per annum from date 
of expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (S) the remainder, if any, to the person or persons 
legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County 
Clerk of the county in which the sale took place. 
16. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder. Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums 
secured hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law 
for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceed-
ing all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be 
fixed by the court 
17. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County 
Recorder of each county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From 
the tune the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority 
and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and 
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law. 
18. This Trust D^d shall apply to. inure to the benefit of. and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, 
devisees, adminstrators. executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and 
several. The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured 
hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or 
neuter, and the singular number includes the plural. 
19. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public 
record as provided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other 
Trust Deed or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor. Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless 
brought by Trustee. 
20. This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah 
21. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale 
hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth. 
(If Trustor an Individual) 
STATE OF UTAH. 
COUNTY OFSunnat *»« 
On the 1.0th 
appeared before me 
the signer(s) of the abo; 
same. 
My Commission Expires: 
9-28-82 
S$K&. 
.., AJ). 19...??., personally 
R. M3CCY 
acknowledged to me that £..he.X executed the 
Sal t lake City, Utah 
(If Trustor a Corporation) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 
On the day of , A.D. 19 , personally 
appeared before me - , who being by me duly sworn, 
says that he is the of , 
the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument was 
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws (or by authority of a resolution 
of its board of directors) and said acknowledged 
to me that said corporation executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Public residing at: 
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ADDENDUM 11 
GERALD H. KINGHORN A 1825 
Attorney for Defendants 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 3 64-86 44 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON as Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of D. C. ANDERSON and DAN 
SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MICHAEL R. McCOY, and 
EUGENE E. DOMS, 
Defendants. 
Eugene E. Doms hereby answers the Complaint of the^PIain-
tiffs on file herein and for Counterclaim against the Plaintiffs 
alleges as follows: 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
Defendant Eugene E. Doms admits, denies and alleges as 
follows: 
1. The Answering Defendant denies the allegations of 
paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 on the grounds and for the reasons that 
with respect to the allegations of paragraphs 1 and 2 The Answer-
ing Defendant is without knowledge as to the truth or falsity and 
therefore denies the same; with respect to the allegations of 
paragraph 3 the Answering Defendant believes that the Defendant 
Michael R. McCoy is not a resident of Orange County, State of 
California. 
_1
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2. The Answering Defendant admits the allegations of 
paragraph 4 and alleges that the note was in consideration for a 
certain purchase of real property described more specifically in 
paragraph 7 of Plaintiff's Complaint as an integral part and 
consideration for the purchase and sale transaction wherein the 
Plaintiffs sold to the Defendant the real property described 
therein. 
3. The Answering Defendant denies the allegation in 
paragraph 5 on the grounds and for the reasons that the Answering 
Defendant is entitled to rescission of the transaction for the 
reasons stated in the Defendants Counterclaim. 
4. The Answering Defendant admits the allegations of 
paragraph 6 and 7 and denies the balance of the allegations 
contained therein. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
For the Counterclaim against the Plaintiffs the Counterclaim 
of Eugene E. Doms alleges as follows: 
1. That the parties are the holders of a certain trust 
deed note executed in connection with the purchase by the Defen-
dants of certain real property in Park City, Utah, described more 
specifically in paragraph 7 of the Plaintiff's Complaint. 
2. That the parties entered into the transaction on or 
about November 12, 1981 and that in consideration of the trust 
deed note which is attached to the Plaintiff's Complaint the 
Plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest executed a certain 
general warranty deed in favor of the Defendants warranting title 
_o_ 000042 
in the grantors thereof with the implied warranty and 
covenant against encumbrances on the property. 
3. That the grantors violated the warranty against encum-
brances in the execution and delivery of the warranty deed in 
exchange for the trust deed note by virtue of certain prescrip-
tive easements which prevented the warranty deed from passing 
clear title to the Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms. 
4. Because of the violation of the implied warranty 
against encumbrances the Counterclaimant is entitled to 
rescission of the sales transaction and the return of all sums 
paid upon a tender by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs of title 
to the property described in paragraph 7 of the Plaintiffs1 
Complaint. 
5. Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms alleges that the Court 
should rescind the transaction entered by the parties, vest title 
in the Plaintiffs as the grantors or successors in interest to 
the grantors under that certain warranty deed executed by them 
and grant judgement in favor of the Counterclaimant and against 
the Plaintiffs in the amount of all sums paid by the Counter-
claimant to the Plaintiffs in a specific amount to the proven 
upon trial of the matter. 
Wherefore the Answering Defendant and Counterclaimant Eugene 
E. Doms prays that the Plaintiff's takgL^nothing by the Complaint 
and that the Court award Judgment as set/forth/ abo^e. 
000043 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM was mailed, postage prepaid, on 
the ^ ^ day of January, 1988, to the following: 
E. Russell Vetter 
BIEHLE, HASLAM & HATCH 
50 West Broadway, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
- 4 -
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ADDENDUM 12 
NO. 
FILED 
LARRY R. KELLER, #1785 
Attorney for Defendant Doms 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
, er* M ium<r t ^ouniy 
BY ^i 
Deputy Clark 
#K' 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ELLEN ANDERSON as Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
Of CD. ANDERSON, ELLEN 
ANDERSON personally, DAN 
SCOTT and JEAN SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY and 
EUGENE E. DOMS, 
Defendants. 
ORDER REGARDING 
PROVISIONAL ATTORNEY'S 
FEES 
Case No. 8339 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
-ooOoo-
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on 
Defendant Doms' objection to the Order proposed by Plaintiff 
setting aside Default Judgment and the award of attorney's 
fees in the matter. Plaintiff was represented by Irving H. 
Biehle, Esq. and Defendant Doms was represented by Larry R. 
Keller, Esq. 
SVJT*-* 000245 
After hearing argument of counsel and receiving pleadings 
and memoranda of counsel on the issue as to whether or not it 
was appropriate for the Court to have awarded all of the 
attorney's fees incurred by counsel from the on set of the 
case to the date of setting aside the Default Judgment, the 
Court orders that the matter shall be taken under advisement 
and considered anew once the case itself is finally disposed 
of on the merits. 
Furthermore, the Court denies Defendant Doms? Motion to 
impound the sum of $4,467.00 paid by Defendant Doms' to 
Plaintiffs' counsel as a condition of setting aside the 
Default Judgment on June 1, 1988. The court finds that 
because this sum has already been paid, that it would be 
inappropriate for the Court to now impound it as requested by 
Defendant Doms' counsel, but once again orders that whether or 
not it was appropriate for the Court to award that sum as 
attorney's fees for setting aside the Default Judgment is an 
issue which will be reserved until the final disposition of 
the case on its merits. 
'/ / 
BY THE COURT: 
DATED t h i s 5 clay o f y, ,,/> SI*, , 1988 . 
7 / 
U 
HtfN. PAT B. BRIJ 
Third D i s t r i c t Court 
- 2 -
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order, first class postage prepaid, this day 
of June, 1988 to Irving H. Biehle, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 50 
West Broadway, Fourth Floor, Salt Lake City, UT 84101. 
jMjon djuaofa 
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r \ n n O A *"i 
ADDENDUM 13 
NO 
LARRY R. KELLER, #1785 
Attorney for Defendant 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
J 
Cierx 
i a 
JT ounmiT 
Deputv 
Counry 
Cierir 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OoOoo 
ELLEN ANDERSON, Personal Re-
presentative of the Estate 
Of D.C. ANDERSON & DAN SCOTT, 
and JEAN SCOTT, his wife, and 
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY & EUGENE E. 
DOMS, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. 8339 
-ooOoo-
COMES NOW Defendant, Eugene E. Doms, by and through his 
attorney, Larry R. Keller, and amends the Counterclaim 
previously filed in the above-entitled matter as follows: 
COUNTERCLAIM 
For cause of action alleged, Defendant Eugene E. Doms 
counterclaims against Plaintiffs as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiffs jointly and severally are the 
holders of a certain trust deed note executed in connection 
000102 
with the purchase by the Defendant Doms of certain real 
property in Park City, Utah described more specifically in 
Paragraph No. 7 of the Plaintiffs1 Complaint. 
2. That the parties entered into the transaction on or 
about November 12, 1981 and that in consideration of the trust 
deed note which is attached to the Plaintiffs' Complaint the 
Plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest executed a 
certain general warranty deed in favor of the Defendants 
warranting title in the grantors thereof with the implied 
warranty and covenant against encumbrances on the property. 
3. That the grantors violated the warranty against 
encumbrances in the execution and delivery of the warranty 
deed in exchange for the trust deed note by virtue of certain 
prescriptive easements which prevented the warranty deed from 
passing clear title to the Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms. 
4. Due to the violation of the implied warranty against 
encumbrances and a violation of the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated Section 57-1-12 as amplified by Utah Supreme Court 
decisions such as Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1124 
(Utah 1984), the Counterclaimant is entitled to rescission of 
the sales transaction and contract and the return of all sums 
paid together with interest upon a tender by the Defendants to 
the Plaintiffs of title to the property more particularly 
described in Paragraph No. 7 of the Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
5. Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms alleges that no 
default ever occurred and the Court should rescind the 
transaction and contract entered into by the parties, vest 
- 2 -
title in the Plaintiffs as the grantors or successors in 
interest to the grantors under that certain warranty deed 
executed by them, and grant judgment in favor of the 
Counterclaimant and against the Plaintiffs in the amount of 
all sums paid by the Counterclaimant to the Plaintiffs 
pursuant to said contract in a specific amount to be proven 
upon trial of the matter which should include interest, costs 
and attorneyfs fees of pursuing this rescission action. 
6. Defendant Doms purchased the property which is the 
subject of this lawsuit with the intent of developing said 
property and earning a profit from such development. 
7. The failure of the Plaintiff to deliver clear title 
prevented Defendant Doms from developing the subject property 
as planned and he is damaged thereby in an amount to be 
determined at trial, together with interest, costs and 
attorneyT s fees. 
WHEREFORE, the Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms prays that 
Plaintiffs take nothing by the Complaint filed against him in 
the above-entitled matter and that the Court award Judgment 
against Plaintiffs, jointly and severally, rescinding the 
contract and conveyance in the above-entitled matter and 
ordering Plaintiffs to repay all sums paid to them under the 
contract and conveyance including interest at the contract or 
legal rate, costs, and attorney's fees required to pursue this 
rescission action. 
- 3 -
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FURTHER, Counterclaimant prays the Court award him 
damages for lost profits, interest thereon, costs and 
attorney's fees for this inability to develop the property 
which was caused by Plaintiffs' failure to deliver clear 
title. 
DATED this day of June, 1988. 
,LER, 
Attorney/ for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Amended Counterclaim, first class postage 
prepaid, this /j day of June, 1988 to: E. Russell Vetter, 
Biehle, Haslam and Hatch, 50 West Broadway, Fifth Floor, Salt 
Lake City, UT 84101. 
- 4 -
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ADDENDUM 14 
NO, 
FILED 
LARRY R. KELLER #178 5 
Attorney for Defendant Doms 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ELLEN ANDERSON as Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of~D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN 
ANDERSON personally, DAN 
SCOTT and JEAN SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MICHAEL R. McCOY, and 
EUGENE E. DOMS, 
Defendants. 
ooOoo 
COMES NOW Defendant Eugene E. Doms, by and through his coun-
sel, Larry R. Keller, Esq., and files this Second Amended 
Counterclaim amending the previously filed Amended Counterclaim 
in the above-entitled matter as follows: 
COUNTERCLAIM 
For cause of action alleged, Defendant Eugene E. Doms 
Counterclaims against Plaintiffs as follows: 
1 
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^terx 2T ourr.miT County 
™ <<Jx 
SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. 8339 
Judae Pat B. Brian 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. That the Plaintiffs jointly and severally are the 
holders of a certain Trust Deed Note executed in connection with 
the purchase by Defendant Doms of certain real property in Park 
City, Summit County, Utah. 
2. That the parties entered into a transaction for the 
transfer of the parcel of real property more specifically 
described in Plaintiffs1 Complaint on or about November 12, 1981 
and that in consideration of the Trust Deed Note, a copy of which 
is attached to Plaintiffs1 Complaint, the Plaintiffs or their 
predecessors in interest, executed a certain Warranty Deed in 
favor of the Defendants warranting title in the Grantors thereof 
with the implied warranty and covenant against encumbrances on 
the property provided by law. 
3. That the Grantors violated the warranty against 
encumbrances in the execution and delivery of the Warranty Deed 
in exchange for the Trust Deed Note by virtue of certain 
prescriptive easements which prevented the Warranty Deed from 
passing clear title to the Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms. 
4. Due to the violation of the implied warranty against 
encumbrances and a violation of the provisions of U.C.A. § 57-1-12 
as amplified by Utah Supreme Court decisions such as Bergstrom v. 
Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah 1984), the Counterclaimant is 
2 
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entitled to rescission of the sales transaction and contract and 
the return of all sums paid, together with interest,* upon a 
tender by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs of title to the pro-
perty more particularly described in Paragraph No. 7 of the 
Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
5. As a result of the failure to grant clear title to the 
property which is the subject of this lawsuit through the Warranty 
Deed, Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms alleges that no default ever 
occurred with regard to payments due under the Trust Deed Note, 
and the Court should rescind the transaction and contract entered 
into by the parties, vest title in the Plaintiffs as the Grantors 
or successors in interest to the Grantors under that certain 
Warranty Deed executed by them, and grant judgment in favor of 
the Counterclaimant and against the Plaintiffs in the amount of 
all sums paid by the Counterclaimant to the Plaintiffs pursuant 
to said contract in a specific amount to be proven upon trial of 
the matter which should include interest, costs and attorney's 
fees pursuing this rescission action. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
6. Defendant Doms realleges and incorporates by reference 
all allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 5 above as 
though set out in full herein. 
7. Defendant Eugene E. Doms purchased the property which is 
3 
00G239 
the subject of this lawsuit with the intent of developing said 
property and earning a profit from such development.* 
8. The failure to the Plaintiffs to deliver clear title 
prevented Defendant Doms from developing the subject property as 
planned, and he is damaged thereby in an amount to be determined 
at trial, together with interest, costs and attorney's fees. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
9. Defendant Doms realleges and incorporates by reference 
all allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 8 above as 
though set out in full herein. 
10. Defendnat Eugene E. Doms discovered on June 23, 1988, 
through his attorney, that a fraud was perpetrated upon him by 
the Plaintiffs in this matter, in that Plaintiffs transferred 
title to Defendant Doms through a "Special Warranty Deed" in 
violation of the express contract and agreement that title should 
be transferred by virtue of a warranty deed without the denomina-
tion "Special" in the deed. 
11. Plaintiffs therefore breached their contract with 
Defendant Doms at the time they typed in the word "Special" in 
the form Warranty Deed in violation of the Earnest Money Agreement 
which represented the contract between the parties in the above-
entitled matter. 
12. As a result of said breach of contract, Defendant Doms 
4 
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is entitled to a complete rescission of the contract, or in the 
alternative, payment of all sums which are damages as a result of 
Plaintiffs1 breach of contract, which include all sums paid by 
Defendant Doms on said contract to Plaintiffs, plus interest, 
costs and attorney's fees relating thereto. 
WHEREFORE, Counterclaimant prays that Plaintiffs take 
nothing by the Complaint filed against him the above-entitled 
matter, and that the Court award him judgment against Plaintiffs, 
jointly and severally, rescinding the contract and conveyance in 
the above-entitled matter, and ordering Plaintiffs to repay all 
sums paid to them under the contract and conveyance, including 
interest at the contract or legal rate, costs and attorney's fees 
required to pursue this recission action. 
FURTHER, Counterclaimant prays the Court award him damages 
for lost profits, interest thereon, costs and attorney's fees for 
his inability to develop the property which was caused by 
Plaintiffs1 failure to deliver clear title. 
FURTHER, Counterclaimant prays the Court award him all dama-
ges caused as a result of Plaintiffs' fraud and breach of 
contract in not supplying Defendant Doms with a general warranty 
deed as required by the original contract between the parties. 
DATED this &(H day of June, 1988. 
00G241 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true, correct copy of the 
foregoing Second Amended Counterclaim, first class postage pre-
paid, this 2^Hh day of June, 1988, to: 
Irving H. Biele, Esq. 
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorney for Ellen Anderson as 
Personal Representative of the 
Estate of D.C. Anderson and 
Dan Sco t t 
6 
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ADDENDUM 15 
G r a n t s DOMCOY ENTERPRISES. IMC. 
c/o Larry R. Xmllmx 
257 E. 200 S., Suite 340, BGBC 10 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
qurucuoH WBD 
2%2^ 
88 AUG 30 AH 10: Ob 
ALAN Si'RIGGS
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SUMMIT C0UN1 T RECORDER 
SUMMIT COUNTY, A Body Corporate and Politic, organized and existing under 
the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal office at Coalville, County 
of Sumit. State of Utah, grantor, hereby QUIT CLAIMS to DOMCOY 
Salt Lake XTEyT of TJEaTT 
Grantee 
_for good and 
valuable consideration, the interest of Summit County as acquired under that 
certain tax sale in Book 1982 page 216
 t and subsequent Auditors stamp 
recorded as antry I 273536 in Book 436 paee 779 in and to the 
following described tract of• land in SusaUt County* State of Utah: 
PARCEL NO. 1: All of Lota 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 
27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, according to 
the amended plat thereof, as filed and of record in the office of 
the Summit County Recorder. 
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lot* J7 and 19, BLock 59. Park City Survey, 
according to the amended plat thereof, a* filed and of record in the 
office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any portion 
located within the railroad righta of way ee deacrlbed in thoae certain 
documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 In Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 
13316 in Book H at Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373. 
records of Summit County, Utah. 
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, according 
to the Amended Plat thereof, aa filed and of record In the office of 
the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any portion, located 
within the railroad rights of way aa deacrlbed in those certain 
documents recorded aa Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry 
No. 13316 In Book N at Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book N at 
Page 373, records of Summit County, Utah. 
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and water lines 
over the Southerly Five feet and Northerly five feet of the following 
deacrlbed lota. 
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot IS, Block 58, Park City Survey 
according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of record in the 
office of the Summit County Recorder. 
The officer who signs this deed hereby certifies thst this instrument snd 
the tranafer represented hereby wss duly authorised under a resolution duly 
adopted by the Board of County Commiaalonera of the grantor at a lawful meeting 
duly held and attended by a quorum. 
Therefore, In accordance with title 59-2-1363 of the Utah Code and In 
witness hereof, the grantor Itaa cauaed ita corporate name and acal to be here 
unto affixed by ita duly authorised County Clerk thie ^W'bar of fli//.it< J 
A.D., 1 ? W . W 
SUrtilT COUNTY 
By Douglas R. Geary 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 
. On the 
><.uj*> Douglas R. Caary 
f7#* 
SiimmirCounty Clerk1 wQKjJ^p.Qink 
500* 491^405 
.J</ d0T Of tt<< *^,tJ't 
who being bj me duly sworn, did say 
loJ* A.D., pereonally appeared before me 
that he, the said Douglae £.«>> 
R. Gca*?- is the Clerk of Summit County, snd that the within and foregoing instrument -*•*' 
was signed in behalf of said county by authority of a resolution of its Board of 
Commissioners, and Douglas R. Geary duly acknowledged to me that said county executed 
the same and that the seal affixed is the sesl of the said county. 
V*. 
My Commission Expires 
Notant'^ublic 
Residing at: 
L. f* + ~rt* 
l*S~ 
ADDENDUM 16 
Recorded at Request of 
a t M. Fee Pa id $ . 
by 
"2%300 
Dep.Book 
Mai l t a x n o t i c e t o : Grantee c / o Larry R. K e l l e r , 2 
S u i t e 3 4 0 , Box 1 0 , S a l t Lake C 
6 8 AUG 3 0 AHlQ:Qli 
^ ALAN SPHSG6S 
Page R«fKMITIlMIJ RECORDER 
W A R R A N T Y D E E D 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC. grantor 
of Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, hereby 
CONVEYS and WARRANTS to 
EUGENE E. DOMS grantee 
of Mission Viejo, California for the sum of 
TEN and 00/100 DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in Summit County, 
State of Utah: 
PARCEL NO. 1: All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, 
according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of record 
in the office of the Summit County Recorder. 
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City 
Survey, according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of 
record in the office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting 
therefrom any portion located within the railroad rights of 
way as described in those certain documents recorded as Entry 
No. 8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at 
Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records 
of Summit County, Utah. 
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, 
according to the Amended Plat thereof, as filed and of record 
in the office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting there-
from any portion located within the railroad rights of way as 
described in those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 
8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 
326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of 
Summit County, Utah. 
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and water 
lines over the Southerly Five feet and Northerly five feet of the 
following described lots: 
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City Survey 
according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of record in 
the office of the Summit County recorder. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor, thistf_ day of &^&?L_, 1988. 
Signed in the presence of: 
Jean M. Henry DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, I N C . , a 
Mission Viejo National Bank Corpo^fation by/: p 
Mission Viejo, CA 92691 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
) SS. 
COUNTY OF ORANGE ) 
EU(£?NE 4.. DOMsf Secretary/" 
Treasurer and Authorized Officer 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this26th^ 
day of August r ^3^f bv Eugene E. Poms , 
Secretary/Treasurer and Authorized Officer of Domcoy Enterprises, 
JEAN M HENRY % \ / /
 y )Z JJ. 
NOTARY PUBUC-CALirORNIA * \ ( U 1 > ' i / ' s ) / /.» ^ ' / 
ORANGt COUNT* 2 — -j^trrz—n -=*•—=• - - r - < j ^ ~ 
My Comm £ip April 21 19M X 
I n c . 
NOTARY PUBLIC jea^M. H£rfr7~ 
My Commission E x p i r e s 4-27-92 R e s i d i n g in °^n8_e c ? u n t y j ,CA.: 
eoo» 491.-a-.i406 
ADDENDUM 17 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ. — No. 2194 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
A Utah Professional Law Corporation 
Attorneys for Petitioner Jeanne Scott 
Suite 14, Intrade Bldg. South 
1399 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
Telephone: (801) 487-7834 
8ET0FE3 8 1989 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate of 
D. C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON 
personally, DAN SCOTT and 
*JEANNE SCOTT 
Plaintiffs and 
Petitioner 
*JEANNE SCOTT IS THE ONLY 
PLAINTIFF TO THIS APPEAL 
vs. 
MICHAEL R. McCOY and EUGENE 
E. DOMS, 
NONRESIDENT JEANNE SCOTT'S 
PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO 
APPEAL INTERLOCUTORY ORDER 
DENYING HER MOTION TO 
DISMISS FOR LACK OF IN 
PERSONAM JURISDICTION 
Trial Court No. 
(Summit County) 
8339 
Defendants 
litigate the original lawsuit in the Utah courts, as well as also 
litigating the third-party action against Summit County Title 
Company. 
ADVANCE TERMINATION OF LITIGATION 
Jeanne Scott submits the granting of her appeal will 
materially advance the termination of the litigation, because the 
case would be finally dismissed on the merits as to her, without 
causing an innocent nonresident to expend substantial time and 
funds in litigating a case, when the court has no jurisdiction over 
her. 
DATED this 6th day of February, 1989. 
Respectfully Submitted: 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
\Ui: 
•C?" / JAMES A. MCINTOSH 
( / A t t o r n e y s f o r P e t i t i o n e r J e a n n e S c o t t 
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ADDENDUM 18 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
March 9, 1989 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Larry R. Keller, Esq. 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South-10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jeanne Scott, Ellen Anderson, 
as personal representative of 
the Estate of D.C. Anderson, 
Ellen Anderson, personally, and 
Dan Scott, 
Plaintiffs and Appellant, 
v. No. 890042 
Michael R. McCoy and Eugene 
E. Doms, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Ellen Anderson as personal 
representative of the Estate of 
D.C. Anderson, Ellen Anderson 
personally, Dan Scott and 
Jeanne Scott, 
Third-party Plaintiffs 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Summit County Title Company, a 
Utah corporation, 
Third-party Defendant 
and Appellee. 
THIS DAY, Petition for an interlocutory appeal having been 
heretofore considered, and the Court being sufficiently advised in the 
premises, it is ordered that an interlocutory appeal be, and the same 
is, denied. 
C T '.*3 t 51989 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
ADDENDUM 19 
IRVING H. BIELE, A0317, of 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
Ellen Anderson as Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of D. C. Anderson and Dan Scott 
333 North 3 00 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-2506 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, 2194 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
Jeanne Scott, Personally 
Ellen Anderson, Personally 
Suite 14, Intrade Bldg. South 
1399 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Telephone: (801) 487-7834 
umsunp^'m 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal 
Representative of the ESTATE 
OF D. C. ANDERSON 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
DAN SCOTT, Personally 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
ELLEN ANDERSON, Personally, 
Involuntary Plaintiff and 
Petitioner, 
JEANNE SCOTT, Personally, 
Involuntary Plaintiff and 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JUDGES OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH, 
PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY 
WRIT UNDER RULE 65B(b)2 AND 
65B(b)4 (TANTAMOUNT TO 
PROHIBITION OR MANDAMUS) 
Case No. 
Respondent, 
could be dismissed on routine motions relating to the statute of 
limitations, waiver and estoppel• Judicial economy requires that 
the courts enforce the laws and rules that create economy of an 
action rather than ignoring the same causing citizens and the court 
extensive time and expense before these matters can be brought to 
the attention of the Utah Supreme Court. Continuation of the 
discovery in this matter under the present pleadings will require 
depositions and discovery in several states which is only a small 
example of the costs involved. (See Petitioner Points and 
Authorities, Point 2.) 
WHEREFORE, your Petitioners and each of them pray that this 
Court issue its Writ directed to the Respondent Court and the 
Judges thereof, restraining and prohibiting the Court and the 
Judges from proceeding further in the trial of the aforesaid action 
against these Petitioners without dismissal from this action of 
those persons who are now named as Involuntary Plaintiffs or 
mandating that they be so dismissed. 
DATED this 23rd day of June, 1989. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NYGAARO, COKE & VINCENT 
/ S L ^ 
BIEZE ^ ^ X 
rney for Petitioners Ellen 
Anderson as Personal Representative 
and Dan Scott 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
JAME^'A. M C I N T O S f c ^ ' J? 
Attorney for Petitioners Jeanne 
Scott and Ellen Anderson, Personally 
-16-
ADDENDUM 20 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
State of Utah \ 
County of Salt Lake J 
I, GEOFFREY J. BUTLER, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, do 
hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct copy of the j&agStfew£ rendered 
Anderson v. Judges of Thi rd D i s t r i c t No. 890269 
in the foregoing entitled action, now of record and on file in my office. 
In Testimony Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand 
and affixed the seal of said Supreme Court this 
the 1 1 t h 
day of Ap.r.i-1 A. D. 19..&Q.. 
Geof Xj:<fty...J.*...Ru.tler. 
Clerk, Supreme Court 
Deputy Clerk 
332 STATE CAPITOL 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 
July 31, 1989 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Brant H. Wall 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ellen Anderson, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of D.C. Anderson, Dan Scott, 
Ellen Anderson, and Jeanne 
Scott, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
Judges of the Third Judicial 
District Court of the State 
of Utah, 
Respondents. 
Amended Minute Entry 
The petition for an extraordinary writ is denied because the 
district court has jurisdiction over both petitioners inasmuch as they 
were grantors on the deed, and both are proper parties to the 
counterclaim for recission under U.R.C.P. # 13 and 19. Further, under 
district court ruling, petitioner Scott still has opportunity to move 
for dismissal atleast as to one issue, and district court has not yet 
ruled on statute of limitations defense of petitioners to counterclaim. 
FILE 
Petition for Extraordinary 
Writ Under Rule 65B(b)4 
(Tantamount to Prohibition 
of Mandamus) 
No. 890269 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL -DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate 
Of D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN 
ANDERSON, personally, DAN 
SCOTT and JEANNE SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY and 
EUGENE E. DOMS, 
Defendants. 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate 
of D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN 
ANDERSON, personally, DAN 
SCOTT and JEANNE SCOTT, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Third Party Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 83 39 
NC. 
F I L E D 
MAY 21990 
Car* of Summit County 
BY Z...ia?h~ 
Dapulv C'eric 
This case was tried on April 17, 18, 19, 1990, at the 
Summit County Courthouse in Coalville, Utah. The plaintiffs 
0 0 4 JP!>7 
ANDERSON V. McCOY PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
were represented by James A. Mcintosh and Irving H. Biele. The 
defendant Doms was represented by Larry R. Keller. Third 
party defendant was represented by Brant H. Wall. The Court 
heard the testimony of witnesses, admitted documentary 
evidence, read the Memorandums filed herein, heard oral 
argument, and took the matter under advisement. 
The Court now being fully advised, makes its ruling. 
The Court finds as follows: 
1. Defendant Doms met with Mike Sloan, a real estate 
agent, in the fall of 1981 to discuss the sale and purchase of 
the Rossie Hills property. 
2. Defendant Doms also met with Dewey Anderson, the 
seller of the property, once before Doms and McCoy purchased 
the property. 
3. Both Sloan and Anderson represented that the property 
was a prime piece of development property and its highest and 
best use would be as an integrated development with the two 
adjoining parcels referred to as block 62 and the Slipper 
Parcels. 
4. The plaintiffs conveyed the property to defendants 
Doms and McCoy on March 10, 1982. 
5. Defendants Doms and McCoy purchased an interest in the 
Slipper parcel in October of 1982. 
nn A ? .'.^  
ANDERSON V. McCOY PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
6. The Slipper parcel was purchased by Doms and McCoy to 
further the integrated development of the three parcels and to 
equalize their position with the developers of the Slipper 
parcel and block 62. 
7. In October of 1982 Doms engaged Mr. Kinghorn, an 
attorney, for the specific purpose of closing the purchase of 
the Slipper parcel and continuing the negotiations with the 
owners of block 62 for the purpose of developing the three 
parcels as an integrated development. 
8. Prior to Doms7 purchase of the Anderson parcel of 
property, Doms was shown a preliminary site plan for the 
development of the three parcels of property prepared by the 
architect: Mr. Kohler 
9. Doms knew or should have known at the time he 
purchased the Anderson parcel and the Slipper parcel that the 
integrated development of the three parcels had failed because 
of the problems with the Anderson parcel and the inability of 
the parties to reach an agreement as to credits for each parcel. 
10. Doms walked the Anderson property with Mr. Sloan in 
the fall of 1981 and knew that there were roads and sheds on 
the property. 
0041S0 
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11. Doms had actual notice of the easement encroachment 
for the first time sometime between October 22, 1981 and 
November 7, 1981 and had further notice during 1982 and up and 
through 1984. 
12. Doms did not give notice of his intent to rescind 
until January of 1985. 
13. Doms' purchase of the Slipper parcel, the negotiations 
to develop the three parcels as an integrated development, the 
subsequent negotiations about credits and defining the problems 
with the Anderson parcel, affirm the fact that Doms had 
personal knowledge of the road and encroachments no later than 
October of 1982. 
The issue presented to the Court for decision is whether or 
not laches should apply in this matter. 
The Court has found that Doms knew of the loop road and 
the encroachments as early as the fall of 1981 and was made 
aware of the encroachments and road prior to the purchase of 
the Slipper parcel. Therefore, Doms was bound to take remedial 
action after that time. It is unbelievable that Doms would 
purchase the Anderson parcel and an interest in the Slipper 
parcel without viewing the property and determining why 
Anderson couldn't conclude the integration of the three parcels 
(\n A \ o ; 
Y PAGi MEMORANDUM DECISION 
for development . The court believes 
pr i)b] ems IA - credits that woul . . . .cated I n each 
parcel problems that nt^ v L» encountered as a result of 
the tiirro.i parcel, 
nevertheless, purchased
 ;... merest - lipper parcel 
in hopes of integrating the three parcels ~:;d making his 
in 
The Court , opinion that ^ "J- necessar-
Do; c obtai; o p i n i o n "cna %. ~ -,--*----
p r - ~ "* si: 1 =1! :i an I fe 
fo being \nderson property before :,- could make ., -
tende: --s-Lnd. Once Doms knew *•*
 4jLe 
€ ii'ic/i.iiiiLij.hi, a n c e f j i , reasona.:;] e 
time to notify the sellers of his intent to rescinc - - "•-.; . 
claim for damages. 
I Hnit". c'i,.11 III11;11n,;:l";:, I. 11id, t E a e t e r v. y e s t a n d N o r t h P r o p e r t i e s , ; 58 
P.2d 361 (Ore, App. 1988), is the applicable law to be applied 
to the facts in this case, Eaeter stands for the propositi on, 
a UK1,11 it] u'LttH" i, ",. Ll'iij L an u, n i i id in ta ined d i r t road t h a t showed l:i t t l e 
u s e and b r u s h anc ' : ;.-- • - . r moved t o d r i v e c 
so ODen or not - .uub uiidL -chase r 
knowledge o i i t s e x i s t e n c e . 
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ANDERSON V. McCOY PAGE SIX MEMORANDUM DECISION 
This case is readily distinguishable on the facts because 
there is no question that the road in this case has been used 
and was being used. The aerial photograph of the Anderson 
parcel clearly defines the loop road so that there could be no 
question that the road has been and is still in use. 
The Egeter case is also cited for the rule that the person 
seeking to rescind the contract must do so promptly after 
obtaining knowledge of the facts constituting the grounds for 
rescission. However, the buyer is not required to act 
immediately to rescind so long as he acts within a reasonable 
time. 
The Court does not agree with Doms' contention that he 
acted within a reasonable time after he obtained knowledge that 
that Loop Road and the encroachments were upon the Anderson 
property. 
Doms knew of the Loop Road and encroachments as early as 
1981 and no later than October of 1982, and yet he did not take 
any action to rescind until January of 1985, and that was by 
way of a settlement offer in lieu of making the $194,000 
payment due on January 25, 1985. 
It was not until plaintiffs7 action to foreclose was filed 
that Doms filed his Amended Counterclaim in June of 1988 
seeking to rescind the warranty deed. 
ANDERSON V. McCOY PAGE SEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
f 
amount of ti me to seek rescission, therefore, rescission is not 
the appropriate remedy 
the- :: supports the . .• ;-.:; -. ^-. • e ^ , -• ,-:i \ •, 
appropriate remedy 
' \ \ Ch^- ^ \l^<d^<S^ 
JOHN A) ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
0041S4 
ANDERSON V. McCOY PAGE EIGHT MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby c e r t i f y tha t I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing. Memorandum Decis ion, t o the fo l lowing , 
t h i s M dav of -Apr&i 1 9 9 0 A YY\eUt^ RdeAta, Qru^fr fit&ok's 
Satf <ZeJfe QJhsUk %: a U ° 
Irving H. Biele 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
James A. Mcintosh 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs 
1399 South 700 East, Suite 14 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Brant H. Wall 
Attorney for Third Party Defendant 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Larry R. Keller 
Attorney for Defendant Doms 
257 East 200 South, Suite 340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Gerald H. Kinghorn, Esq. 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Franklin P. Anderson 
Deputy Summit County Attorney 
P.O. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
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ADDENDUM 22 
.<t.l ? ' W\ 
LARRY R. KELLER #1785 
Attorney for Defendant rmiii'i 
257 Tower, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
I II Till': 'I'll I Kll JUDICIAL r ' " 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE 
-00000-• 
Cam oi Summit County 
Deputy Cieik 
tJr* 
1URT 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
Of D.C. ANDERSON, DAN SCOTT, 
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally, 
and JEANNE SCOTT, 
v. 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY AND 
EUGENE E. DOMS, 
TRIAL BRIEF REG;-
ISSUE OF LACHES 
Defendants. 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
Of D.C. ANDERSON, DAN SCOTT, 
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally, 
and JEANNE SCOTT, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Third Party Defendant. 
Civil No. 
Judge John 
i 
Rokich 
CONSOI, inAI Kll IIM'Mlli. rONT'INUm UN III I l',"ii,'l 
on 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate of 
D.C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and 
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of 
Utah; BLAKE L. FRAZIER, in his 
official capacity as Summit 
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS 
REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah 
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS; 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC-, a 
Utah corporation; EUGENE E. 
DOMS; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS 
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1, 2, 
3, 4, and 5, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 10066 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
-ooOoo-
COMES NOW Defendant Eugene E. Doms, through his attorney, 
Larry R. Keller, and submits the following Trial Brief with 
regard to the issue of laches, as follows: 
I. 
FACTS 
During the trial of the above-entitled matter held on April 
17, 18, and 19, 1990, at the County Courthouse in Coalville, 
Utah, the following facts were adduced: 
1. Defendant Eugene E. Doms testified that he observed the 
2 
property only from its parameters and never viewed np Road 
C - ..... I J I fl I K I;? 
upon the property. 
1 Although Mike Sloan testified that --" : * he 
wdl Eugene t 
say what month, what day, what time of day, or any of the other 
detail^ Ircumstances regarding that alleged event (See Point 
I ). 
3. Mike Sloan, real estate agent for the Plaintiffs In this 
case, represented to Mi Doms that the highest and best use of 
t Anderson parcel wn , be to combine i t with the two other 
parcels of property on the top of Rossie Hill for purposes of a 
three-parcel development. 
4 The property was transferred from Plaintii ip +-o Defen-
dant Doms by Warranty Deed dated March 1 0, J 982 
5. Defendant Doms tost if :i eel t:l: la !:: 11 e 
station business in southern California and had numerous other 
business and financial interests besides the purchase and devel-
opmenl 
6 Defendant Doms testified that he had contact with Craig 
Masters of Park City, Utah, on several occasions. He testified 
h I" i i I i in,,'""!:MI Il | l r I h i s t t"« r s " i-",r- ' ' " p i " i n o "i p<;i 11 i illi :iii'iiiiy I I K J p r i i I  11 • ' 
the remaining two parcels property, which will be referred 
3 
! fy o 
herein as the "Investors Ltd." parcel and "Slipper" parcel. 
7. Defendant Doms testified that in the weeks and months 
subsequent to March 10, 1982, when the property was purchased, he 
had preliminary discussions with Mike Sloan and Mr. Masters 
regarding the purchase of the Slipper parcel. 
8. Defendant Doms testified he desired to purchase the 
Slipper parcel to minimize the number of players with regard to 
the three-parcel development, and to be in a better or "more 
equal" position with regard to obtaining profits from the devel-
opment . 
9. Defendant Doms testified that he believed during this 
period of time that the three-parcel development proposed by Mr. 
Sloan at the time he sold the Anderson parcel was a viable 
possibility, and that several units could be built on the Ander-
son parcel to contribute to the overall three-parcel development. 
10. In approximately October of 1982, Defendant Doms 
retained Gerald H. Kinghorn for the specific purposes of closing 
the deal with regard to Mr. Doms' purchase of the Slipper parcel, 
and continuing negotiations with the owners of the Investors, 
Ltd. parcel for purposes of creating the three-parcel development 
originally envisioned by Mr. Doms based upon the representations 
of Mike Sloan. (Mr. Kinghorn was at that time representing Mr. 
Doms in other matters). 
4 
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1 ] Geralc Kinghorn testified at the trial that he met 
C I I 
between October 5 :. <: summer an effor; to 
negotl ate a - mo venture agreement which would be acceptable to 
a..... rhe parties. 
12. Plaintiffs1 Exhibits "" and 82 are two drafts of 
proposed joint venture agreements which would have put together 
the three-parcel development, 
13. Mr. Kinghorn testified that - summei of 1983, 
negotiations broke down result ox tj usition taken by 
Terry Cole .-:-,• -. Colorado speaking on behalf of Inves-
tor's Ltd. »r:- nformed Mi: Kinghorn that the percentage of the 
overa2 L U H L IU ue xeceived by Mr. Doms was much smaller than 
Mr Kinghorn and Mr noms wanted i*» *-n * ffact that much m the 
Anderson parcel undevelopable casements encum-
brance 
1 1 others representing the Investors TA"^ 
group represented to Mr, Kinghorn that "they had been through all 
this before irevious owners.11 
15. ShortI the particular meeting described above, 
in :,;>* summer v* Kinghorn testified *v :\ s: walked the 
L 
owners had told Kinghorn they believed constituted easements 
0051U5 
or encumbrances on the Anderson parcel. 
16. Mr. Kinghorn testified that although the Loop Road 
appeared to be located on the Anderson parcel, he was uncertain 
because he did not know the exact boundaries of the property. 
17. Mr. Kinghorn testified he immediately contacted Mr. 
Doms in California and informed him that a road and some build-
ings appeared to exist on the Anderson parcel, and might consti-
tute easements and encumbrances on the property. 
18. Mr. Kinghorn testified that Mr. Doms instructed him to 
immediately take whatever steps were necessary to determine 
whether or not the Loop Road and other buildings and encroach-
ments did in fact constitute legal easements and encumbrances. 
This testimony was consistent with the testimony of Mr. Doms. 
19. Mr. Kinghorn testified in August of 1983, he retained a 
surveyor by the name of Bing Christensen to locate and stake the 
boundaries of the Anderson parcel. 
20. Mr. Kinghorn testified that Mr. Christensen*s efforts 
were unsatisfactory and did not assist in establishing the 
boundaries of the property or the location of the possible 
physical encroachments which Mr. Kinghorn suspected would be on 
the property based upon the information he had received from the 
representatives of the Investors, Ltd. group. 
21. Mr. Kinghorn testified that although Mr. Christensen 
6 
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claime< - > have placed stakes on the property to determine the 
I: u n t i l i f i 'if","""-'; 111" II 11 « p i o p e r l ^ ' ; i:,i f T o r I In ii i \ n / i ri«••* "I i t "HI i 11 I II i i ; p i i n g 
of 1984, 1 le walked the property and was unable to locate the 
stakes, and therefore was unable to determine the boundaries of 
LI n.Jl K U M J .1 I Ii III i I I | ni i 11 II " i 1 i.< «,s , 
,-2„ : .-5 arid Mr, Kinghor^ ^oth testified that in the 
spring they contacted A - • Engineering and asked for 
i, 
including a:; : survey; and subsequently commissioned Alliance 
Engineering ^ survey. 
ely Mar cl: i 1 3, 
1984 meeting with Edward : weeney, he first expressed his 
concerns Sweeney that and buildings which 
app^ 
and encumbrances the property, Mi Sweeney was an attorney 
and associate . of Biele, Haslain & Hatch and was 
i i a s bs t::l: lex I d 3-
ceased) and Ellen Anderson, who was the personal representative 
Oo. . estate, and Dan Scott. 
e 
Engineering completed their land survey and prepared the document 
admitted Defendantf s Exhibit 
survey clea sealed and 
7 
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Mr. Doms (as they both testified) for the very first time that 
the Loop Road and other physical encroachments were located on 
the Anderson parcel. 
26. Mr. Kinghorn and Mr. Doms both testified that Mr. Doms 
then instructed Mr. Kinghorn to do further investigation and 
determine whether or not these encroachments constituted pre-
scriptive easements. 
27. Mr. Kinghorn testified that shortly thereafter he 
personally talked to several long-time residents of Park City 
regarding the use of the Loop Road by abutting property owners. 
He testified several of these people told him that Elden and Ella 
Sorensen, who resided on property abutting the Anderson parcel, 
had always used the Loop Road for access to their property since 
they first moved there, which was sometime in 1941. 
28. Mr. Kinghorn testified that about this time he was also 
in contact with the Park City Planning Department, and was 
informed that all developments in Park City must recognize and 
protect lawful prescriptive easements which exist upon the 
property. 
29. Mr. Kinghorn then testified that for the first time, he 
formed a legal conclusion that the Loop Road and other encroach-
ments constituted prescriptive easements upon the Anderson 
parcel, and he shortly thereafter reported his legal conclusion 
8 
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to Mr. Doms. 
30. Mr. Kinghorn testified that shortly thereafter, on or 
about December 5, 1984, he had a telephone conversation with 
attorney Edward S. Sweeney and informed Mr. Sweeney during this 
conversation that the Loop Road and other encroachments were, in 
his legal opinion, prescriptive easements on the Anderson parcel 
and constituted a serious problem which needed to be resolved. 
31. Mr. Kinghorn also testified that he informed Mr. 
Sweeney at that time that he would talk with his client Mr. Doms, 
in order to obtain authority to make some kind of a proposal. 
32. Mr. Kinghorn testified that in January of 1985, he 
contacted Mr. Doms and told him for the first time that the Loop 
Road and other encroachments on the property were, in his legal 
opinion, prescriptive easements on the Anderson parcel, and the 
development proposal originally presented to Mr. Doms by Mike 
Sloan would not be possible. 
33. Mr. Doms testified that he accepted Mr. Kinghorn?s 
legal opinion and conclusion, which he had heard for the first 
time in January of 1985, and instructed Mr. Kinghorn to attempt 
to negotiate a resolution to the problem that would avoid litiga-
tion. 
34. Mr. Doms and Mr. Kinghorn both testified that in early 
January of 1985, Mr. Doms authorized Mr. Kinghorn to offer to 
9 
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deed the Anderson parcel back to the Andersons and the Scotts in 
exchange for a cancellation of the Trust Deed Note. 
35. Mr. Doms and Mr. Kinghorn also testified that Mr. Doms 
instructed Mr. Kinghorn not to demand the return of the monies 
which had already been paid, in order to avoid expensive and 
time-consuming litigation. 
36. Mr. Doms and Mr. Kinghorn both testified that Mr. Doms 
at that time further instructed Mr. Kinghorn to inform opposing 
counsel that Mr. Doms would not make the principal payment due on 
January 25, 1985, in the amount of $194,250.00. 
37. Mr. Kinghorn testified that on or about January 17, 
1985, he had a lengthy meeting with Mr. Sweeney in his law 
office. At this meeting, Mr. Kinghorn showed Mr. Sweeney the 
Alliance Engineering land survey of the Anderson parcel, which 
clearly showed the encumbrances located upon the Anderson parcel. 
38. Mr. Kinghorn testified he told Mr. Sweeney at this 
meeting the names of the people he had talked to in Park City 
regarding the use of the Loop Road by the Sorensens for over 40 
years as access to their property; and that, in his legal opin-
ion, the Loop Road constituted a prescriptive easement on the 
property under Utah law. 
39. Mr. Kinghorn testified he also told Mr. Sweeney at that 
time that the existence of the Loop Road on the Anderson parcel 
10 
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as a prescriptive easement constituted a violation of the cove-
nant against encumbrances in the Warranty Deed dated March 10, 
1982, pursuant to U.C.A. § 57-1-12. 
40. Mr. Kinghorn further informed Mr. Sweeney that the Park 
City Planning Department required that all developments recognize 
and protect prescriptive easements; and that therefore, Mr. Doms 
desired to tender the property back to the grantors whom Mr. 
Sweeney represented. 
41. Mr. Kinghorn testified he further informed Mr. Sweeney 
that if the Plaintiffs accepted the tender and took the property 
back, Mr. Doms would request that the Trust Deed Note be can-
celled; and that further, Mr. Doms would allow them to keep all 
monies already paid under the contract. 
42. A discussion ensued regarding the payment of the 
principal due on March 25, 1985; and Mr. Kinghorn testified Mr. 
Sweeney said he would have to talk to his clients and not to 
worry about making the payment until he got back to Mr. Kinghorn. 
43. Mr. Kinghorn testified that on March 18, 1985, he met 
with Mr. Sweeney and a Mr. Peter Mulhern at Mr. Kinghornfs law 
office to further discuss the matter. 
44. Mr. Kinghorn testified that he reiterated to Mr. 
Mulhern and Mr. Sweeney at that time all of the statements he had 
made to Mr. Sweeney at the January 17, 1985 meeting. 
11 
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45. Mr. Kinghorn testified he again made the offer that Mr. 
Doms, in an attempt to avoid litigation in this matter, would 
deed the property back to the Andersons and the Scotts in ex-
change for their cancellation of the Trust Deed Note; and they 
could keep all payments already received under the Note. 
46. Mr. Kinghorn testified that Mr. Mulhern stated that he 
and/or Mr. Sweeney would get back to him; and they assured him 
that Mr. Doms would not be expected to make the payment due 
January 25, 1985 until they got back to Mr. Kinghorn. 
47. Mr. Kinghorn testified that the next thing he heard 
regarding the matter occurred in July of 1985 when Mr. Doms 
called him from California and told him that Mr. McCoy in Santa 
Monica, California, had received a Summons and Complaint regard-
ing the instant lawsuit and asked Mr. Kinghorn to get further 
information about the matter. 
48. The Court then ruled from the bench upon request from 
counsel for Defendant Doms that anything which occurred after the 
time of the filing of the lawsuit was not to play a part in the 
Court's decision with regard to the issue of laches presented by 
Plaintiffs, and no further testimony was adduced from Mr. Doms or 
Mr. Kinghorn about events subsequent to June of 1985. 
12 
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II. 
MIKE SLOAN'S REPRESENTATIONS ARE NOT BELIEVABLE. 
Mike Sloan was called to the stand by Plaintiffs and admit-
ted that he represented the grantors on the deed and the Plain-
tiffs in the instant case in his discussions with Mr. Doms 
regarding purchase of the Anderson parcel. Although Mr. Sloan 
testified that he "believed" that he walked the Anderson parcel 
and the Loop Road with Mr. Doms, he could not remember when this 
occurred. He could remember almost no details of this situation 
other than the fact that he remembered telling Mr. Doms that 
there were some sheds and fence lines which encroached on the 
parcel of property he was attempting to sell to Mr. Doms. He 
further testified that he informed Mr. Doms that the boundary of 
this property went through the back yard of Elden and Ella 
Sorensen, and part of their backyard was on the Anderson parcel. 
DEFENDANT DOMS MAINTAINS THAT THIS TESTIMONY IS INHERENTLY 
INCREDIBLE AND UNBELIEVABLE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 
1. Mr. Sloan admitted that he had been partners with 
grantor and seller Dewey Anderson in at least one joint venture 
project. 
2. Mr. Sloan admitted that he was assisting Mr. Anderson in 
attempting to sell the property and that he stood to make a 
13 
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substantial commission from the property; and further, he was 
still owed 50% of that commission. 
3. Mr. Sloan admitted that it was possible that he was 
mistaken about walking the Loop Road and making the representa-
tions to Mr. Doms. 
4. Mr. Sloan's lack of memory of so many details, including 
whether or not there was snow on the ground; what month it was; 
what day it was; and other details, make it difficult for anyone 
to believe that he can remember the specific details of having 
walked the property and discussing the encumbrances and encroach-
ments upon the property with Defendant Doms. 
5. Mr. Sloan admitted that he had walked the property with 
several others, including at least two developer-investor type 
people, and it is clear that he could have easily been confused 
attempting to recall something that happened nine years earlier. 
6. In his deposition, which has been published by Order of 
the Court and so can be considered as evidence by this Court, Mr. 
Sloan did not testify that he had told Mr. Doms that the property 
line for the Anderson parcel went through the Sorensensf, and 
perhaps other peoples' back yards. 
7. In fact, Mr. Sloan admitted on pages 57-58 of his 
deposition that the fact that the roadway existed did not give 
him or anyone else he talked with a reason for concern regarding 
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the property. 
8. Mr. Sloan further testified in his deposition that he 
did not think that it was appropriate or necessary to talk with 
Mr. Doms or Mr. McCoy about those existing roadways for any 
reason; yet he now says in Court he did talk with Mr. Doms about 
them. (See Sloan Deposition, pg. 58, In. 25; pg. 59, Ins. 
1,2,3). 
9. Mr. Sloan admitted in his testimony that he thought he 
would have taken Mr. Doms to a knoll which had an "exceptionally 
nice view of the old town of Park City." In his deposition he 
stated on page 62: "And as a salesperson I wouldn't miss that 
opportunity." 
10. In his deposition, Mr. Sloan was asked whether or not 
he remembered what representations he had made to Mr. Doms 
concerning the Anderson parcel. He answered, "Specifically, no, 
I don't." (Sloan Deposition, pg. 42, Ins. 13-18). 
11. Yet at trial Mr. Sloan testified he told Mr. Doms that 
certain sheds and backyards encroached upon the Anderson parcel. 
However, he admitted he had never seen a survey map showing the 
boundaries of the Anderson parcel, and that he had relied only 
upon an architectural scheme drawing. In fact, he wasn't even 
sure of what he had looked at to determine the boundaries. 
Defendant Eugene E. Doms testified categorically and without 
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question that he did not walk the property with Mr. Sloan; that 
he would only have driven around the property; and that he would 
not have purchased the property if he had been told about the 
encroachments on the property. 
Mr. Doms also testified that he would not have wanted to buy 
a piece of property for purposes of development where it would 
have been obvious that lawsuits would probably be necessary to 
establish the boundary lines to the property. 
Mr. Doms further testified he relied upon the representa-
tions of Mr. Sloan and the warranties against encumbrances 
contained in the Warranty Deed he received from the sellers to 
reach the conclusion that the property was not encumbered in any 
way. Mr. Doms testified this was the first time he had purchased 
a piece of property for development. 
Defendant Doms submits that the testimony of Mike Sloan is 
simply inherently unbelievable! Certainly no potential buyer of 
a piece of property, let alone a buyer of a piece of raw ground 
who intended to develop it, would ever purchase the property 
unconditionally if he had been told by the sellers' agent prior 
to the sale (as claimed by Mr. Sloan) that the property had 
numerous encroachments, including sheds, roadways, etc. Further-
more, if any potential buyer had been informed that the property 
line ran through someone's backyard, it is simply inherently 
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unbelievable and inconceivable that such person would go ahead 
with the purchase of the property without at least making a 
condition that the seller would have to make certain that any 
such problems were taken care of before the sale would be consum-
mated! 
Surely, the Court cannot believe this inherently unbeliev-
able testimony of Mike Sloan; and Defendant Doms requests the 
Court to remember that it is the burden of Plaintiffs who are 
asserting the affirmative defense of laches to establish that 
such representations had been made to Mr, Doms* 
Certainly the Court can also see as a simple matter of logic 
that any salesperson attempting to sell a piece of real estate 
and obtain a healthy commission for the sale would not present 
specific information to the buyer regarding encroachments upon 
the property! Defendant Doms submits that Plaintiffs have failed 
to sustain their burden of proof and overcome his testimony that 
he specifically did not walk the property with Mr* Sloan and had 
not been informed of the encroachments upon the property by Mr. 
Sloan* 
Furthermore, the Court must consider that Mr. Sloan's 
reputation is under attack; and further he must be concerned 
about his own potential liability; both good reasons for him to 
falsify what he claims to have told Mr* Doms. 
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The Court ruled from the bench that it accepted the proposi-
tion contained in Jones v. Grow Investment Company, and subse-
quently reaffirmed by the Utah Supreme Court in Bergstrom v. 
Moore, that even actual notice of encumbrances upon the property 
does not relieve the seller from the responsibility of guarantee-
ing to the buyer that no encumbrances exist pursuant to Utah's 
statute involving warranties contained in warranty deeds• 
Therefore, the question becomes: should the Court use some 
vague date (which Mike Sloan was not even able to recall) when 
Mr. Sloan supposedly told Mr. Doms that the encroachments ex-
isted, as the date from which the Court should attempt to deter-
mine the period of laches? 
Defendant Doms maintains that even if the Court were to 
conclude that Mike Sloan were telling the truth, no date prior to 
January of 1985 should be used by the Court as a starting date 
for laches since Mike Sloan was an agent of the sellers. If 
nothing else, the sellers put themselves on notice through their 
agent Mike Sloan, that encumbrances existed. However, Mr. Sloan 
testified in his deposition and at the trial that he had walked 
this road with Dewey Anderson. If the question involved is 
notice, Mr. Anderson obviously was aware of the existence of the 
Loop Road and the encumbrances and had notice before the property 
was ever sold! Nevertheless, it is Defendant Doms' position, 
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under any circumstances, that mere knowledge of the Loop Road 
itself is not the issue. The issue for purposes of laches has to 
be: When was Defendant Doms aware that a prescriptive easement 
existed upon the Anderson parcel, such as would trigger a viola-
tion of the sellers' warranties against encumbrances? 
III. 
DEFENDANT DOMS WAS DILIGENT AND DID NOT 
UNREASONABLY DELAY HIS OFFg&ER TO RESCIND. 
It is the contention of Defendant Doms that the date the 
Court should use for purposes of determining whether or not 
laches should apply in this matter, is the date of January of 
1985, when Mr. Kinghorn contacted Mr. Doms and informed him for 
the first time that in his legal opinion, the encroachments on 
the Anderson parcel were legal prescriptive easements; and that 
said easements constituted a violation of the sellers1 warranty 
against such encumbrances in the Warranty Deed dated March 10, 
1982. The Court should recall, however, that it was on or about 
March 13, 1984, in a meeting with Edward S. Sweeney, when Mr. 
Kinghorn first informed Plaintiffs in this case of the possibili-
ty of the existence of easements and encumbrances on the property 
which could constitute a violation of the warranties against 
encumbrances contained in the Warranty Deed. 
The Facts portion of this Trial Brief goes into detail about 
the efforts of Mr. Doms and Mr. Kinghorn to develop this property 
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from the time of its purchase, and the problems that were con-
fronted. The testimony of Mr. Kinghorn and Mr. Doms also show 
that it was not until at least the summer of 1983, almost a year 
and a half after the property had been transferred by Warranty 
Deed, that either one of them became aware of the fact that there 
were potential encroachments upon the property which might 
constitute prescriptive easements. Mr. Kinghorn and Mr. Doms 
both testified that they then diligently pursued efforts to 
determine whether or not these encroachments existed (by obtain-
ing a survey), and further, whether or not these encroachments 
constituted legal prescriptive easements due to the length of 
time they had been on the property and the ability to force the 
sellers to remedy the situation. 
Only in January of 1985 was the conclusion drawn by Mr. 
Kinghorn, based upon his full investigation, that the encroach-
ments constituted prescriptive easements. He immediately commu-
nicated that conclusion to Mr. Doms, who contemporaneously 
instructed Mr. Kinghorn to negotiate for rescission of the 
Warranty Deed. 
Even if the Court were to believe the inherently unbeliev-
able testimony of Mike Sloan, the mere fact that Mr. Doms had 
been informed of encroachments upon the property did not cause 
Mr. Doms to reach any legal conclusions about whether or not such 
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encroachments were irremediable and therefore constituted pre-
scriptive easements. Even Mr. Sloan testified that he had walked 
the property with seller Dewey Anderson, and neither he nor Mr. 
Anderson drew any conclusions regarding prescriptive easements. 
In fact, Mr. Sloan testified that he informed Mr. Doms that the 
Loop Road and the encroachments he allegeldy informed him about 
were "no problem". Therefore, Mr. Doms was not put on notice 
that legal prescriptive easements existed on the parcel of 
property he was about to buy. 
In fact, Mr. Sloan admits that he encouraged Mr. Doms to buy 
the property and showed him a proposed development plan; and 
further, that he told him this was a "prime piece" of developable 
property. Therefore, the Court simply cannot believe that the 
delay between the time Mr. Doms learned that there were legal 
prescriptive easements upon the property, and the time he in-
structed his attorney to inform attorneys for the Plaintiffs that 
such prescriptive easements existed, was unreasonable in any 
fashion. That period of time was instantaneous. Mr. Doms and 
Mr. Kinghorn both testified that during the same conversation in 
which Mr. Kinghorn informed Mr. Doms that in his legal opinion 
the encroachments that Mr. Kinghorn had heard about for the first 
time in the summer of 1983 were actually prescriptive easements, 
Mr. Doms informed Mr. Kinghorn to return to the Plaintiffs in 
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this case and tender the property back to them for rescission 
purposes. Mr. Kinghorn testified that he made such a rescission 
offer to the Plaintiffs and sellers through their attorney Edward 
S. Sweeney on January 17, 1985. 
Defendant Doms submits that under the facts of this case, 
his Counterclaim seeking rescission of the sale and conveyance of 
the property cannot be barred by the equitable doctrine of 
laches. There was no unreasonable delay; Defendant Doms and Mr. 
Kinghorn were diligent in all respects relating to this matter; 
and Defendant Doms has clearly exhibited the utmost good faith by 
his attempts to negotiate a fair and reasonable settlement of the 
dispute short of the protracted litigation now before this Court. 
In "Plaintiffs' Trial Brief," dated April 16, 1990, sub-
mitted to the Court on the first day of trial, Plaintiffs cite 
language from Egeter v. West & North Properties, 758 P.2d 361, 
364 (Ore.App. 1988), as their leading case in regard to the issue 
of laches. Counsel for Defendant Doms submits that the citation 
of the language from Egeter contained on page 3 of Plaintiffs' 
Trial Brief is a calculated and deliberate attempt by counsel for 
Plaintiffs to mislead this Court! What Plaintiffs deliberately 
have failed to point out to the Court is that the Oregon Court of 
Appeals, analyzing a factual situation strikingly similar to the 
instant case, held that an unmaintained dirt road did not consti-
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tute a sufficiently open and notorious condition to charge the 
buyers with knowledge of its existence, even though the buyers 
had been on the road and observed that it ran the entire length 
of the parcel prior to the time they bought the property! 
Although Plaintiffs have attached numerous cases as Exhibits 
to their Trial Brief, a copy of the Egeter case was not attached 
as an Exhibit, even though it is the lead case for Plaintiffs' 
laches arguments. Upon examination of this case, counsel for 
Defendant Doms submits that it will be readily apparent to the 
Court why a copy of Egeter was not attached. Counsel for Defen-
dant Doms would ask the Court to carefully review this case, 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 
The Court will note that the Oregon Court of Appeals in 
Egeter discussed the issue of laches in regard to one seeking to 
rescind a contract, and held as follows: 
A person seeking to rescind a contract must 
do so promptly after obtaining knowledge of the 
facts constituting the grounds for rescission. 
(Citations omitted). However, delay alone 
cannot constitute a waiver of the right to 
rescind. (Citation omitted). A buyer is not 
required to act immediately to rescind, so long 
as he acts within a reasonable time. (Citation 
omitted). Further, courts have recognized that 
there may be a sufficient explanation for the 
delay, even if it seems long. (Citations 
omitted). We agree with the trial court that, 
under the circumstances, plaintiffs did not 
delay so long as to waive their right to re-
scind. The trial court did not err in rescind-
ing the contract. (Emphasis added). 758 P.2d 
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at 364-365. 
Defendant Doms does not dispute the well-established rule 
that one seeking to rescind must do so promptly after obtaining 
knowledge of the facts constituting the grounds for rescission. 
The Utah Supreme Court has reiterated this general proposition in 
many of its decisions. 
The facts of the instant case clearly indicate that Mr. Doms 
did act promptly after obtaining knowledge that the Loop Road and 
lot encroachments constituted prescriptive easements on the 
propertyI Plaintiffs1 argument that Defendant Doms is required 
under the law of rescission to seek rescission before he had 
knowledge that he possessed grounds for rescission is just plain 
inaccuate. Even when presented with the same conclusive evidence 
as presented in this trial, Plaintiffs refused to even respond to 
the offer of Mr. Doms communicated by his attorney, Mr. Kinghorn 
in January and again in March of 1985. Rather, Plaintiffs filed 
their foreclosure action. Defendant Doms submits that this shows 
a clear lack of good faith on the part of Plaintiffs, and that 
they cannot now come into a court of equity and ask for relief in 
equity. They do not possess "clean hands". 
The testimony of Mr. Doms and Mr. Kinghorn in this trial has 
established that Mr. Doms diligently pursued a reasonable and 
logical course of action to determine the nature and extent of 
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the encroachments on the property. It must be kept in mind, that 
surveys take a considerable amount of time to complete, especial-
ly in the Park City area due to the long winters. Furthermore, 
Mr. Doms simply cannot in equity and fairness be punished for any 
delays caused by the inadequate work of professionals he retained 
to survey the property or the length of time it took such profes-
sionals to complete these surveys. 
Counsel for Defendant Doms further submits that Plaintiffs 
have again attempted to mislead this Court by citing language 
from the Utah Supreme Court case of Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 
632, 637 (Utah 1984), on page 3 of Plaintiff's Trial Brief! 
In Baker, the Utah Supreme Court was dealing with an action to 
set aside a warranty deed on the grounds of undue influence by 
one in a confidential relationship with the grantees, an elderly 
couple. The language cited by Plaintiffs on page 3 of their 
Trial Brief is actually a synopsis of an Oklahoma case which 
directly addressed the issue of fraud, undue influence and lack 
of mental capacity. The full quotation from Baker is set forth 
as follows: 
In In re Woodward, Okla., 549 P.2d 1207 (1976), 
the nieces of a decedent attempted to set aside 
a joint tenancy deed in favor of their brothers 
on the grounds of fraud, undue influence and 
lack of mental capacity. In holding that the 
statute of limitations had expired on a claim 
of fraud and undue influence, the court stated 
that the means of discovering fraud and undue 
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influence came into the hands of the plaintiffs 
when the deed was filed of record and that they 
failed to exercise ordinary diligence in dis-
covering it. (Emphasis added). 684 P.2d at 
637. 
The underlined language above is the only language cited by 
Plaintiffs in their Trial Brief! The Utah Supreme Court, in 
Baker, was simply stating what the Oklahoma Supreme Court had 
held in regard to the specific issue of cancelling a deed based 
upon claims of fraud, undue influence and lack of mental capaci-
ty. Furthermore, the next paragraph of Baker reveals that 14 
years had elapsed after the deed was recorded, before cancella-
tion was sought. This case simply has no application to the 
case now before the Court! 
Counsel for Defendant Doms submits that the remaining cases 
and authorities cited in Plaintiffs' Trial Brief in regard to the 
issue of rescission and laches are clearly distinguishable on 
their facts and simply do not stand for the selective proposi-
tions claimed by Plaintiffs. Defendant Doms does not dispute the 
well-established law that one cannot rescind, after he receives 
knowledge of the fraud, if he waits an unreasonable amount of 
time to seek rescission. As pointed out by Plaintiffs, this is 
the established law in Utah. The cases of Perry v. Woodall, 438 
P.2d 813, 815 (Utah 1968) and Frailey v. McGarry, 211 P.2d 840, 
845 (Utah 1949), cited on pages 4-5 of Plaintiffs' Trial Brief, 
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simply reiterate the long-established law in Utah that one, after 
learning all of the facts which indicate that he haswbeen de-
frauded, or in other words, after discovery of the fraud, has a 
duty to act promptly in seeking rescission. 
This is exactly what Mr. Doms did in the instant case! 
After diligently attempting to determine whether the encroach-
ments constituted prescriptive easements on the land and would 
therefore constitute a lawful ground for rescission based upon 
breach of the covenants contained in the Warranty Deed, Mr. Doms, 
through his attorney at that time, Mr. Kinghorn, promptly offered 
a deal to Plaintiffs which was even better than rescission as far 
as Plaintiffs' position is concerned! 
CONCLUSION 
This is a case of equity. Equity dictates that the Court 
make a fair and just determination with regard to the affirmative 
defense of laches and whether or not Mr. Doms should be estopped 
from receiving rescission of the March 10, 1982 Warranty Deed 
because of unreasonable delay. The burden of proof in this case 
is on the Plaintiffs to establish this affirmative defense, and 
they have failed miserably. Utah law provides that in order to 
find laches, the Court must find that there was a lack of dili-
gence on the part of Defendant Doms in notifying Plaintiffs of 
the violation of the warranty against encumbrances. The facts 
27 
005127 
and evidence show that from the date Mr. Doms purchased the 
property, March 10, 1982, through the summer of 1983; he and his 
attorney Gerald H. Kinghorn diligently pursued efforts to develop 
the Anderson parcel in a combined development as had been repre-
sented to him to be possible by the real estate agent of the 
sellers and Plaintiffs in this case. The evidence further shows 
that from the time Mr. Kinghorn first learned of the possibility 
of prescriptive easements on the property, he diligently pursued 
efforts to come to a legal conclusion with regard to that issue. 
The evidence further shows that upon Mr. Kinghornfs reaching his 
legal conclusion that such prescriptive easements did exist, he 
immediately communicated his opinion to Mr. Doms, who immediately 
instructed Mr. Kinghorn to tender the property back to Plain-
tiffs. There simply can be no finding of unreasonable delay in 
this case. 
Furthermore, laches also requires a showing that somehow, 
Plaintiffs have been injured by whatever delay the Court finds to 
be unreasonable. Even if the Court were to find unreasonable 
delay, Plaintiffs have presented no evidence whatsoever as to how 
they may have been injured by such unreasonable delay, if it 
existed. 
Finally, Plaintiffs are the ones who have the burden of 
proof to establish their affirmative defense. They have failed 
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to do so. Therefore, Defendant Doms urges the Court to reject 
Plaintiffs' argument regarding laches and to rule that rescission 
is the appropriate remedy in this case and allow the parties to 
present additional arguments with regard to how such rescission 
should occur and the other issues raised in the pleadings and the 
Pretrial Order. 
~3* 2 vy v O day of 1990. 
T . P T P / LER, 
rfor Defendant Doms 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
ELLEN ANDERSON, Personal 
Representative of the 
Estate of D.C. ANDERSON & 
DAN SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Civil No. 8339 
DEPOSITION OF 
MICHAEL SLOAN 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY & EUGENE 
E. DOMS, 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED, that on Monday, June 27, 1988, 10 
a.m., the deposition of Michael Sloan, called as a witness 
on behalf of the defendant Doms, was taken pursuant to 
subpoena and notice and pursuant to the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure before Ronald F. Hubbard, notary public 
and shorthand reporter in and for the State of Utah 
(License No. 32), at 257 East 200 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111. 
That there were present as counsel: 
For plaintiff: Irving H. Biele 
Attorney at Law 
Biele, Haslam and Hatch 
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Q Do you remember showing Mr. Doms a condo unit on Park 
Avenue that had an inside pool that you or your brother 
may have owned an interest in the unit? 
4 I A I—I don't recall showing him that particularly, but 
we did own a unit, Silver Town that had an inside pool. 
6 I We owned Unit 406. 
7 J Q Did it involve a red brick unit? 
A Yes. 
9 I Q But other than that, most of the conversations then 
10 were about this Rossi Hill property? 
11 A I believe I—at the same time, I probably would have 
t2 mentioned the King Road property. 
13 Q All right. Now, at the time you were talking about 
14 the Rossi Hill property to Mr. Doms and attempting to sell 
15 him on the idea of purchasing the parcel for development, 
16 do you remember what representations you made to him 
*
7
 regarding that property? 
18
 A Specifically, no, I don't. 
19
 Q Did you tell Mr. Doms that you believed that it was 
20
 the best undeveloped piece of property outside of Deer 
21
 Valley within walking distance to town? 
22
 A I believe that I would have said that, yes. 
23
 Q Did you tell him that the city was in favor of the 
24
 J development project, which would include the entire Rossi 
1
 Hill Parcel that we've shown you as Exhibit 3? 
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- A I believe I did, yes. 
2 Q Uo"-yoii recall when you would have told him? 
3 A I do not recall when, but my recollection is that it 
4 was discussed in conjunction with that plat (indicating), 
5 because the encroachments were of a nature that the roads 
9 would b e — i t would be away from the property that was 
7 needed to put the roads in. 
8 Q Do you know what a prescriptive easement is, Mr. 
9 Sloan? 
10 A If I had to give you a definition, no. I have a 
11 vague working knowledge of it, yes. 
12 Q Are you aware of Utah law which provides that if a 
20 
21 
24 
25 
13 person uses an area for ingress and egress to their 
n property for at least 20 years that they then have a right 
IS of passage and easement, even though it may not be 
1
* J recorded? Are you familiar_w:ith__that_aspect of Utah law? 
17
 ' A I anu 
18 
19
 be unrecorded easements with Mr. Anderson? 
Q Did y^u p^*>r rlisrn^ thp possibility that these may 
A flo, X-did not. 
Q Did you ever discuss it with Mr. Doms? 
22 
I A No. I did not. 
23 Q Or Mr. McCoy? 
A Not to my knowledge, no. 
Q
 g Essentially the fact that these roadways existed did 
* 
5L 
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not give you or anyone that you talked with regarding this 
property a reason for concern? Is that a fair, st**"^ **™*0 
A Yes. 
Q Did you ever walk the property with Ellen Anderson? 
A Not to my knowledge. 
Q Or Dan Scott? 
A No. 
Q Have you ever talked to any of the property owners 
that front onto Ontario that may have a claim to this 
roadway? 
A Never. 
Q Now, Mr. Sloan, answer me thisf if you will. You 
have previously identified Exhibit 3 as an exhibit that 
you provided to Mr. Doms. At least, the first page and 
the fourth page of this exhibit. 
A I think I've—I think that I said that I felt that I 
could have. 
Q Could have provided it, but you weren't certain? 
A Right. 
Q Let's be accurate about it. The exhibit that you— 
Exhibit 3—which you could have provided to Mr. Doms 
doesn't show the existing roadways or the then existing 
roadways on the property, does it? 
A No, it does not. 
Q Did you at any time think it appropriate or necessary 
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t o t a l k with flrr nmng anH Mr. MrPny f|fr°"t those e x i s t i n g 
roadways for any reason? 
A No. 
Q Have you ever been involved with any transactions 
regarding Block 62 owned by Investors Ltd.? I'd like to 
show you a better map, if I could. 
A I know—the parcel you're speaking of—my only 
involvement, I believe, would have been in trying to put 
Mac Development, which is Bruce McMullen, into a position 
to purchase that along with the Anderson parcel. 
Q Were you ever involved in the transaction which 
changed ownership of that parcel to the best of your 
recollection? 
A No. 
Q Were you ever involved with Investor's Ltd., as a 
group or as an organization? 
A No. 
Q Let me ask you the same question with regard to the 
Slipper parcel. Have you ever been involved in a 
transaction which transferred ownership of the Slipper 
parcel? 
A No. 
Q Or involved in the Slipper parcel in any other way 
than what you've talked about here today? 
A No. 
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MR. KELLER: Mr. Biele, may I ask what the note was 
you showed to the witness? 
3 I MR. BIELE: I'm going to ask him a question when 
4 you're through. 
5 I MR. KELLER: Oh, you're going to ask him a question. 
6 And I have no objection to that, but I think I'm entitled, 
7 since he's not your client, to know what your notes to him 
8 are. And I'd like the record to reflect that he passed to 
9 him a note, and I'd like to know what the note says. 
10 MR. BIELE: May I ask him a question? 
11 MR. KELLER: I'd just like to know what the note 
12 says, sir. That's all. 
13 MR. BIELE: Let me ask a question. 
1* MR. KELLER: Well, I'm going to ask you to answer my 
15 question on the record. What was the note you passed to 
16 I Mr. Sloan? 
MR. BIELE: I asked him, "Did you walk the property 17 
18
 j "with Doms and McCoy"? 
19
 I MR. KELLER: Thank you very much. 
20
 Q (By Mr. Keller) Now, my next question is, are you 
21
 I aware of any appraisals of the Anderson parcel prior to 
22
 the sale of property in this situation to Doms and McCoy? 
23
 I A I believe that there was one. I don't believe that I 
24 , 
ever saw one. 
25 , Q Do you know if one would have been a part of your 
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records? 
A No, I'm pretty certain that it would not have been. 
I believe that Dewey told me that he had an appraisal on 
t^he property that was so much per lot, or whatever; but I" 
don't believe that I ever physically saw one or had one in 
my possession. 
Q Did you ever walk the property with Mr. Doms or Mr. 
McCoy? 
A I believe I didf yes. 
Q Which one? 
A I believe—my mind tells me both of them, but I am 
certain that I would have at least with Mr. Doms. 
Q You're certain of that? Tell me when that was, Mr. 
Sloan. 
A I could not. I don't recall. 
Q Who else was present? 
A 
Q 
A 
I don't recall. 
Why are you so certain, if you can't recall? 
Because of the question that you asked me earlier 
about my representation about the property being so 
outstanding and the best development parcel in Park City. 
You have to stand on it to know and believe it. And for 
that reagpri pypryh^y f h a f T + a < I V c ^ ^ , T uta^ e an effort 
to walk them out on the property. There is a nice knoll 
out on about Lot 15 that has a nice, very nice, 
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exceptionally nice view of the old town of Park City. And 
^ ^ J 
as a salesperson I wouldn't miss that opportunity. 
Q So you might have stopped on that knoll with him? | 
A I believe that I walked clear down around what we 
call the turnaround down ?+• +»Ho Hrvt-f rflTL^ J^ fr*a"°° one of the 
other things that—in looking at the map that is drawn, or 
the schematic plan that was drawn, you have to understand 
that the lower units, the lower units are going to have a | 
O^ery nice view and that the upper units are going to be in 
such a way that they will look over that view. 
Q Would you be surprised to learn, Mr. Sloan, that Mr. 
Doms never walked that property? Would that surprise you? 
A Yes, it would. 
Q Because you specifically remember him walking that 
property, is that correct, under oath you're telling us? 
A Yes. | 
Q What was said and by whom during that conversation? j 
A I don't recall. 
Q What time of day was it? 
A I do not recall. ""~~ 
Q What time of year was it? 
A I do not recall. | 
Q How can you be positive about something, Mr. Sloan, 
that you can't recall any of the details of? 
A I guess I would have to throw it back and ask Mr. 
; 
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United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 
117, 128, 101 S.Ct 426, 432, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 
(1980), quoting Burks v. United States, 
437 U.S. 1, 11, 98 S.Ct 2141, 2147, 57 
L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). The double jeopardy 
clause prohibits retrying a defendant for 
the same offense after a judgment of ac-
quittal has been entered. See United 
States v. Scott, supra, 437 U.S. at 91, 98 
S.Ct at 2193. A defendant is "acquitted" 
for double jeopardy purposes only when 
some or all of the factual elements of the 
offense charged are actually resolved in 
the defendant's favor. United States v. 
Dahlstrum, 655 F.2d 971, 974 (9th Cir. 
1981), cert den. 455 U.S. 928, 102 S.Ct 
1293, 71 L.Ed.2d 472 (1982). The trial 
court's characterization of its own action as 
an "acquittal'1 is not controlling. United 
States v. Scott, supra, 437 U.S. at 97, 98 
S.Ct at 2197. A defendant suffers "no 
injury cognizable under the Double Jeopar-
dy Clause • • • " when he deliberately 
seeks and obtains termination of the pro-
ceedings in the trial c o u r t j ^ n a basis 
unrelated to factual guilt or innocence. 
United States v. Scott, supra, 437 U.S. at 
98-99, 98 S.Ct at 2198; see United States 
v. Schwartz, 785 F.2d 673, 678-79 (9th 
Cir.), cert den. 479 U.S. , 107 S.Ct 
290, 93 L.Ed.2d 264 (1986). 
In Scott, the defendant moved to dismiss 
the first count of his indictment for prein-
dictment delay. The trial court granted the 
motion at the close of all the evidence, 
after jeopardy had "attached." 437 U.S. at 
95, 98 S.Ct at 2196. The defendant thus 
"successfully avoided * * * submission 
of the first count of the indictment [to 
the jury] by persuading the trial court to 
dismiss it on a basis which did not de-
pend on guilt or innocence. He was thus 
neither acquitted nor convicted, because 
he himself successfully undertook to per-
suade the trial court not to submit the 
issue of guilt or innocence to the jury 
which had been empaneled to try him." 
437 UJS. at 99, 98 S.Ct at 2198. 
The Court concluded that the defendant 
could not claim former jeopardy, because 
the double jeopardy clause "guards against 
government oppression, [but] does not re-
lieve a defendant from the consequences of 
NORTH PROPERTIES Or. 361 
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his voluntary choice." 437 U.S. at 99, 98 
S.Ct at 2198. 
The circumstances of this case are strik-
ingly similar to those in Scott After the 
state had presented its case and jeopardy 
had attached, defendant moved for a judg-
ment of acquittal. The trial court granted 
the motion because of a variance between 
the proof and the accusatory instrument 
The record does not indicate that the state 
failed to establish defendant's guOt Guilt 
or innocence was not resolved at the first 
trial. Furthermore, the state was not af-
forded an opportunity to supply evidence at 
the second trial that it did not produce at 
the first trial. The granting of defendant's 
motion, therefore, does not invoke the fed-
eral prohibition against double jeopardy, 
United States v. Scott, supra, and the 
state was not barred from prosecuting de-
fendant again. 
Affirmed. 
92 OrApp. 118 
IngSteven R. EGETER and Linda M. 
Egeter, husband and wife, and 
Roth V. Egeter, Respondents, 
v. 
WEST AND NORTH PROPERTIES, Ore-
gon Ltd,, a limited partnership, and 
Patrick Gisler, General Partner, Appel-
lants, 
and 
Cameron Cliff and Jane Doe Cliff, 
husband and wife, Defendants. 
83-134CV-1; CA A43344. 
Court of Appeals of Oregon. 
Argued and Submitted Jan. 25, 1988. 
Decided July IS, 1988. 
Purchasers brought suit to rescind 
land sale contract The Circuit Court, Kla-
f inS I *3fl 
362 Or. 758 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
math County, Rodger J. Isaacson, J., al-
lowed rescission, and the vendor appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Van Hoomissen, J., 
held that neighbor's use of unrecorded 
easement was sufficient encumbrance to 
allow rescission of contract 
Affirmed. 
1. Vendor and Purchaser *»I34 
At common law, open and notorious 
conditions are not encumbrances, even 
though they are not excepted from the 
warranty of title, because they are visible 
for all to see. 
2. Vendor and Purchaser *=»138 
A purchaser of real property has an 
obligation to inspect the property and to be 
aware of open and notorious conditions. 
3. Vendor and Purchaser *=»I38 
Purchasers are deemed to have pur-
chased the property with the knowledge of 
the existence of any easements which rea-
sonably could have been discovered. 
4. Easements *=»22 
Easement, although a public road, was 
not so open and notorious that purchasers 
were chargeable with knowledge of its ex-
istence where road was not maintained and 
was not shown in county records and ven-
dor's agent represented that purchasers 
had right to lock out the public and»denied 
that neighbor's easement claim was valid. 
5. Vendor and Purchaser *=» 135(1) 
The existence of an unrecorded ease-
ment that is not open and notorious is an 
encumbrance and does constitute a materi-
al breach of contract. 
6. Vendor and Purchaser «=»112(1) 
Neighbor's use of easement to drive 
cattle was sufficient encumbrance to war-
rant rescission of a real estate contract, 
where, although not frequent, would inter-
fere with purchasers' construction and use 
of a residence. 
7. Vendor and Purchaser «=»119 
A person seeking to rescind a contract 
must do so promptly after obtaining knowl-
edge of the facts constituting the grounds 
for rescission. 
8. Contracts *»262 
Delay alone cannot constitute a waiver 
of the right to rescind. 
9. Vendor and Purchaser *»119 
A buyer of land is not required to act 
immediately to rescind, so long as he acts 
within a reasonable time. 
10. Vendor and Purchaser *=»114 
Purchasers did not delay so long as to 
waive their right to rescind; purchasers 
contended that vendor's categorical denial 
of the existence of an easement created the 
delay. 
Gerald A. Martin, Bend, argued the 
cause for appellants. With him on the 
briefs was Francis & Martin, Bend. 
Claud Ingram, Eugene, argued the cause 
for respondents. With him on the brief 
was Bick & Monte, P.C., Eugene. 
Before WARDEN, PJ., JOSEPH, 
CJ., and VAN HOOMISSEN, J. 
j^oVAN HOOMISSEN, Judge. 
Defendant West and North Properties 
(West) appeals from a judgment declaring 
that defendants Cliff have an easement 
over the parcel of property which plaintiffs 
purchased from West and also rescinding 
plaintiffs' land sale contract for that parcel. 
The issues are whether the easement con-
stitutes an encumbrance sufficient to allow 
rescission and whether plaintiffs delayed 
too long in seeking to rescind. On de novo 
review, ORS 19.125(3), we affirm. 
West's real estate agent showed plain-
tiffs the subject property in February, 
1981. The agent drove than to the proper* 
ty on the road which gave rise to this claim. 
At that time, there were at least six inches 
of snow on the ground. The road showed 
little use, and trees and brush had to be 
moved to drive on i t The real estate agent 
represented that the "old stagecoach road" 
ran alongside, not on the property, but did 
provide legal access to it 
005139 
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On May 8, 1981, plaintiffs and West en-
tered into an earnest money agreement for 
the property. Plaintiffs were on the prop-
erty again in the spring of 1981 and 
reached it by the same road that they had 
used before. They observed that the road 
ran across the entire parcel and that there 
were gates at each end. They also ob-
served cattle droppings on the property. 
On September 10, 1981, the parties exe-
cuted a land sale contract 
In the spring of 1982, plaintiffs were 
back on the property and saw cattle graz-
ing there. They wrote a letter to Cameron 
Cliff, explaining that they had placed locks 
on the gates and sending him a key. On 
June 14, plaintiffs received a letter from 
Cameron advising them that he had an 
easement across the property and that he 
did not want the gates locked. Plaintiffs 
could not reach him, because he was out of 
town for the summer. 
Plaintiffs consulted an attorney, who 
wrote to West regarding the claimed ease-
ment West's attorney responded that the 
Cliffs did not have an easement and sug-
gested that plaintiffs resolve the matter by 
litigation with the Cliffs. Plaintiffs went 
to the property after Labor Day. They 
testified that at that time, the road was 
not well defined and that there imwere 
1. The trial court did not make any findings of 
fact regarding the road and whether it was the 
old stagecoach road (a public road) or a private 
road over which the Cliffs could have an ease-
ment Defendants Cliff moved for summary 
judgment, contending that they had an ease-
ment. The trial court ruled that there was a 
question of fact regarding the status of the road 
as public or private and denied the motion. 
Following a telephone conference, the court is-
sued the following order: 
"At the time of the conference [call], Mr. 
Johnson [Cliffs' attorney] pointed out that the 
Court, in ruling on the motion for summary 
judgment submitted on behalf of the Estate of 
Cameron Cliff, deceased, and Ruth Cliff, de-
termined that the issue of fact which re-
mained was whether the road in question is a 
public way or a private easement. He stated 
that his clients had no further interest in the 
case if in fact the only issue regarding the 
road was its status either as a public way or a 
private easement and that they were solely 
concerned with their ability to travel over it 
across the land in question and to transport 
their cattle across it. Mr. Martin [West's at-
torney] pointed out that their pleadings had 
NORTH PROPERTIES Or. 3 6 3 
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trees down over it There was no evidence 
of maintenance. 
In December, plaintiffs decided that the 
existence of the road easement was unac-
ceptable to them; it runs through the area 
in which they planned to build a house. 
They ceased making payments that month 
and sought a declaratory judgment in Janu-
ary, 1983. During Cameron Cliffs deposi-
tion, plaintiffs were told that the road is a 
public road and is the old stagecoach road. 
It does not appear in the Klamath County 
records, but West found a map at the Ore-
gon Historical Society showing the location 
of the road on the property. The trial 
court granted plaintiffs rescission and 
awarded the Cliffs an easement over the 
road.1 
West contends that the road does not 
constitute an encumbrance, because it was 
open and notorious and therefore known to 
plaintiffs. It argues that the road is a 
continuation of the road which provided 
access to the property and that hait ex-
tends through the property with a gate at 
each end. Plaintiffs argue that the road 
was covered with snow the first time that 
they aaw it, that it is nothing more than a 
dirt trafl which had not been maintained 
admitted the existence of the road either as a 
public way or a private easement, depending 
on proof at trial Mr. Ingram [Egeters' attor-
ney] stated he had no objection to the status 
of the road being limited to that issue. Plain-
tiffs had filed no response to Defendants 
Cliffs' motion for summary judgment. 
-NOW THEREFORE. IT IS HEREBY OR-
DERED that for purposes of trial the exist-
ence of the road is established but its status as 
a public way or an easement existing in favor 
of the Estate of Cameron Cliff and Ruth Cliff 
remains in issue." 
The imrnriffri judgment provides, in relevant 
part: 
"3. The estate of Cameron Cliff and Ruth 
Cliff, pursuant to an Order entered herein* 
have an easement over the subject pmucrty in 
the location of the existing road." 
The status of the road as public or private does 
not affect the outcome of the dispute between 
plaintiffs and West. Whether the road is public 
or private, it constitutes a material breach of 
contract. We do not decide whether the trial 
court was correct in awarding the Cliffs an 
easement. 
nnsi An. 
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and that it could only be used by removing 
brush from it 
[1-4] At common law, open and notori-
ous conditions are not encumbrances, even 
though they are not excepted from the 
warranty of title, because they are visible 
for all to see. A purchaser has the obli-
gation to inspect the property and to be 
aware of such conditions. Purchasers are 
deemed to have purchased the property 
with the knowledge of the existence of any 
easements which reasonably could have 
been discovered. Ford v. White, 179 Or. 
490, 495-96, 172 P.2d 822 (1946); Barnum 
v. Lockhart, 75 Or. 528, 540, 146 P. 975 
(1915). It is not clear whether that rule 
applies to a statutory warranty deed. In 
Leach v. Gunnarson, 290 Or. 31, 40-42, 
619 P.2d 263 (1980), the court recognized 
that, although the purpose of the rule is to 
put the onus on the buyer, not all condi-
tions are obvious enough. 290 Or. at 42, 
619 P.2d 263. Although the present case 
does involve a public road, the road has not 
been maintained and is not shown in the 
county records. In reaching the parcel, 
Wests agent drove plaintiffs across sever-
al parcels and at one point located a hidden 
key to open a gate. West's agent repre-
sented to plaintiffs that they had the right 
to lock out the public In addition, once 
plaintiffs had informed West of the Cliffs' 
claim, West denied that it was valid. We 
agree with the trial court that the ease-* 
ment is not so open and notorious that 
plaintiffs should be charged with knowl-
edge of its existence. 
West next argues that, considering the 
use which has been made of the roadway, it 
does not constitute a material defect in the 
title and that, therefore, plaintiffs are not 
entitled to rescission. It points out that 
Cameron Cliffs deposition establishes that 
his only use of the road is to drive cattle in 
the spring and again in the fall and that he 
makes an occasional trip in the summer to 
check on the cattle. Further, he did not 
object to having the gates closed, only to 
having them locked. West also argues 
that, although plaintiffs claim that the 
easement would interfere with their 
planned building site, the actual recorded 
road easement runs through a portion of 
the building site and presumably would 
have caused more interference. 
[5,6] iiaPlaintiffs argue that the exist-
ence of the Cliffs' easement is a material 
defect in the title. An encumbrance is 
"any right to or interest in the land, 
subsisting in a third person, to the dimi-
nution of the value of the land, though 
consistent with the passing of the fee by 
conveyance." Ford v. White, supra, 179 
Or. at 494, 172 P.2d 822. 
The existence of an unrecorded easement 
that is not open and notorious is an encum-
brance and does constitute a material 
breach of contract Leach v. Gunnarson, 
supra, 290 Or. at 42, 619 P.2d 263; Mar-
shall v. Wattles, 67 OrApp. 442, 448, 678 
P.2d 762 (1984). Use of the easement, al-
though not frequent, would certainly inter-
fere with the construction and use of a 
residence. That is sufficient reason to al-
low rescission. 
West contends that plaintiffs waited too 
long to rescind the contract It argues 
that, before June, 1982, plaintiffs became 
aware that Cliff was using the road across 
that property, that nothing changed be-
tween June and December of that year and 
that plaintiffs waited until December to 
stop making payments and untO January to 
initiate this action. Plaintiffs argue that 
they acted with reasonable diligence in 
electing to rescind, that it was West's cate-
gorical denial of the existence of the ease-
ment that created the delay and that the 
delay, if any, was not sufficient to deny 
their right to rescind. 
[7-10] A person seeking to rescind a 
contract must do so promptly after obtain-
ing knowledge of the facts constituting the 
grounds for rescission. Engelking v. 
Field, 268 Or. 537, 542, 522 P.2d 493 (1974); 
Miller v. Barker, 233 Or. 113,123, 377 P.2d 
343 (1962); Porras v. Bass, 63 OrApp. 832, 
836, 665 P.2d 1249, rev. den. 295 Or. 840, 
671 P.2d 1176 (1983). However, delay 
alone can not constitute a waiver of the 
right to rescind. McDonald v. Shore, 285 
Or. 151, 157, 590 P.2d 218 (1979). A buyer 
is not required to act immediately to re-
scind, so long as he acts within a reason-
r\n~ i A i 
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able time. Brown et ux v. Hasaerutab et 1. Criminal Law *»435 
Or. 365 
uz, 212 Or. 246, 256-57, 319 P.2d 929 
(1957). Further, courts have recognized 
that there may be a sufficient explanation 
for the delay, even if it seems long. See 
Bodenhamer v. Patterson, 278 Or. 367, 
375-76, 563 P.2d 1212 (1977); Hampton v. 
Sabin, 49 Or.App. 1041, 621 R2d 1202 
(1980). We agree with the trial court that, 
under the circumstances, plaintiffs did not 
delay so long as to waive their right to 
rescind. The trial court did not err in 
rescinding the contract 
1 laiAffirmed. 
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Following trial before the District 
Court, Multnomah County, William J. 
Keys, J., defendant was convicted of driv-
ing under influence of intoxicants, and he 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Graber, 
J., held that (1) permitting police officer 
who had no present recollection to read 
pertinent portion of police report to jury 
was proper under rule permitting recorded 
recollection, even though police report it-
self was inadmissible, and (2) reading por-
tion of police report to jury did not violate 
defendant's constitutional rights to con-
front witnesses. 
Affirmed. 
1. Defendant raises no other objection to the 
admission of his statements made at the time of 
Police officer who testifies at criminal 
trial may read relevant portions of his po* 
lice report into record if he has insufficient 
present recollection to testify fully and ac-
curately, notwithstanding rule of evidence 
barring admission of police reports into evi-
dence. Rules of Evid., Rule 803(5), (8KB). 
2. Criminal Law <*=»662.40 
Defendant was not denied his federal 
and State constitutional rights to confront 
witnesses when police officer was permit-
ted to read portion of police report into 
evidence as recorded recollection concern-
ing matters of which officer had no present 
recollection, where defendant had opportu-
nity effectively to cross-examine officer 
who was author of police report U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 6; Const Art 1, § 11. 
Clint A. Lonergan, Portland, argued the 
cause and filed the brief for appellant 
Stephanie Smythe, Asst Atty. Gen., Sa-
lem, argued the cause for respondent 
With her on the brief were Dave Prohn-
mayer, Atty. Gen., and Virginia L. Lander, 
Sol. Gen., Salem. 
Before WARDEN, PJ.f and VAN 
HOOMISSEN and GRABER, JJ. 
j^GRABER, Judge. 
Defendant appeals his conviction for 
driving under the influence of intoxicants. 
ORS 813.010. He argues that the court 
erred in admitting testimony, under OEC 
803(5), from the arresting police officer. 
We affirm. 
At trial, the officer testified to circum-
stances surrounding the stop and the ar-
rest of defendant He had no present rec-
ollection of several questions that he had 
asked or of the answers that defendant had 
given. However, that information was con-
tained in the police report that the officer 
had prepared shortly after the arrest The 
court allowed him to read the pertinent 
portion of the report to the jury.1 
his arrest. 
r\l> ~ 1 AO 
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CONVEYANCES 57-1-12 
57-1-12. Form of warranty deed — Effect. 
Conveyances of land may be substantially in the following form: 
WARRANTY DEED 
(here insert name), grantor, of (insert place of 
residence), hereby conveys and warrants to (insert name), 
grantee, of (insert place of residence), for the sum of 
dollars, the following described tract of land in 
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the premises). 
Witness the hand of said grantor this day of , 
19 
Such deed when executed as required by law shall have the effect of a 
conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of the premises 
therein named, together with all the appurtenances, rights and privileges 
thereunto belonging, with covenants from the grantor, his heirs and personal 
representatives, that he is lawfully seised of the premises; that he has good 
right to convey the same; that he guarantees the grantee, his heirs and as-
signs in the quiet possession thereof; that the premises are free from all 
encumbrances; and that the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives 
will forever warrant and defend the title thereof in the grantee, his heirs and 
assigns against all lawful claims whatsoever. Any exceptions to such cove-
nants may be briefly inserted in such deed following the description of the 
land. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1981; 
C.L. 1917, § 4881; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
78-1-11. 
ANALYSIS 
Actions for breach of warranty. 
Appurtenances. 
—Parol evidence. 
—Water rights. 
Covenant against encumbrances. 
Covenants running with land. 
Determination of character of instrument. 
"Encumbrances" construed. 
Formal requirements. 
—Presumptions. 
—Signature of witness. 
Interest conveyed. 
Liability of grantor. 
—Materialman's lien. 
Limitation of actions. 
Vendor's lien. 
Way of necessity. 
Actions for breach of warranty. 
Where paramount title is in sovereign, pur-
chaser may yield to that title, and such yield-
ing constitutes constructive eviction which will 
support action on covenant of warranty. East 
Canyon Land & Stock Co. v. Davis & Weber 
Counties Canal Co., 65 Utah 560, 238 P. 280 
(1925). 
In an action by a grantee against his grantor 
for breach of warranty because in a quiet title 
action between the grantor and a third person, 
the title was quieted in the third person, the 
grantor cannot assert the defense that because 
the third party had filed no lis pendens the 
grantee was not bound by the earlier decree. 
Briggs v. Hess, 122 Utah 559, 252 P.2d 538 
(1953). 
Appurtenances. 
On severance of estate by sale of part 
thereof, all easements of permanent character 
that have been created in favor of land sold, 
and which are open and plain to be seen, and 
are reasonably necessary for its use and conve-
nient enjoyment, unless expressly reserved by 
grantees, pass as appurtenances to land; ce-
ment walk constructed in front of several lots 
which was used as easement in connection 
with use and occupation of lots passed as an 
appurtenance to lots on sale thereof. Rollo v. 
Nelson, 34 Utah 116, 96 P. 263, 26 L.R.A. 
(N.S.) 315 (1908). 
A warranty deed conveys the fee simple title 
"together with all the appurtenances, rights 
and privileges thereunto belonging," by force 
of this section, unless some rights are reserved 
299 
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grantee. Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co., 123 Utah 
123, 255 P.2d 989 (1953). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 32 
et seq. 
C.J.S. — 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 22. 
Key Numbers. — Deeds e=> 29. 
57-1-14. Form of mortgage — Effect. 
A mortgage of land may be substantially in the following form: 
MORTGAGE 
(here insert name), mortgagor, of (insert 
(insert name), place of residence), hereby mortgages to 
mortgagee, of (insert place of residence), for the sum of 
dollars, the following described tract of land in 
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the premises). 
This mortgage is given to secure the following indebtedness (here state 
amount and form of indebtedness, maturity, rate of interest, by and to 
whom payable and where). 
The mortgagor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments on said prem-
ises, and the sum of dollars attorneys' fee in case of foreclosure. 
Witness the hand of said mortgagor this day of , 
19 
Such mortgage when executed as required by law shall have the effect of a 
conveyance of the land therein described, together with all the rights, privi-
leges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, to the mortgagee, his heirs, 
assigns and legal representatives, as security for the payment of the indebted-
ness thereon set forth, with covenants from the mortgagor of general war-
ranty of title, and that all taxes and assessments levied and assessed upon the 
land described, during the continuance of the mortgage, will be paid previous 
to the day appointed for the sale of such lands for taxes; and may be foreclosed 
as provided by law upon any default being made in any of the conditions 
thereof as to payment of either principal, interest, taxes or assessments. 
History: RS . 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1983; 
C.L. 1917, § 4883; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
78-1-13. 
Cross-References. — Failure to discharge 
mortgage after satisfaction, § 57-3-8. 
Foreclosure of mortgages, § 78-37-1 et seq. 
Mortgage not deemed a conveyance, 
§ 78-40-8. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
"Conveyance" construed. 
Deed or mortgage. 
Destruction of mortgaged property. 
Equitable mortgage. 
Form. 
Title to mortgaged property. 
Water rights. 
"Conveyance" construed. 
The term "conveyance," as used in this sec-
tion, covers only transactions involving mort-
gages or encumbrances of land and not trans-
fers of title or estate in view of § 57-1-1, so that 
a provision in this section that a mortgage in a 
statutory form "shall have the effect of a con-
veyance of the land" is not inconsistent with 
former § 104-57-7, Code 1943 (§ 78-40-8) pro-
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57-1-17 REAL ESTATE 
Attorney's fee. 
Attorney's fees incurred by mortgagor in 
bringing suit to cancel mortgage and note and 
to recover damages against mortgagee were 
proper item of damage to be assessed against 
mortgagee Swaner v Union Mtg. Co , 99 Utah 
298, 105 P.2d 342 (1940) 
Defenses. 
—Good faith. 
Where a bank, relying upon the advice of 
attorney and honestly thinking it had valid 
and subsisting mortgages against appellant 
which had not been satisfied, refused to release 
the mortgages, it was acting in good faith and 
was not liable for damages under this section 
Shibata v Bear River State Bank, 115 Utah 
395, 205 P.2d 251 (1949). 
Liability of mortgagee. 
—Breach of contract 
Mortgagee who refused to advance money for 
construction of house according to agreement, 
but who used position to coerce mortgagor m 
another transaction, could not claim that he 
was acting in good faith so as to escape liability 
under this section for failure to satisfy mort-
gage. Swaner v Union Mtg Co., 99 Utah 298, 
105 P2d 342 (1940) 
Proof of damages. 
Where there are both chattel mortgages and 
real estate mortgages which are not released it 
is not incumbent that the person damaged sep-
arate and prove separately his damages. 
Nalder v Kellogg Sales Co., 4 Utah 2d 117, 
288 P2d 456 (1955) 
Statutory construction. 
This section is penal in nature and should be 
strictly construed Shibata v. Bear River State 
Bank, 115 Utah 395, 205 P.2d 251 (1949). 
57-1-17, 57-1-18. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch. 155, § 24 repeals 
§ 57-1-17 and 57-1-18, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, relating to powers of attorney, effective 
July 1, 1988 
57-1-19. Trust deeds — Definitions of terms. 
As used in Sections 57-1-20 through 57-1-36: 
(1) "Beneficiary" means the person named or otherwise designated in a 
trust deed as the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or his 
successor in interest. 
(2) "Trustor" means the person conveying real property by a trust deed 
as security for the performance of an obligation. 
(3) "Trust deed" means a deed executed in conformity with Sections 
57-1-20 through 57-1-36 and conveying real property to a trustee in trust 
to secure the performance of an obligation of the trustor or other person 
named in the deed to a beneficiary. 
(4) "Trustee" means a person to whom title to real property is conveyed 
by trust deed, or his successor in interest. 
(5) "Real property" has the same meaning as set forth in Section 
57-1-1. 
(6) "Trust property" means the real property conveyed by the trust 
deed. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 1; 1988, ch. 
155, § 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1988, substituted "Sec-
tions 57-1-20 through 57-1-36" for "this act" in 
the introductory paragraph and in Subsection 
(3), substituted "trustor" for "grantor" in Sub-
section (3), and substituted the present provi-
sion in Subsection (5) for the former definition, 
which had listed various interests m land. 
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ADDENDUM 25 
1*1 
* jaw .:^i 
LARRY R. KELLER, #1785 
Attorney for Defendant Doms 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OOOOO 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate of 
D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON 
personally, DAN SCOTT and 
JEANNE SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY and EUGENE E. 
DOMS, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT EUGENE E. DOMS' 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 
OF DOCUMENTS TO PLAINTIFF 
ELLEN ANDERSON, AS 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
OF THE ESTATE OF D.C. 
ANDERSON 
Civil No. 8339 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
-ooOoo-
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representatiwe of the Estate 
Of D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN 
ANDERSON, personally, DAN 
SCOTT, and JEANNE SCOTT, 
Third-party Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, a 
Utah Corporation, 
Third-party Defendant. 
-ooOoo-
Defendant Eugene E. Doms, by and through his counsel of 
record, Larry R. Keller, and pursuant to the provisions of 
Rule 34, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby requests 
Plaintiff Ellen Anderson, as personal representative of the 
Estate of D.C. Anderson, to produce for inspection and copying 
on the 11th day of April, 1989, at the hour of 10:00 a.m., at 
the law office of Larry R. Keller, 257 East 200 South, Suite 
340, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, or to otherwise respond to 
this request, the following documents designated and set forth 
below, which documents are in the possession, custody or under 
the control of said Plaintiff, or to which said Plaintiff 
might have access. 
REQUESTED DOCUMENTS 
1. Please produce all documents or physical evidence you 
intend to introduce at trial in support of the Complaint filed 
against Defendant Doms in this action, the Third-Party 
Complaint filed against Third-Party Defendant Summit County 
Title Company in this action, and in defense to Defendant 
Doms1 Second Amended Counterclaim. 
2. Please produce all documents which support the 
allegations contained in or which were relied upon in the 
Affidavit of Jeanne Scott, dated August 10, 1988. 
3. Please produce all documents which support the 
allegations contained in or which were relied upon in the 
Affidavit of Dan Scott, dated August 10, 1988. 
4. Please produce all documents which support the 
-2-
DATED this J$2_ day of March, 1989. 
JLER, 
Attorney for Defendant Doms 
&4&g£uSz#7m*^ 
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LARRY R. KELLER, #1785 
Attorney for Defendant Doms 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OoOoo 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate of 
D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON 
personally, DAN SCOTT and 
JEANNE SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MICHAEL R. McCOY and EUGENE E. 
DOMS, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT EUGENE E. DOMSf 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 
OF DOCUMENTS TO PLAINTIFF 
DAN SCOTT 
Civil No. 8339 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
-ooOoo-
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representatiwe of the Estate 
Of D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN 
ANDERSON, personally, DAN 
SCOTT, and JEANNE SCOTT, 
Third-party Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, a 
Utah Corporation, 
Third-party Defendant. 
ooOoo 
Defendant Eugene E. Doms, by and through his counsel of 
record, Larry R. Keller, and pursuant to the provisions of 
Rule 34, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby requests 
Plaintiff Dan Scott to produce for inspection and copying on 
the 11th day of April, 1989, at the hour of 10:00 a.m., at the 
law office of Larry R. Keller, 257 East 200 South, Suite 340, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, or to otherwise respond to this 
request, the following documents designated and set forth 
below, which documents are in the possession, custody or under 
the control of said Plaintiff, or to which said Plaintiff 
might have access. 
REQUESTED DOCUMENTS 
1. Please produce all documents or physical evidence you 
intend to introduce at trial in support of the Complaint filed 
against Defendant Doms in this action, the Third-Party 
Complaint filed against Third-Party Defendant Summit County 
Title Company in this action, and in defense to Defendant 
Doms1 Second Amended Counterclaim. 
2. Please produce all documents which support the 
allegations contained in or which were relied upon in the 
Affidavit of Jeanne Scott, dated August 10, 1988. 
3. Please produce all documents which support the 
allegations contained in or which were relied upon in the 
Affidavit of Dan Scott, dated August 10, 1988. 
4. Please produce all documents which support the 
-2-
similar documents relating to the "Dan Scott Ranch Account" 
for the period beginning January 1, 1980 to January 1, 1983. 
22. Please produce all documents which relate to any 
joint ownership or control by Dan Scott and Jeanne
 fcScott of 
any real property or business interest for the period January 
1, 1980 to January 1, 1983. 
23. Please produce all documents relating to any marital 
agreements, contracts, financial accounts, or any similar 
documents by and/or between Dan Scott and Jeanne Scott for the 
period January 1, 1980 to January 1, 1983. 
DATED this Jj£_ day of March, 1989. 
-6-
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LARRY R. KELLER, #1785 
Attorney for Defendant Doms 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate of 
D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON 
personally, DAN SCOTT and 
JEANNE SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MICHAEL R. McCOY and EUGENE E« 
DOMS, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT EUGENE E. DOMSf 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 
OF DOCUMENTS TO PLAINTIFF 
ELLEN ANDERSON, PERSONALLY 
Civil No. 8339 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
-ooOoo-
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representatiwe of the Estate 
Of D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN 
ANDERSON, personally, DAN 
SCOTT, and JEANNE SCOTT, 
Third-party Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, a 
Utah Corporation, 
Third-party Defendant. 
ooOoo 
Defendant Eugene E. Doms, by and through his counsel of 
record, Larry R. Keller, and pursuant to the provisions of 
Rule 34, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby requests 
Plaintiff Ellen Anderson, personally, to produce for 
inspection and copying on the 11th day of April, 1989, at the 
hour of 10:00 a.m., at the law office of Larry R. Keller, 257 
East 200 South, Suite 340, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, or to 
otherwise respond to this request, the following documents 
designated and set forth below, which documents are in the 
possession, custody or under the control of said Plaintiff, or 
to which said Plaintiff might have access. 
REQUESTED DOCUMENTS 
1. Please produce all documents or physical evidence you 
intend to introduce at trial in support of the Complaint filed 
against Defendant Doms in this action, the Third-Party 
Complaint filed against Third-Party Defendant Summit County 
Title Company in this action, and in defense to Defendant 
Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim. 
2. Please produce all documents which support the 
allegations contained in or which were relied upon in the 
Affidavit of Jeanne Scott, dated August 10, 1988. 
3. Please produce all documents which support the 
allegations contained in or which were relied upon in the 
Affidavit of Dan Scott, dated August 10, 1988. 
4. Please produce all documents which support the 
-2-
DATED this //? day of March, 1989. 
^w^-tUslhER^ urn &ij?**p*-
Attorney for Defendant Doms 
-6-
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LARRY R. KELLER, #1785 
Attorney for Defendant Doms 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OOOOO 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate of 
D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON 
personally, DAN SCOTT and 
JEANNE SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MICHAEL R. McCOY and EUGENE E. 
DOMS, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT EUGENE E. DOMS' 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 
OF DOCUMENTS TO PLAINTIFF 
JEANNE SCOTT 
Civil No. 8339 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
-ooOoo-
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representatiwe of the Estate 
Of D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN 
ANDERSON, personally, DAN 
SCOTT, and JEANNE SCOTT, 
Third-party Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, a 
Utah Corporation, 
Third-party Defendant. 
-ooOoo-
Defendant Eugene E. Doms, by and through his counsel of 
record, Larry R. Keller, and pursuant to the provisions of 
Rule 34, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby requests 
Plaintiff Jeanne Scott to produce for inspection and copying 
on the 11th day of April, 1989, at the hour of 10:00 a.m., at 
the law office of Larry R. Keller, 257 East 200 South, Suite 
340, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, or to otherwise respond to 
this request, the following documents designated and set forth 
below, which documents are in the possession, custody or under 
the control of said Plaintiff, or to which said Plaintiff 
might have access. 
REQUESTED DOCUMENTS 
1. Please produce all documents or physical evidence you 
intend to introduce at trial in support of the Complaint filed 
against Defendant Doms in this action, the Third-Party 
Complaint filed against Third-Party Defendant Summit County 
Title Company in this action, and in defense to Defendant 
Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim. 
2. Please produce all documents which support the 
allegations contained in or which were relied upon in the 
Affidavit of Jeanne Scott, dated August 10, 1988. 
3. Please produce all documents which support the 
allegations contained in or which were relied upon in the 
Affidavit of Dan Scott, dated August 10, 1988. 
4. Please produce all documents which support the 
-2-
similar documents relating to the "Dan Scott Ranch Account" 
for the period beginning January 1, 1980 to January 1, 1983. 
22. Please produce all documents which relate to any 
joint ownership or control by Dan Scott and Jeanne Scott of 
any real property or business interest for the period January 
1, 1980 to January 1, 1983. 
23. Please produce all documents relating to any marital 
agreements, contracts, financial accounts, or any similar 
documents by and/or between Dan Scott and Jeanne Scott for the 
period January 1, 1980 to January 1, 1983. 
DATED this JQ day of March, 1989. 
Attorney for Defendant Doms 
-6-
ADDENDUM 26 
75-1-201 GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Part 2 
Definitions 
75-1-201. General definitions.—Subject to additional definitions con-
tained in the subsequent chapters which are applicable to specific chap-
ters or parts, as used in this code: 
(1) "Application" means a written request to the registrar for an 
order of informal probate or appointment under part 3 of chapter 3. 
(2) "Beneficiary/' as it relates to trust beneficiaries, includes a per-
son who has any present or future interest, vested or contingent, and 
also includes the owner of an interest by assignment or other transfer 
and as it relates to a charitable trust, includes any person entitled to 
enforce the trust. 
(3) "Child" includes any individual entitled to take as a child under 
this code by intestate succession from the parent whose relationship is 
involved and excludes any person who is only a stepchild, a foster child, 
a grandchild, or any more remote descendant. 
r ( 4 ) j "Claims," in respect to estates of decedents and protected per-
sossr^includes liabilities of the decedent or protected person whether 
arising in contract, in tort, or otherwise, and liabilities of the estate 
which arise at or after the death of the decedent or after the appoint-
ment of a conservator, including funeral expenses. The term does not 
include estate or inheritance taxes, Utah income taxes, or demands 
or disputes regarding title of a decedent or protected person to specific 
assets alleged to be included in the estate. 
(5) "Court" means any of the district courts of the state of Utah. 
(6) "Conservator" means a person who is appointed by a court to 
manage the estate of a protected person. 
(7) "Devise," when used as a noun, means a testamentary disposi-
tion of real or personal property and when used as a verb, means to dis-
pose of real or personal property by will. 
(8) "Devisee" means any person designated in a will to receive a de-
vise. In the case of a devise to an existing trust or trustee, or to a trus-
tee or trust described by will, the trust or trustee is the devisee, and the 
beneficiaries are not devisees. 
(9) "Disability" means cause for a protective order as described by 
section 75-5-401. 
(10) "Distributee" means any person who has received property of a 
decedent from his personal representative other than as a creditor or 
purchaser. A testamentary trustee is a distributee only to the extent of 
distributed assets or increment thereto remaining in his hands. A bene-
ficiary of a testamentary trust to whom the trustee has distributed 
property received from a personal representative is a distributee of the 
personal representative. For purposes of this subsection, testamentary 
trustee includes a trustee to whom assets are transferred by will to the 
extent of the devised assets. 
12 
75-3-801 PROBATE OF WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION 
The sections which follow facilitate collection of claims against decedents in 
several ways. First, a simple written statement mailed to the personal representa-
tive is a sufficient "claim." Allowance of claims is handled by the personal repre-
sentative and is assumed if a claimant is not advised of disallowance. Also, a per-
sonal representative may pay any just claims without presentation and at any time, 
if he is willing to assume risks which will be minimal in many cases. The period of 
uncertainty regarding possible claims is only four months from first publication. 
This should expedite settlement and distribution of estates. 
75-3-801. Notice to creditors.—Unless notice has already been given 
under this section, a personal representative upon his appointment shall 
publish a notice once a week for three successive weeks in a newspaper 
of general circulation in the county announcing his appointment and 
address and notifying creditors of the estate to present their claims 
within three months after the date of the first publication of the notice 
or be forever barred. 
History: C. 1953, 75-3-801, enacted 
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 4. 
Editorial Board Comment. 
Section 75-3-1203, relating to small 
estates, contains an important qualifica-
tion on the duty created by this section. 
Failure to advertise for claims would 
involve a breach of duty on the part of 
the personal representative. If, as a 
result of such breach, a claim is later 
asserted against a distributee under sec-
tion 75-3-1004, the personal representa-
tive may be liable to the distributee for 
costs related to discharge of the claim 
and the recovery of contribution from 
other distributees. The protection af-
forded personal representatives under 
section 75-3-1003 would not be available, 
for that section applies only if the 
personal representative truthfully re-
cites that he has advertised for claims as 
required by this section. 
It would be appropriate, by court rule, 
to channel publications through the per-
sonnel of the probate court. See section 
75-1-401. If notices are controlled by a 
centralized authority, some assurance 
could be gained against publication in 
newspapers of small circulation. Also, 
the form of notices could be made uni-
form and certain efficiencies could be 
achieved. For example, it would be com-
patible with this section for the court 
to publish a single notice each day or 
each week listing the names of personal 
representatives appointed since the last 
publication, with addresses and dates of 
nonclaim. 
Collateral References. 
Executors and Administrators(S=3226. 
34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators 
§411. 
31 Am. Jur. 2d 150, Executors and Ad-
ministrators § 297. 
Also see Am. Jur. 2d, New Topic Serv-
ice, Uniform Probate Code. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Notice. 
Where one such as a creditor claimed 
to be interested, but never had actual 
notice of the proceedings, and wanted to 
attack the final judgment or any of the 
proceedings as being void, his only 
method of direct attack was through pe-
tition. In re Phillips' Estate, 86 U. 358, 
44 P. 2d 699. 
Administrator who failed to file copy 
of notice to creditors and proof of its 
publication as required by statute was 
not entitled to mandamus to compel judge 
to decree that due notice had been given; 
although court could decree that due 
and legal notice had been given, even 
though proof had not been timely filed, it 
was not compelled to do so and could re-
fuse to so decree if in its discretion it 
appeared that the late filing of proof of 
publication resulted in prejudice. Harris 
v. Turner, 96 U. 342, 85 P. 2d 824. 
Constructive notice to creditors was 
sufficient; where Federal Land Bank, 
with claim against estate, knew of death 
of deceased and appointment of adminis-
trator, it was its duty to keep informed 
on time within which it could present its 
claim, and if it failed to do so, the court 
would not relieve it from its lack of dili-
gence; whether creditor learned of said 
facts before or after expiration of time 
within which it could present its claim 
was a question of fact. In re Ewles' 
Estate, 105 U. 507,143 P. 2d 903. 
Notice to nonresident creditors. 
Notice mailed to nonresident creditors 
who had listed their claims with railroad 
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75-3-803 PROBATE OF WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION 
action accruing* at or after death of per- against estate claim antedating dece-
son in whose favor it would have accrued, dent's death, 146 A. L. R. 1179. 
28 A. L. R. 3d 1141. Nonclaim statute as governing claim 
Direction in will for payment of debts barred, subsequent to death of obligor, 
of testator, or for payment of specified by general statute of limitations, 112 A. 
debt, as affecting debts or debt barred L. R. 289. fc 
by limitation, 109 A. L. R. 1440. Relation back of appointment of ad-
Effect of statement of claim against ministrator, running of statute of limi-
decedent's estate regarding debt appar- tations as affected by doctrine of, 3 
ently barred by the statute of limitations, A. L. R. 3d 1234. 
119 A. L. R. 426. Waiver or tolling of statute of limita-
Estoppel by silence or other conduct tions by executor or administrator, 8 A. 
(other than failure to file) to assert L. R. 2d 660. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Claims barred by statute of limitations. statute of limitations was available al-
Under former section, an executor or though not pleaded. Fullerton v. Bailey, 
administrator could not waive or abandon 1 7 u - 85> 5 3 p- 1 0 2 ° ; Clayton v. Din-
statute of limitations; nor could court, woodey, 33 U. 251, 93 P. 723, 14 Ann. 
in passing upon claim of a decedent, C a s - 926J Hawkley v. Heaton, 54 U. 314, 
approve one against which statute had 1 8 0 p - 44°J Gulbranson v. Thompson, 
run; therefore, where evidence showed 63 u - 115» 2 2 2 p- 59°J Holloway v. Wet-
that claim was barred, it could not be zel, 86 U. 387, 45 P. 2d 565; Gray Realty 
allowed although administrator did not Co. v. Robinson, 111 U. 521, 184 P. 2d 
plead statute of limitation; defense of 237. 
75-3-803. Limitations on presentation of claims.—(1) All claims 
against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of the decedent, 
including claims of the state and any subdivision of it, whether due or to 
become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded 
on contract, tort, or other legal basis, if not barred earlier by other stat-
ute of limitations, are barred against the estate, the personal representa-
tive, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented as fol-
lows: 
(a) Within three months after the date of the first publication of no-
tice to creditors n notice is given in compliance with section 75-3-801; 
provided, claims barred by the nonclaim statute at the decedent's domi-
cile before the first publication for claims in this state are also barred 
in this state. 
(b) Within three years after the decedent's death, if notice to 
creditors has not been published. 
(2) All claims against a decedent's estate which arise at or after the 
death of the decedent, including claims of the state and any subdivision 
of it, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated 
or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, are barred 
against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and dev-
isees of the decedent, unless presented as follows: 
(a) A claim based on a contract with the personal representative, 
within three months after performance by the personal representative 
is due; 
(b) Any other claim, within three months after it arises. 
(3) Nothing in this section affects or prevents: 
188 
CREDITORS' CLAIMS 75-3-803 
(a) Any proceeding to enforce any mortgage, pledge, or other lien 
upon property of the estate; or 
(b) To the limits of the insurance protection only, any proceeding 
to establish liability of the decedent or the personal representative for 
which he is protected by liability insurance. 
History: C. 1953, 75-3-803, enacted 
by L. 1975, ch. 150, §4. 
Editorial Board Comment. 
There was some disagreement among 
the reporters over whether a short pe-
riod of l i m i t a t i o n s , or of nonclaim, 
should be provided for claims arising at 
or after death. Subsection (2) was finally 
inserted because most felt it was de-
sirable to accelerate the time when un-
adjudicated distributions would be final. 
The time limits stated would not, of 
course, affect any personal liability in 
contract, tort, or by statute, of the per-
sonal representative. Under section 75-
3-808 a personal representative is not 
liable on transactions entered into on 
behalf of the estate unless he agrees to 
be personally liable or unless he breaches 
a duty by making the contract. Creditors 
of the estate and not of the personal 
representative thus face a special limita-
tion that runs four months after per-
formance is due from the personal rep-
resentative. Tort claims normally will 
involve casualty insurance of the dece-
dent or of the personal representative, 
and so will fall within the exception of 
subsection (3). If a personal representa-
tive is personally at fault in respect to 
a tort claim arising after the decedent's 
death, his personal liability would not be 
affected by the running of the special 
short period provided here. 
The limitation stated in subdivision 
( l ) (b ) dovetails with the three-year 
limitation provided in section 75-3-108 
to eliminate most questions of succession 
that are controlled by state law after 
three years from death have elapsed. 
Questions of interpretation of any will 
probated within such period, or of the 
identity of heirs in intestacy are not 
barred, however. 
Cross-References. 
Where party dies after verdict or de 
cision and before judgment, Rules 
Civil Procedure, Rule 58A (d). 
Collateral References. 
Executors and AdministratorsC=>225. 
34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators 
§§ 405-408. 
31 Am. Jur. 2d 148, Executors and 
Administrators § 291. 
of 
Action on contingent claim, presen-
tation of claim as condition precedent, 
34 A. L. R. 372. 
Amendment of claim against dece-
dent's estate after expiration of time for 
filing claims, 56 A. L. R. 2d 627. 
Applicability of nonclaim statute to 
claims arising under contract executory 
at time of death, 47 A. L. R. 896. 
Bar of statute of nonclaim of dece-
dent's domicile as affecting assertion of 
claim elsewhere, 72 A. L. R. 1030. 
Claims for taxes as within contempla-
tion of statute requiring presentation of 
claims against decedents' estates, 109 
A. L. R. 1370. 
Condition precedent to suit for spe-
cific performance of contract to make 
will in favor of another or to will latter 
a specified sum or property, presentation 
of claim against decedent's estate as, 113 
A. L. R. 1070. 
Counterclaim or setoff, presentation of 
claim to executor or administrator as 
prerequisite of its availability as, 36 
A. L. R. 3d 693. 
Delay in appointing administrator or 
other representative, effect on cause of 
action accruing at or after death of 
person in whose favor it would have 
accrued, 28 A. L. R. 3d 1141. 
Effect of recovery of judgment on un-
filed or abandoned claim after expiration 
of time allowed for filing claim against 
estate, 60 A. L. R. 736. 
Filing claim against estate of decedent 
as affecting or precluding other remedies 
against estate, 120 A. L. R. 1225. 
Funeral expenses, presentation of claim 
for to executor or administrator, 34 A. L. 
R. 375, 120 A. L. R. 275. 
Government: claim of government or 
subdivision thereof as within provision 
of nonclaim statute, 34 A. L. R. 2d 1003. 
Guaranty, suretyship, or endorsement, 
claim on decedent's contract of, as con-
tingent, 94 A. L. R. 1155. 
Judgment lien, presentation of claim 
against deceased debtor's estate as con-
dition of action to enforce, 114 A. L. R. 
1167. 
Land contract, application of non-
claim statute to claim for unmatured 
payments under, 99 A. L. R. 2d 275. 
Limitations, effect of statement ^ of 
claim against decedent's estate setting 
out debt apparently barred by statute of, 
119 A. L. R. 426. 
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21 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 8 
Relief from judgment or order, U.R.C.P. 60. 
Requirements of signature. U.R.C.P. 11. 
Service and filing of motions, pleadings and 
other papers, U.R.C.P. 5. 
Special forms of writs abolished, U.R.C.P. 
tioBia/. 
Supreme Court, rulemaking power of, 
§ 78-2-4. 
Temporary restraining orders, setting aside, 
U.R.C.P. 65A. 
Time for service of written motions, U.R.C.P. 
6(d). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Motions. 
—Amendments. 
Prayer for relief. 
—New trial. 
Particularization. 
—Setting aside conditional order. 
Orders. 
—Correction. 
Cited. 
Motions. 
—Amendments. 
Prayer for relief. 
Although a trial court may deny a motion to 
amend the complaint for a movant's failure to 
present a written motion and a proposed 
amended complaint, that rule does not apply to 
the prayer for relief because, under Rule 54(c), 
the prayer does not limit the relief which the 
court mav grant. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills 
Hosp., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983). 
—New trial. 
Particularization. 
Only purpose for requiring particularization 
of grounds for motion for new trial is to inform 
court and other party of theories upon which 
new trial is sought; where defendant filed affi-
davit with motions setting forth theories, and 
judgment had been on pleadings, court and 
parties were sufficiently advised as to grounds 
for motion. Howard v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 
149, 356 P.2d 275 (1960). 
—Setting aside conditional order. 
Where court on own initiative lowered from 
$2,000 to $1,000 value of building as found by 
jury and entered conditional order granting 
new trial unless plaintiff consented to reduc-
tion, court could restore jury findings under 
authority of this Rule, since plaintiff filed mo-
tion to set aside conditional order for new trial 
within ten days. National Farmers ' Union 
Property & Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 
286 P.2d 249, 61 A.L.R.2d 635 (1955). 
Orders. 
—Correction. 
Where judge made perfunctory or clerical 
mistake resulting from erroneous assumption 
that order prepared by counsel correctly re-
flected judgment of Supreme Court and trial 
court, judge could correct order on his own mo-
tion. Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 5 Utah 2d 196, 
299 P.2d 827 (1956). 
Cited in Boskovich v. Utah Constr. Co., 123 
Utah 387, 259 P.2d 885 (1953); Thomas v. 
Heirs of Braffet, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P.2d 507 
(1956). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. Jur . 2d Motions, 
Rules, and Orders § 1 et seq.; 61A Am. Jur . 2d 
Pleading §§ 1 et seq., 238. 
C.J .S . — 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § 1 
et seq.; 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 63 to 210, 140 et 
seq., 211 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Proceeding for summary judgment 
as affected by presentation of counterclaim, 8 
A.L.R.3d 1361. 
Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action 
as affected by opponent's motion for summary 
judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or di-
rected verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113. 
Key Numbers. — Motions «=» 1 et seq.; 
Pleading *= 38 V2 to 186, 187 et seq. 
Rule 8. General rules of pleadings. 
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, 
whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, 
shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to 
which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several differ-
ent types may be demanded. 
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms 
his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments 
upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or informa-
tion sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state 
and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of 
the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a 
part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true 
and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends 
in good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he 
may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments or para-
Rule 8 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 2 2 
graphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated 
averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend 
to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the 
obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party 
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, 
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, 
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, 
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of 
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affir-
mative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a coun-
terclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so 
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a respon-
sive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are 
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a plead-
ing to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as 
denied or avoided. 
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency. 
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No 
technical forms of pleading or motions are required. 
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense 
alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate 
counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alter-
native and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the 
pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the 
alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims 
or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal 
or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject 
to the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially the same as Rule 8, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Amended and supple-
mental pleadings, U.R.C.P. 15. 
Arbitration, § 78-3la-1 et seq. 
Comparative negligence, § 78-27-38. 
Counterclaim and cross-claim, U.R.C.P. 13. 
Creditors, assignment for benefit of, § 6-1-1 
et seq. 
Defenses and objections, U.R.C.P. 12. 
Fee for filing cross-claim or counterclaim, 
§§ 21-1-5, 78-6-14. 
Fellow servant defined, § 34-25-2. 
Form of pleadings, U.R.C.P. 10. 
Forms intended to indicate simplicity and 
brevity of s tatement, U.R.C.P. 84. 
Forms of answers, Forms 21, 22. 
Hearing of certain defenses before trial. 
U.R.C.P. 12(d). 
Interpleader, U.R.C.P. 22. 
Motions, forms for. Forms 20, 23, 24. 
Numbered paragraphs, U.R.C.P. 10(b). 
One form of action, U.R.C.P. 2. 
Reply to answer, order for, U.R.C.P. 7(a). 
Security interest, enforceability of, § 70A-
9-203. 
Special forms of pleadings and writs abol-
ished. U.R.C.P. 65B(a). 
Statute of frauds, generally, § 25-5-1 et seq. 
Statute of frauds, investment securities. 
§ 70A-8-319. 
Statute of frauds, sales, S 70A-2-201. 
Statute of frauds, Uniform Commercial 
Code, personal property not otherwise covered, 
§ 70A-1-206. 
Third-party practice, U.R.C.P. 14. 
Time for answer, U.R.C.P. 12(a). 
Uniform Commercial Code, supplementary 
principles of law applicable, § 70A-1-103. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affirmative defenses. 
—Accord and satisfaction. 
Pleading. 
Time limitation. 
—Avoidance. 
—Consent. 
—Election of remedies. 
—Estoppel. 
Failure to plead. 
—Failure of consideration. 
Failure to plead. 
Pleading. 
—Failure to plead. 
Affidavit opposing summary judgment. 
Denial. 
Notice and opportunity. 
Waiver of defense. 
Rule 13 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 40 
Rule 13. Counterclaim and cross-claim. 
(a) Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim 
any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against 
any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject-matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adju-
dication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire juris-
diction. But the pleader need not state the claim if Q) at the time the action 
was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action, or (2) the 
opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or other process by 
which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on 
that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this Rule 
13. 
(b) Permissive counterclaim. A pleading may state as a counterclaim any 
claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occur-
rence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's claim. 
(c) Counterclaim exceeding opposing claim. A counterclaim may or 
may not diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party. It may 
claim relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought in the 
pleading of the opposing party. 
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after pleading. A claim which 
either matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving his pleading may, 
with the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supple-
mental pleading. 
(e) Omitted counterclaim. When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim 
through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice re-
quires, he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by amendment. 
(f) Cross-claim against co-party. A pleading may state as a cross-claim 
any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or 
occurrence that is the subject-matter either of the original action or of a 
counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject-matter of 
the original action. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the party 
against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or 
part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant. 
(g) Additional parties may be brought in. When the presence of parties 
other than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete 
relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall 
order them to be brought in as defendants as provided in these rules, if juris-
diction of them can be obtained. 
(h) Separate judgments. Judgment on a counterclaim or cross-claim may 
be rendered in accordance with the terms of Rule 54(b), even if the claims of 
the opposing party have been dismissed or otherwise disposed of. 
(i) Cross demands not affected by assignment or death. When cross 
demands have existed between persons under such circumstances that, if one 
had brought an action against the other, a counterclaim could have been set 
up, the two demands shall be deemed compensated so far as they equal each 
other, and neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof by the assignment or 
death of the other, except as provided in Subdivision (j) of this rule. 
(j) Claims against assignee. Except as otherwise provided by law as to 
negotiable instruments and assignments of accounts receivable, any claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim which could have been asserted against an as-
signor at the time of or before notice of such assignment, may be asserted 
against his assignee, to the extent that such claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim does not exceed recovery upon the claim of the assignee. 
(k) Claim in excess of court's jurisdiction. Where any counterclaim or 
cross-claim or third-party claim is filed in an action in a city court or justice's 
court, and due to its limited jurisdiction, such court does not have the power to 
grant the relief sought thereby, it shall suspend all proceedings in the entire 
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plaint was filed and two weeks before the 
scheduled trial date, where reasons for the un-
timely motion were inadequate and where the 
parties failed to demonstrate that the court's 
denial of the motions resulted in prejudice. 
Tripp v. Vaughn. 746 P.2d 794 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). 
Cited in Serr v. Rick Jensen Constr., 
743 P.2d 1202 (Utah 1987). 
Inc., 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
or indemnity from original tortfeasor, 20 
A.L.R.4th 338. 
Key Numbers. — Parties <s= 49 to 56. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties 
§ 188 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Parties §§ 72 to 84. 
A.L.R. — Defendant's right to contribution 
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is 
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been 
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days 
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of 
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended 
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or 
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may 
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by 
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to 
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party 
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the 
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense as-
serted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occur-
rence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the 
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon 
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a 
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events 
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supple-
mented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is 
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it 
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall 
so order, specifying the time therefor. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially similar to Rule 15, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Amendments. 
—After pretrial order. 
—Alternative to dismissal. 
Payment of attorney fees. 
Prolix complaint. 
—Amendment of response. 
—Answer. 
To include counterclaim. 
—Complaint. 
To defeat motion for summary judgment. 
To include damages. 
—Considerations. 
Prejudice. 
—Court's discretion. 
Abused. 
Not abused. 
—Dismissal without opportunity to amend. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 62A Am. Jur. 2d Pretrial issues not fixed for trial in pretrial order, 11 
Conference and Procedure § 1 et seq. A.L.R. Fed. 786. 
C.J.S. — 88 C.J.S. Trial § 17(2). Validity and effect of local district court 
A.L.R. — Failure of party or his attorney to rules providing for use of alternative dispute 
appear at pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. resolution procedures as pretrial settlement 
Propriety of allowing state court civil liti- mechanisms, 86 A.L.R. Fed. 211. 
gant to call nonexpert witness whose name or Imposition of sanctions tinder Rule 16(f), 
address was not disclosed during pretrial dis- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failing to 
covery proceedings, 63 A.L.R.4th 712. obey scheduling or pretrial order, 90 A.L.R. 
Consideration or submission at trial, under Fed. 157. 
Rule 16 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of Key Numbers. — Trial «=> 9(1). 
PART IV. 
PARTIES. 
Rule 17. Parties plaintiff and defendant. 
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of 
the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, 
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract 
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may 
sue in that person's name without joining the party for whose benefit the 
action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use or 
benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. No action 
shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the 
real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection 
for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, 
the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall 
have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the 
real party in interest. 
(b) Minors or incompetent persons. A minor or an insane or incompetent 
person who is a party must appear either by a general guardian or by a 
guardian ad litem appointed in the particular case by the court in which the 
action is pending. A guardian ad litem may be appointed in any case when it 
is deemed by the court in which the action or proceeding is prosecuted expe-
dient to represent the minor, insane or incompetent person in the action or 
proceeding, notwithstanding that the person may have a general guardian 
and may have appeared by the guardian. In an action in rem it shall not be 
necessary to appoint a guardian ad litem for any unknown party who might 
be a minor or an incompetent person. 
(c) Guardian ad litem; how appointed. A guardian ad litem appointed by 
a court must be appointed as follows: 
(1) When the minor is plaintiff, upon the application of the minor, if 
the minor is of the age of fourteen years, or if under that age, upon the 
application of a relative or friend of the minor. 
(2) When the minor is defendant, upon the application of the minor if 
the minor is of the age of fourteen years and applies within 20 days after 
the service of the summons, or if under that age or if the minor neglects so 
to apply, then upon the application of a relative or friend of the minor, or 
of any other party to the action. 
(3) When a minor defendant resides out of this state, the plaintiff, upon 
motion therefor, shall be entitled to an order designating some suitable 
person to be guardian ad litem for the minor defendant, unless the defen-
dant or someone in behalf of the defendant within 20 days after service of 
notice of such motion shall cause to be appointed a guardian for such 
minor. Service of such notice may be made upon the defendant's general 
or testamentary guardian located in the defendant's state; if there is 
none, such notice, together with the summons in the action, shall be 
served in the manner provided for publication of summons upon such 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 6 Am. Jur. 2d Associations 
and Clubs §§ 50, 51; 36 Am. Jur. 2d Foreign 
Corporations § 193 et seq.; 41 Am. Jur. 2d In-
competent Persons §§ 115 to 121; 42 Am. Jur. 
2d Infants §§ 155 et seq., 175; 59 Am. Jur. 2d 
Parties 88 31, 38 to 44, 249 to 252, 255; 60 Am. 
Jur. 2d Partnership 8 324. 
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Associations 88 36, 38; 20 
C.J.S. Corporations 8 1828 et seq.; 43 C.J.S. 
Infants 88 108, 110; 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons 
88 133 to 146; 67 C.J.S. Parties 88 17, 18, 133 
to 138; 68 C.J.S. Partnership 8 206 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Power of incompetent spouse's 
guardian, committee or next friend to sue for 
granting or vacation of divorce or annulment of 
marriage, or to make a compromise or settle-
ment in such suit, 6 A.L.R.3d 681. 
Insurance, proper party plaintiff, under real 
party in interest statute, to action against tort-
feasor for damage to insured property where 
insured has paid part of loss, 13 A.L.R.3d 140. 
Insurance, proper party plaintiff, under real 
party in interest statute, to action against tort-
feasor for damage to insured property where 
loss is entirely covered by insurance, 13 
A.L.R.3d 229. 
State Consumer Protection Act, right to pri-
vate action under, 62 A.L.R.3d 169. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially similar to Rule 18, F.R.C.P. 
ANALYSIS 
Joinder of claims. 
—Tort, contract and equity. 
Auto accident. 
Same transaction. 
—Unrelated claims by assignee. 
Joinder of remedies. 
—Insurer and tort-feasor. 
Cited. 
Joinder of claims. 
—Tort, contract and equity. 
Auto accident. 
Where insurer of a vehicle involved in an 
auto accident filed a declaratory judgment ac-
tion seeking to void insurance policy due to 
Who is minor's next of kin for guardianship 
purposes, 63 A.L.R.3d 813. 
Bailor's right of direct action against bailee's 
theft insurer for loss of bailed property, 64 
A.L.R.Sd 1207. 
Proper party plaintiff in action for injury to 
common areas of condominium development, 
69 A.L.R.3d 1148. 
Necessary or proper parties to suit or pro-
ceeding to establish private boundary line, 73 
A.L.R.3d 948. 
Necessity of requiring presence in court of 
both parties in proceedings relating to custody 
or visitation of children, 15 A.L.R.4th 864. 
Right of illegitimate child to maintain action 
to determine paternity, 19 A.L.R.4th 1082. 
Required parties in adoption proceedings, 48 
A.L.R.4th 860. 
Joint venture's capacity to sue, 56 A.L.R.4th 
1234. 
Standing to bring action relating to real 
property of condominium, 74 A.L.R.4th 165. 
Key Numbers. — Associations «=» 20, 26; 
Corporations «=» 662; Courts «= 12; Infants «=» 
78, 80; Mental Health «=» 471 to 497; Parties «= 
1, 2, 6, 8, 21; Partnerships «=» 191. 
misrepresentations by the vehicle's owner in 
the policy application, and one of the defen-
dants in the declaratory judgment action coun-
terclaimed against the insurer and cross-
claimed in tort against the other defendants, in 
determining whether to dismiss the defen-
dant's counterclaim and cross-claim or permit 
their joinder, the trial court should have per-
mitted the joinder unless the insurer could 
show that it would be prejudiced because of 
bias by the trier of fact if joinder was allowed; 
trial court should not have dismissed defen-
dant's counterclaim and cross-claim on basis 
that joinder was of both tort and contract ac-
tions. Dairvland Ins. Corp. v. Smith, 646 P.2d 
737 (Utah 1982). 
Rule 18. Joinder of claims and remedies, 
(a) Joinder of claims. The plaintiff in his complaint or in a reply setting 
forth a counterclaim and the defendant in an answer setting forth a counter-
claim may join either as independent or as alternate claims as many claims 
either legal or equitable or both as he may have against an opposing party. 
There may be a like joinder of claims when there are multiple parties if the 
requirements of Rules 19, 20, and 22 are satisfied. There may be a like joinder 
of cross-claims or third-party claims if the requirements of Rules 13 and 14 
respectively are satisfied. 
(b) Joinder of remedies; fraudulent conveyances. Whenever a claim is 
one heretofore cognizable only after another claim has been prosecuted to a 
conclusion, the two claims may be joined in a single action; but the court shall 
grant relief in that action only in accordance with the relative substantive 
rights of the parties. In particular, a plaintiff may state a claim for money and 
a claim to have set aside a conveyance fraudulent as to him, without first 
having obtained a judgment establishing the claim for money. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Same transaction. Joinder of remedies. 
All issues, whether in contract, tort, law or
 T , , . r 
equity, arising out of a transaction between ~ * n S U r * £ " " ! t o r * - f e a s o i \ . 
two parties, may be pleaded and proved in a Plaintiffs attempt to join defendants msur-
single action. Smoot v. Lund, 13 Utah 2d 168, a n c e company as a party defendant in a per-
369 P.2d 933 (1962). sonal injury action, based on insurance policy 
—Unrelated claims by assignee. providing that the insurance company "has 
Where seven different claimants assigned agreed to pay a claim only after another claim 
twelve different causes of action to plaintiff for n a s D e e n prosecuted to a conclusion," did not 
purpose of collecting on them from a single de- come within the joinder provision of either 
fendant, and each cause of action arose from Subdivision (b) or Rule 20 Young v. Barney, 
facts unrelated to any of the other causes of 20 Utah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 (1967). 
action so assigned, the single collector-plaintiff Because there is no reason to believe the new 
was not permitted to join all of the claims rules were intended to change prior practice of 
against defendant in one action despite the not permitting disclosure to a jury of insurance 
provisions of the rule, since the assignors could coverage in a personal injury suit, joinder of 
not have joined together and asserted their tort-feasor with plaintiffs uninsured motorist 
various claims m one action against defendant
 m s u r e r 1S Chnstensen v. Peterson, 
(Rule 20(a)), and an assignee cannot possess
 2 5 U t a h 2 d 4 n 4 g 3 p 2 d 4 4 ? ( 1 9 ? 1 ) 
any greater rights than those possessed by his 
assignor. Stank v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 96, 404 Cited in Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 
P.2d 964 (1965). 351 P.2d 959 (1960). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 1 Am. Jur. 2d Actions C.J.S. — 1 C.J.S. Actions §§ 61 to 101. 
§§ 100 to 126. Key Numbers. — Action o=> 39 to 60. 
Rule 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication. 
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible, A person who is subject to service of 
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his 
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) 
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated 
that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter 
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the 
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, mul-
tiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If 
he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he 
should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, 
in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue 
and his joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be 
dismissed from the action. 
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a person 
as described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court 
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should 
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person 
being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the 
court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's ab-
sence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties: second, the extent 
to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or 
other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a 
judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether 
the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for non-
joinder. 
(c) Pleading reasons for nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for 
relief shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as de-
scribed in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons 
why they are not joined. 
(d) Exception of class actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of 
Rule 23. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
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Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanc-
tions. 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable 
notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order 
compelling discovery as follows: 
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be 
made to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters relating 
to a deposition, to the court in the district where the deposition is being 
taken. An application for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall 
be made to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken. 
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or 
submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to 
make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer 
an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a 
request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that 
inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as 
requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling an 
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance 
with the request. When taking a deposition on oral examination, the 
proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination be-
fore he applies for an order. 
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may make such 
protective order as it would have been empowered to make on a motion 
made pursuant to Rule 26(c). 
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of this subdivision 
an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer. 
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, the court 
shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose 
conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such 
conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable ex-
penses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the 
court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or 
that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, 
require the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of 
them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reason-
able expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees, 
unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially 
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may 
apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion 
among the parties and persons in a just manner. 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a 
deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to 
do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is being taken, 
the failure may be considered a contempt of that court. 
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an 
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated 
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an 
order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Sub-
division (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order 
entered under Rule 26(f), the court in which the action is pending may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others 
the following: 
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made 
or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the 
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purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party ob-
taining the order; 
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or 
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from intro-
ducing designated matters in evidence; 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying fur-
ther proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or 
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default 
against the disobedient party; 
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an 
order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders 
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination; 
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 
35(a) requiring him to produce another for examination, such orders 
as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless 
the party failing to comply shows that he is unable to produce such 
person for examination. 
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court 
shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising 
him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, 
caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substan-
tially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses 
unjust. 
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness 
of any document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if 
the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the 
document or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an order 
requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in 
making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make 
the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant 
to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or 
(3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might 
prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to 
admit. 
id) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to 
interrogatories or respond to request for inspection. If a party or an 
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under 
Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before 
the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper 
notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under 
Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written 
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper 
service of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may 
take any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision 
(b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall 
require the party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay the 
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless 
the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other cir-
cumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the 
ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to 
act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c). 
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party 
or his attorney fails to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery 
plan by agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportu-
nity for hearing, require such party or his attorney to pay to any other party 
the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
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PART VII. 
JUDGMENT. 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree 
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a 
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
tion and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision 
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is en-
tered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not 
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one 
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as 
between or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different 
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the 
demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is 
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be 
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for re-
view is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such 
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination 
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies 
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five 
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against 
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs 
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like 
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the 
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily in-
curred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs 
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, 
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the 
judgment was rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the 
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be 
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(3), (4) [Deleted.] 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must 
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
ADDENDUM 28 
iM IHU JUDICIAL DISJHICT 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT - STATE OF UTAH 
FILE NO. 8339 
TrTT 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as p e r s . r e p , of ESTATE of 
D.C.ANDERSON, ETAL, DAN & JEANNE SCOTT 
V 
( J PARTIES PRESENT) COUNSEL: (^  COUNSEL PRESENT) 
IRVING H. BIELE, 50 W BROADWAY.4TH FL,SLC 84 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, 1399 S 700 E*?SLC 84105 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY & EUGENE E. DOMS 
V 
LARRY R. KELLER.257 E 200 S-10,#340, SLC 841 
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE CO. BRANT H. WALL, 9 EX PL, #800, SLC 84111 
JOYE D. OVARD 
CLERK HON. J, DENNIS FREDERICK 
JUDGE 
REPORTER DATE JUNE 22, 1989 
BAILIFF 
After RKQUEST FOR RULING was received and respective MEMORANDA reviewed, also OBJECTIONS 
thereto, Court rules as follows: 
Involuntary Plaintiffs Anderson & Scott's MOTION FOR SANCTIONS RE: DOM'S OBJECTIONS TO 
REQUESTS is granted to the extent that the discovery sought relates to real property 
transactionsCas opposed to personalty). Defendant Doms is directed to respond to the 
discovery request within 30 davs of the date of this minute entry ruling. Movant is 
granted reasonable attorney fees for necessity of bringing motionyto pe determined at 
trial. 
2. Counsel far Movants is to prepare order, 
Copies mailed tp"Counsel as shown above 6-22-89. JO 
r\t} * ^ O Q 
ADDENDUM 29 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT - STATE OF UTAH 
FILE NO. 8339 
r P L E : (^ PARTIES PRESENT) COUNSEL. I ' COUNSEL PRESENT) 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal rep. of Estate: IRVING H. BIELE 
of D.C.ANDERSON, ET AL 
333 N 300 W, SLC 84103 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, .SUITE 14, INTRADE BLDG, 
1399 S 700 E, SLC 84105 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY & EUGENE E. POMS : LARRY R. KELLER, 257 TOWERS, SUITE 340, 
257 E 200 S #10, SLC 84111 
ANDERSON & SC0TT(3rd Party Plaintiffs)
 : 
v SUMMIT CO. TITLE CO. (3rd Party Defendant) BRANT H. WALL, 9 EX PL,#800, SLC 84lTT~ 
JOYE D. OVARD 
Cl
-
ER
"- HON. J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
JUDGE 
R E P O R T
" 2£LL AUG. 10 . 1989 
BAILIFF 
After REQUEST FOR RULING ON MOTIONS PERTAINING TO JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK'S JUNE 22, 1989 
MINUTE ENTRY RULING, REQUEST FOR HEARING OR TELEPHONE CONFERENCE and OBJECTIONS thereto having 
been filed and Court's review of MEMORANDA, Court rules as follows: 
1. Defendant Poms' MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFF'S DISCOVERY REQUESr 
is denied. 
2. Defendant Poms' MOTION FOR HEARING ON COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES is denied. Hearin: 
as to reasonableness of fees awarded is reserved for trial. 
3. Defendant Doms' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF COURT'S MINUTE ENTRY RULING OF JUNE 22, 198< 
and REQUEST FOR HEARING OR TELEPHONE CONFERENCE is denied. 
4. Counsel for Anderson and Scott is awarded reasonable Attorney Fees on the instant matte: 
to be determined at trial. 
5. Counsel for Anderson and Scott is to prepare Order. 
Copies mailed to Counsel as shown above. JO 
nniftfi8 PAGE OF. 
ADDENDUM 30 
E. Russell Vetter, (#4934) of 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-1666 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of ) 
D.C. ANDERSON and DAN SCOTT, ] 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MICHAEL R. McCOY and ] 
EUGENE E. DOMS, ] 
Defendants. 
1 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
1 OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
) AND COSTS 
i Civil No. 8339 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
• ss . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE j 
E. RUSSELL VETTER, after being first duly sworn and upon oath, 
deposes and says as follows: 
1. He is a member of the Utah State Bar and in good standing. 
2. He is employed with the law firm of Biele, Haslam & Hatch and 
in such capacity has represented the above-named plaintiffs. 
3. He has undertaken effort in behalf of the plaintiffs in the 
prosecution of this matter as follows: 
DATE DESCRIPTION AMOUNT 
03/13/84 Discussion with Jerry Kinghorn attorney for parties 
who are purchasing the Rossi Hill contract from the 
Dewey Anderson Estate. (ESS) 1.00 $ 85.00 
11/08/84 Preparation of memo to co-counsel. (ESS) .25 $ 21.25 
r\ r\ r\ /*\ r> r\ 
y^O 
D 
11/26/84 Discussion with Ellen Anderson on payment on Rossi 
Hill contracts. (ESS) .50 $ 42.50 
12/05/84 Conference with Jerry Kinghorn related to Rossi Hill 
contracts. (ESS) .50 $ 42.50 
01/17/85 Conference with Jerry Kinghorn concerning the 
January 25 payment owing the estate from Ooms McCoy. 
Review of documentation relative to easement problem. 
(ESS) 2.00 $170.00 
01/29/85 Review publ ishing of service by pub l i ca t i on . (IHB) .75 $ 86.25 
02/14/85 Off ice conference, review f i l e . (JPM) .50 $ 42.50 
02/15/85 Going over Rossi H i l l Doms/McCoy foreclosure wi th 
co-counsel . Conference wi th c red i to r of es ta te . 
(ESS) .50 $ 42.50 
02/15/85 Review of f i l e , l e t t e r to opposing counsel regarding 
encroachment d ispute , assessing over-due amounts 
on cont rac t , phone ca l l to Val ley Bank Trust Dept 
regarding over-due amounts. (JPM) 3.50 $297.50 
02/20/85 Calls to opposing counsel and Valley Bank Trust 
Dept. regarding Rossi H i l l s con t rac t . (JPM) .50 $ 42.50 
02/28/85 Conference wi th Dan Scott concerning the Rossi 
H i l l proper ty . (ESS) .25 $ 21.25 
03/12/85 Conference wi th Jerry Kinghorn related to the 
Doms/McCoy t ransac t ion . (ESS) .25 $ 21.25 
03/18/85 Meeting wi th Jerry Kinghorn on the Rossi H i l l 
property which the estate has a 1/2 i n t e r e s t . 
Review of Doms and McCoy's pos i t ion of defaul t by 
the estate and Dan Scott concerning t rans fer of 
property without encumbrances. (ESS) 1.00 $ 85.00 
03/18/85 Meeting wi th opposing counsel, review of p la t 
maps, d ra f t i ng memorandum to f i l e (JPM) 2.50 $212.50 
03/19/85 Call to opposing counsel, revis ions to memo. 
(JPM) .50 $ 42.50 
03/25/85 Discussion wi th Mike Sloan concerning the Rossi 
H i l l s contract (ESS) .25 $ 21.25 
04/09/85 Review of f i l e , revisions to Complaint. (JPM) .50 $ 42.50 
r m n n o n 
04/10/85 Revisions to Complaint, phone calls regarding 
service of process, preparation of discovery 
requests. (JPM) 2.00 
05/14/85 Phone conference with t i t l e company related to 
obtaining address for Doms and McCoy (ESS) .25 
05/24/85 Review and direction on setting up the Complaint 
for foreclosure. (IHB) .50 
05/24/85 Drafting Complaint, office conference. (JPM) 1.00 
05/28/85 Review of and modifications to Complaint for 
foreclosure. (IHB) 1.00 
05/29/85 Conference with co-counsel, revisions to Complaint, 
(JPM) 1.00 
06/03/85 Meeting with Mike Sloan to go over the Rossi Hi l l 
lawsuit, in part icular, the facts surrounding the 
sale of the property to Doms and McCoy. (ESS) .50 
06/05/85 Review of Complaint and approval. (IHB) .50 
05/21/85 Search for documents related to deposition on 
06/24/85. (CM) .25 
06/25/85 Arranging for service of process, le t ter to Los 
Angeles county sher i f f , phone call to same, 
tracing address. (JPM) 1.00 
06/28/85 Phone call to Dan Scott. (JPM) .25 
09/16/85 Phone call to opposing counsel. (JPM) .25 
10/25/85 Conference with opposing counsel, le t ter to same. 
(JPM) 1.00 
10/31/85 Phone call to opposing counsel, preparation of 
default papers. (JPM) 1.00 
11/19/85 Preparation of default papers, phone call to 
Jerry Kinghorn. (JPM) 1.00 
12/03/85 Phone calls to Dan Scott, Summit County Clerk 
and opposing counsel. (JPM) 1.00 
01/02/86 Conference with opposing counsel. (JPM) .25 
04/05/86 Review of f i l e and preparation to f i l e default 
judgment against Doms and to proceed against 
Michael McCoy. (ESS) 1.00 
$170.00 
$ 21.25 
$ 42.50 
$ 85.00 
$115.00 
$ 85.00 
$ 42.50 
$ 57.50 
$ 10.00 
$ 85.00 
$ 21.25 
$ 21.25 
$ 85.00 
$ 85.00 
$ 85.00 
$ 85.00 
$ 21.25 
$ 85.00 
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12/23/86 Preparation of l e t t e r to c l i e n t . Review f i l e . 
(ERV) .40 $ 28.00 
04/26/87 Review of f i l e re lated to status of case. Further 
review of case and discussions with court c lerk 
re lated to status of case. (ERV) .50 $ 35.00 
04/28/87 Attorney's conference related to strategy in 
case. Discussions wi th Summit County Clerk 
related to pleadings in f i l e . Preparation of 
l e t t e r to c l i e n t . (ERV) .25 $ 17.50 
05/06/87 Discussions with James Sandal 1 re lated to pro-
ceedings in case. (ERV) .25 $ 17.50 
06/18/87 Discussions with Summit County Clerk on t rack ing 
down documents in case. (ERV) .50 $ 35.00 
07/02/87 Discussions with Summit County Clerk regarding 
locat ion of documents. (ERV) .25 $ 17.50 
07/10/87 Preparation for hearing to defau l t Doms. (ERV) .25 $ 17.50 
07/20/87 Appearance at Coa lv i l l e Court fo r hearing on 
motion fo r defaul t judgment. Discussions with 
counsel for defendants regarding resolut ion of 
d isputes. (ERV) 2.00 $140.00 
07/21/87 Preparation of s t i p u l a t i o n . (ERV) .25 $ 17.50 
08/21/87 Preparation of defaul t c e r t i f i c a t e on defendant 
Doms. (ERV) .25 $ 17.50 
12/01/87 Preparation of Default Judgment and Affidavit 
in Support of Attorneys1 Fees. (ERV) 2.00 $140.00 
$3,004.25 
$ 
$ 
50, 
33, 
.00 
.00 
TOTAL 
Costs: Filing Fees 
Service Fees 
TOTAL COSTS $ 83.00 
4. In his opinion, considering the amount for which judgment was 
prayed, the time and effort involved in the matter and the time that will 
be required to enforce the judgment, that the sum of $3,004.25 is a reason-
-4-
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able attorney's fee to be allowed plaintiff in this action, plus $83.00 
as costs. 
DATED this /*> day of January, 1988. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
< {/sO 
E. RUSSELL VETTER 
Attorneys for P la int i f f 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / V ' d a y of January, 1988. > _fiA 
My Commission Expires: 
ITARYPUBLIC <~ ', y . \ NO Y P I ^ .\ ~ ^ " . , , 
Residing at: /jfotT J^lKJL L-uTtj LW 
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TRVTNG H. BIELE, A0317, of, 
BIELE HASLAM & HATCH 
Attorneys For Plaintiff 
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-1666 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
THE COUNTY OF SUMMIT, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
D. C. ANDERSON and DAN SCOTT 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs > ] 
MICHAEL R- McCOY and EUGENE E. DOMS ] 
Defendants. ) 
) SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT IN 
) SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
) AND COSTS 
) Civil No. 8339 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
IRVING H. BIELE, after being first duly sworn, and upon oath deposes 
and says as follows: 
1. He is a member of the Utah State Bar and in good standing. 
2. He is employed with the law firm of Biele, Haslam & Hatch and in 
<"ich caDacity has represented the above-named plaintiffs. 
3. This supplemental affidavit is filed showing attorney's fees and 
costs incurred in this case since December 31, 1987, which fees and costs are as 
follows: 
> U * * 
ooooco 
HATE DESCRIPTION AMOUNT 
01/29/88 
03/03/88 
04/05/88 
04/29/88 
05/02/88 
05/03/88 
Discussions with court clerk of execution of 
order defaulting parties. Review of Answer 
and Counterclaim. 37.50 
Review of documentation. Call to the court 
to determine if a judgment had been filed. 
preparation of letter to opposing counsel 
indicating that our judgment was of record 
prior to his filing of the answer and 
counterclaim. Client updates. 125.00 
Receipt of Motion to Set Aside Judgment. 
Research in relation to the legal issue on 
setting aside the judgment. Preparation of 
Order of Sale and forwarding to Sheriff. 187.50 
Research on the law and preparation of a reply 
to Mr. Kinghorn's Motion to Set Aside. Delivery 
of the same to Judge Brian, the opposing counsel 
and forwarding to the Court Clerk. 462.50 
Travel to Coalville to attend hearing on Motion 
to Set Aside Judgment. Appearance in court and 
return. 275.00 
Preparation of Order pursuant to instructions of 
the Court, preparation of Supplemental Affidavit 
for Attorney's Fees, letter to Sheriff cancelling 
the sale. 125.00 
Total Fees: $1,212.50 
COSTS ADVANCED: 
Photo Copies: 
Long Distance Calls: 
Certified copy of Judgment and Exhibits: 
Sheriff's Fees on Order of Sale (Sale cancelled as 
result of order) 
Total Costs & Fees: 
PLUS: Costs and Fees from original Affidavit 
Total Costs and Fees expended to date: 
Page - 2 -
13.60 
.50 
3.75 
150.00 
$1,380.35 
$3,087.25 
$4,467.60 
000031 
DATED this (^/ day of May, 1988 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN 
My Commission Expires: 
^/^r 
2^^ 
day of May, 1988. 
./ 
<^j>tAS-'' /'/ 
ROTARY PUBLIC 
^Residing at Salt Lake County, Utah 
Page -3-
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the above 
and foregoing supplemental Affidavit in Support of Attorney's Fees and Costs to 
the Defendant, Eugene E. Doms, by delivering the same to counsel for this 
Defendant, Mr. Gerald H. Kinghorn, at his office at 9 Exchange Place, Suite 
#1000, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 6th day of May, 
000083 
ADDENDUM 31 
BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT 16-10-74 
16-10-74. Sale or mortgage of assets other than in regular 
course of business. 
A sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other disposition of all, or 
substantially all, the property and assets, with or without the good will, of a 
corporation, if not made in the usual and regular couise of its business, may 
be made upon such terms and conditions and for such consideration, which 
may consist in whole or in part of money or property, real or personal, includ-
ing shares of any other corporation, domestic or foreign, as may be authorized 
in the following manner: 
(a) The board of directors shall adopt a resolution recommending such 
sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other disposition and directing 
the submission thereof to a vote at a meeting of shareholders, which may 
be either an annual or a special meeting. 
(b) Written or printed notice shall be given to each shareholder of 
record entitled to vote at such meeting within the time and in the manner 
provided in this act for the giving of notice of meetings of shareholders, 
and, whether the meeting be an annual or a special meeting, shall state 
that the purpose, or one of the purposes, of such meeting is to consider the 
proposed sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other disposition. 
(c) At such meeting the shareholders may authorize such sale, lease, 
exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other disposition and may fix, or may 
authorize the board of directors to fix, any or all of the terms and condi-
tions thereof and the consideration to be received by the corporation 
therefor. Each outstanding share of the corporation shall be entitled to 
vote thereon, whether or not entitled to vote thereon by the provisions of 
the articles of incorporation. Such authorization shall require the affir-
mative vote of the holders of at least a majority of the outstanding shares 
of the corporation, unless any class of shares is entitled to vote as a class 
thereon, in which event authorization shall require the affirmative vote 
of the holders of at least a majority of the outstanding shares of each class 
of shares entitled to vote as a class thereon and of the total outstanding 
shares. 
(d) After such authorization by a vote of shareholders, the board of 
directors nevertheless, in its discretion, may abandon such sale, lease, 
exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other disposition of assets, subject to the 
rights of third parties under any contracts relating thereto, without fur-
ther action or approval by shareholders. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 28, § 74. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS section, was unenforceable. Davis v. Heath 
Dev. Co., 558 P.2d 594 (Utah 1976). 
Noncompliance with statute. Sale by majority stockholders. 
Sale by majority stockholders. Contract for sale of "dry farm" executed by 
Sale without stockholders' authorization. owners of substantially all of the stock of a 
corporation was binding upon the corporation 
Noncompliance with statute. notwithstanding the fact that sellers had not 
Contract for sale, not in regular course of complied with the procedure set forth in this 
business, of all corporate property, made with- section. Grover v. Gam, 23 Utah 2d 441, 464 
out attempt at compliance with terms of this P.2d 598 (1970). 
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BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT 16-10-100 
16-10-97. Decree of dissolution. 
In proceedings to liquidate the assets and business of a corporation, when 
the costs and expenses of such proceedings and all debts, obligations and 
liabilities of the corporation shall have been paid and discharged and all of its 
remaining property and assets distributed to its shareholders, or in case its 
property and assets are not sufficient to satisfy and discharge such costs, 
expenses, debts and obligations, all the property and assets have been applied 
so far as they will go to their payment, the court shall enter a decree dissolv-
ing the corporation, whereupon the existence of the corporation shall cease. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 28, § 97. 
16-10-98. Filing of decree of dissolution. 
In case the court shall enter a decree dissolving a corporation, it shall be the 
duty of the clerk of such court to cause a certified copy of the decree to be filed 
with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code. No fee shall be 
charged by that division for the filing thereof. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 28, § 98; 1984, ch. 66, 
§ 114. 
16-10-99. Deposit with state treasurer of assets due un-
known creditor or shareholder. 
Upon the voluntary or involuntary dissolution of a corporation, the portion 
of the assets distributable to a creditor or shareholder who is unknown or 
cannot be found, or who is under disability, and there is no person legally 
competent to receive such distributive portion, shall be reduced to cash and 
deposited with the state treasurer to be held and disposed of by him in accor-
dance with the provisions of the Utah Unclaimed Property Act. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 28, § 99. 
Cross-References. — Uniform Unclaimed 
Property Act, Chapter 44 of Title 78. 
16-10-100. Survival of remedy after dissolution. 
The dissolution of a corporation either (1) by the issuance of a certificate of 
dissolution by the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, or (2) by a 
decree of court when the court has not liquidated the assets and business of 
the corporation as provided in this act, or (3) by expiration of its period of 
duration, shall not take away or impair any remedy available to or against 
the corporation, its directors, officers, or shareholders, for any right or claim 
existing, or any liability incurred, prior to such dissolution if action or other 
proceeding thereon is commenced within two years after the date of such 
dissolution. Any such action or proceeding by or against the corporation may 
be prosecuted or defended by the corporation in its corporate name. The share-
holders, directors and officers shall have power to take such corporate or other 
action as shall be appropriate to protect such remedy, right or claim. If such 
corporation was dissolved by the expiration of its period of duration, such 
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16-10-101 CORPORATIONS 
corporation may amend its articles of incorporation at any time during such 
period of two years so as to extend its period of duration. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 28, § 100; 1984, ch. Meaning of "this act" — See the note un-
66, § 115. der the same catchline following § 16-10-66. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Quiet title action. Valley Investment Co., 16 Utah 2d 77, 395 
A dissolved corporation may maintain an ac- P.2d 915 (1964). 
tion to quiet title. Falconaero Enter., Inc. v. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations tors, and officers where corporate business is 
§§ 2838, 2842, 2843. continued after its dissolution, 72 A.L.R.4th 
C.J.S. — 19 C.J.S. Corporations §§ 879 to 419. 
882. Key Numbers. — Corporations «=» 630(2). 
A.L.R. — Liability of shareholders, direc-
16-10-101. Continuation of corporate existence to wind up 
after dissolution. 
Notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation either (1) by the issuance 
of a certificate of dissolution by the Division of Corporations and Commercial 
Code, or (2) by a decree of court, or (3) by expiration of its period of duration, 
the corporate existence of such corporation shall nevertheless continue for the 
purpose of winding up its affairs in respect to any property and assets which 
have not been distributed or otherwise disposed of prior to such dissolution, 
and to effect such purpose such corporation may sell or otherwise dispose of 
such property and assets, sue and be sued, contract, and exercise all other 
incidental and necessary powers. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 28, § 101; 1984, ch. Cross-References. — Remission of forfei-
66, § 116. ture, Utah Const., Art. XII, Sec. 3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Directors. 
—Authority. 
—Duty. 
Dissolution. 
—Effect. 
—Manner. 
Waiver of forfeiture. 
Directors. 
—Authority. 
Board of directors in winding up affairs of 
corporation on forfeiture of its charter had au-
thority to confess judgment on indebtedness of 
the corporation. Henriod v. East Tintic Dev. 
Co., 52 Utah 245, 173 P. 134 (1918). 
—Duty. 
When corporation's charter was forfeited, it 
was duty of the directors, who were trustees for 
stockholders and creditors, to assemble its as-
sets, liquidate its indebtedness, and generally 
conduct its affairs in such manner as would 
properly expedite winding up of corporation's 
business. Houston v. Utah Lake Land, Water 
& Power Co., 55 Utah 393, 187 P. 174, 47 
A.L.R. 1282 (1919). 
Dissolution. 
—Effect. 
After charter of corporation was forfeited for 
failure to pay license tax, it could not subse-
quently purchase stock of another corporation 
and engage in business that was beyond scope 
of its power even before its civil death, instead 
of winding up affairs of company as required 
by former § 16-1-2. Houston v. Utah Lake 
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ADDENDUM 32 
57-4a-4 REAL ESTATE 
History: C. 1953, 57-4a-3, enacted by L. state or any of its political subdivisions after 
1988, ch. 155, § 21; 1989, ch. 88, § 10. July 1, 1988, may not be recorded unless it is 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- acknowledged and certified." 
ment, effective July 1, 1989, rewrote Subsec- Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 155, 
tion (3)(b), which read "this state or any of its § 25 makes the act effective on July 1, 1988. 
political subdivisions, provided, however, that Cross-References. — *,fAcknowledgement" 
any document conveying an interest m real
 a n d « t» d ef i n ed, § 46-1-2. 
property executed under the authority of this 
57-4a-4. Presumptions, 
(1) A recorded document creates the following presumptions regarding title 
to the real property affected: 
(a) the document is genuine and was executed voluntarily by the per-
son purporting to execute it; 
(b) the person executing the document and the person on whose behalf 
it is executed are the persons they purport to be; 
(c) the person executing the document was neither incompetent nor a 
minor at any relevant time; 
(d) delivery occurred notwithstanding any lapse of time between dates 
on the document and the date of recording; 
(e) any necessary consideration was given; 
(f) the grantee, transferee, or beneficiary of an interest created or de-
scribed by the document acted in good faith at all relevant times; 
(g) a person executing a document as an agent, attorney in fact, officer 
of an organization, or in a fiduciary or official capacity: 
(i) held the position he purported to hold and acted within the 
scope of his authority; 
(ii) in the case of an officer of an organization, was authorized 
under all applicable laws to act on behalf of the organization; and 
(iii) in the case of an agent, his agency was not revoked, and he 
acted for a principal who was neither incompetent nor a minor at any 
relevant time; 
(h) a person executing the document as an individual: 
(i) was unmarried on the effective date of the document; or 
(ii) if it otherwise appears from the document that the person was 
married on the effective date of the document, the grantee was a bona 
fide purchaser and the grantor received adequate and full consider-
ation in money or money's worth so that the joinder of the 
nonexecuting spouse was not required under Sections 75-2-201 
through 75-2-207; 
(i) if the document purports to be executed pursuant to or to be a final 
determination in a judicial or administrative proceeding, or to be exe-
cuted pursuant to a power of eminent domain, the court, official body, or 
condemnor acted within its jurisdiction and all steps required for the 
execution of the document were taken; and 
(j) recitals and other statements of fact in a document, including with-
out limitation recitals concerning mergers or name changes of organiza-
tions, are true. 
(2) The presumptions stated in Subsection (1) arise even though the docu-
ment purports only to release a claim or to convey any right, title, or interest 
of the person executing it or the person on whose behalf it is executed. 
336 
ADDENDUM 33 
322563 
I l l e n A n d e r s o n f s A d d r e s s : Mail a l l tax not ices t o : U v V U v 
134 S t , M a r y ' s Way Larry R. Kel ler , Esq. en MAD 97 iM lO ?R 
a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84108 257 East 200 South - 10 - u nA,x Ll Mn^ o u 
Sal t Lake City, Utah 84111ALAr: • . - ; ; - - 5 
Attorney for Eugene E. Bgwaff"LM:;tv"'.' ;L"CORDTR 
*0 
C O R R E C T E D 
S H E R I F F ' S D E E D 
3IS CORRECTED SHERIFF'S DEED AMENDS, MODIFIES AND CORRECTS THAT CERTAIN 
ffiRIFF'S DEED DATED JUNE 26, 19 89 AND RECORDED ON JULY 7, 19 89 AS ENTRY 
D. 310188, IN BOOK 527, AT PAGES 253 AND 254. 
THIS INDENTURE, made this 26th day of June, 1989, between D. Fred 
Ley, Sheriff, Summit County, State of Utah, party of the first part, and 
Lien Anderson as Personal Representative for the Estate of D. C. Anderson, 
an Scott, Ellen Anderson personally, and Jeanne Scott, parties of the sec-
id part. 
WITNESSETH, WHEREAS, in and by a certain judgment and decree made 
id entered by the Third Judicial District, in and for Summit County, of 
le State of Utah on the 20th day of January, 1988, in a certain action 
len pending in said Court, wherein Ellen Anderson as Personal 
ipresentative for the Estate of D. C. Anderson, Dan Scott, Ellen Anderson 
irsonally, and Jeanne Scott, Plaintiffs, and Michael R. McCoy and Eugene 
Doms, Defendants, was among other things ordered and adjudged that all 
d singular all the right, title and interest of Michael R. McCoy in and 
the premises in said judgment and hereinafter described should be sold 
public auction, by and under the direction of the Sheriff of Summit 
unty, State of Utah, in the manner required by law; that either of the 
rties to said action might become purchaser at such sale, and that said 
eriff should execute the usual certificates and deeds to the purchaser as 
quired by law; and 
WHEREAS, the Sheriff did, at the hour of 11:00 a.m., on the 12th 
y of December, 1988, at the County Courthouse in the City of Coalville, 
jnty of Summit, Stare of Utah, after due pubiic notice had been given, as 
juired by law and said judgment, duly sell at public auction, agreeable 
law and said judgment, all of the right, title and interest of Michael 
McCoy in and to the premises and property in said judgment and hereinaf-
: described at which sale said premises and property were fairly struck 
: and sold to Ellen Anderson as Personal Representative for the Estate of 
C. Anderson, Dan Scott, Ellen Anderson personally, and Jeanne Scott, for 
> sum of ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS it being highest bidder and that being the 
fhest sum bid at said sale; and 
WHEREAS, said Ellen Anderson as Personal Representative for the 
ate of D. C. Anderson, Dan Scott, Ellen Anderson personally, and Jeanne 
>tt, paid to said Sheriff said sum of money so bid, and said Sheriff 
reupon made and issued the usual certificate in duplicate of such sale 
due form, and delivered one thereof to said purchaser, and caused the 
559 =626-*-^ !fl'w 
- 1 -
her to be filed in the office of the County Recorder, County of Summit, 
ate of Utah, 
NOW TS INDENTURE WITNESSES, that the said party of the first 
rt, Sheriff aforesaid, in order to carry into effect said sale in pursu-
ce of said judgment and of the law, and also in consideration of the 
emises and of the money so bid and paid by the said Ellen Anderson as 
rsonal Representative for the Estate of D. C. Anderson, Dan Scott, Ellen 
derson personally, and Jeanne Scott, the receipt whereof is hereby 
knowledged, has granted, sold, conveyed, and by these presents does 
ant, sell and convey, and confirm unto the said party of the second part, 
s successors and assigns forever, all of the right, title and interest of 
chael R. McCoy in and to the following described real estate forever, the 
llowing real estate lying and being in Summit County, State of Utah, 
ing all right, title, claim and interest of the above named defendants 
', in and to the following described property tc-wit: 
Parcel No. 1: 
All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 
28, 29, 30, 31, and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, 
according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of 
record in the office of the Summit County Recorder. 
Parcel No. 2: 
All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City Survey, 
according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of 
record in the office of the Summit County Recorder, 
excepting therefrom any portion located within the rail-
road rights-of-way as described in those certain docu-
ments recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page 401, 
Entry No. 13 316 in Book H at Page 326, and Entry No. 
13610 in Book H at Page 37 3, records of Summit County, 
Utah. 
Parcel No. 3: 
All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, according to 
the Amended Plat thereof, as filed and of record in the 
office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting there-
way as described in those certain documents recorded as 
Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in 
Book H at Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at 
Page 373, records of Summit County, Utah. 
TOGETHER WITH an easement for utilities, including sewer 
and water lines over and southerly five feet and 
northerly five feet of the following described lots: 
All of Lot 14', the South Half of Lot 15/ Block 58, 
Park City Survey, according to the amended plat 
thereof as filed and of record in the office of the 
Summit County Recorder, Coalville, Utah. 
«•, 559.-627 
The above described real property is located in Park 
City, Summit County, Utah. 
OGETHER WITH all and singular the tenements, hereditaments and 
ppurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, to have and 
o hold the same unto said party of the second part, his heirs and assigns 
orever. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, said party of the first part has hereunto set 
is hand and seal the day and year firsjb-^ atoove jtrijztei 
Sheriff dt Sunimit County, Utah 
TATE OF UTAH 
Dunty of Summit 
) ss 
) 
On the 26th day of June, 1989, before me, LINDA SMITH, a Notary 
iblic in and for the County of Summit, State of Utah, personally appeared 
, FRED ELEY, Sheriff of Summit County, State of Utah, personally known to 
i to be the person described in and who executed the foregoing instrument 
10 acknowledged to me that he executed the same as such Sheriff, freely 
id voluntarily, and for the uses and purposes therein mentioned. 
WITNESSED my hand notarial seal, this 26th day of Junfe*, 19&9.. 
^ ? i 
/: 
A / /•iX/L 
-^* Res id ing in Hen^fer , Utah 
My (/ommission E x p i r e s : J u l y '15, 1991 
»00' 559K..-628 
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ADDENDUM 34 
GENERAL PARTNERSHIP 48-1-4 
48-1-3.1. Joint venture defined — Application of chapter. 
(1) A joint venture is an association of two or more persons to carry on as 
co-owners of a single business enterprise. 
(2) This chapter governs the property and transfer rights of joint ventures. 
History: C. 1953, 48-1-3.1, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 14, § 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Agreement to share profits required. 
Continuation of venture presumed. 
Joint venture not found. 
Litigation. 
Shared facilities. 
Agreement to share profits required. 
To establish a joint adventure there must be 
an agreement, express or implied, for the shar-
ing of profits. Bates v. Simpson, 121 Utah 165, 
239 P.2d 749 (1952). 
Fact that the person who finances the sale of 
a used car thereby realizes profit does not 
make him a joint adventurer with the seller. 
Bates v. Simpson, 121 Utah 165, 239 P.2d 749 
(1952). 
Continuation of venture presumed. 
Fact that one joint venturer reimbursed the 
other for the latter's contribution did not, in 
itself, indicate termination of the joint venture, 
thereby making first joint venturer responsible 
for the venture's entire loss. Producer's Live-
stock Mktg. Ass'n v. Christensen, 588 P.2d 156 
(Utah 1978). 
Joint venture not found. 
There was no joint adventure or partnership 
by estoppel where one of the two alleged joint 
adventurers had not given his consent to being 
held out as a joint adventurer with the person 
making the representation, and where the 
third person to whom the representation had 
been made had not relied upon it. Bates v. 
Simpson, 121 Utah 165, 239 P.2d 749 (1952). 
Litigation. 
Joint venturers may sue in the name of the 
joint venture. Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 
P.2d 499 (Utah 1988). 
Shared facilities. 
Used car dealers who share a lot, building, 
and telephone do not become joint adventurers 
by reason of that working arrangement. Bates 
v. Simpson, 121 Utah 165, 239 P.2d 749 (1952). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Joint Ven- tween real-estate agents to share commissions, 
tures §§ 1 to 71. 71 A.L.R.3d 586. 
C.J.S. — 48A C.J.S. Joint Ventures §§ 1 to Joint venture's capacity to sue, 56 A.L.R.4th 
73. 1234. 
A.L.R. — Construction of agreement be-
48-1-4. Rules for determining the existence of a partner-
ship. 
In determining whether a partnership exists these rules shall apply: 
(1) Except as provided by Section 48-1-13, persons who are not partners 
as to each other are not partners as to third persons. 
(2) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by entireties, joint 
property, common property, or part ownership does not of itself establish 
a partnership, whether such co-owners do or do not share any profits 
made by the use of the property. 
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partner-
ship, whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint or common 
right or interest in any property from which the returns are derived. 
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48-1-4 PARTNERSHIP 
(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is 
prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business, but no such 
inference shall be drawn if such profits were received in payment: 
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise. 
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord. 
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of av deceased part-
ner. 
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amounts of payment vary 
with the profits of the business. 
(e) As the consideration for the sale of the good will of a business or 
other property by installments or otherwise. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 7; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 69-1-4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Evidence. 
—Burden of proof. 
—Presumptions. 
Existence of partnership. 
Cited. 
Evidence. 
—Burden of proof. 
In action for accounting and dissolution of 
partnership, plaintiff had burden of proving 
existence of partnership. Benson v. Rozzelle, 85 
Utah 582, 39 P.2d 1113 (1934). 
—Presumptions. 
The fact that two persons share profits of a 
business raises a presumption that they are 
partners. Kimball v. McCornick, 70 Utah 189, 
259 P. 313 (1927). 
Where payment of a portion of profits to de-
fendant constituted partial reimbursement for 
defendant's expenditures in connection with 
the business premises, there was no presump-
tion of partnership, and plaintiff was required 
to meet his burden of proof without the aid of 
the presumption. Koesling v. Basamakis, 539 
P.2d 1043 (Utah 1975). 
Existence of partnership. 
Evidence held insufficient to show that a 
partnership was ever formed, but did show that 
a business arrangement was entered into that 
constituted a preliminary to a partnership. 
Millett v. Langston, 8 Utah 2d 15, 327 P.2d 253 
(1958). 
Where defendant had turned over operation 
of tavern, equipment, furnishing, and inven-
tory that he owned to plaintiff pursuant to an 
agreement to divide profits from the business 
equally, plaintiff had full authority to manage 
the business, including purchase of supplies, 
payment of bills, and keeping of books, and in-
come from the business was reported on part-
nership income tax forms, trial court could 
properly find that a partnership existed, enti-
tling plaintiff to half the compensation paid for 
disruption of business upon condemnation of 
the building where the tavern was located. 
Cutler v. Bowen, 543 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1975). 
Evidence established the existence of a part-
nership where two parties entered into an 
agreement requiring them to work together to 
obtain a zoning change and to develop land, 
and providing for sharing the profits derived 
from their joint efforts; classification of the 
project as a single undertaking rather than a 
continuous business transaction did not render 
the trial court's finding of a partnership erro-
neous. Nupetco Assocs. v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 
877 (Utah 1983) (decided before enactment of 
§ 48-1-3.1). 
Cited in Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partner-
ship §§ 1 to 4. 
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 1. 
Key Numbers. — Partnership «=> 1 to 26. 
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GENERAL PARTNERSHIP 48-1-5 
48-1-5. Partnership property. 
All property originally brought into the partnership stock, or subsequently 
acquired by purchase or otherwise on account of the partnership, is partner-
ship property. 
Unless the contrary intention appears, property acquired with partnership 
funds is partnership property. 
Any estate in real property may be acquired in the partnership name. Title 
so acquired can be conveyed only in the partnership name. 
A conveyance to a partnership in the partnership name, though without 
words of inheritance, passes the entire estate of the grantor, unless a contrary 
intent appears. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89,1 
1943, 69-1-5. 
8; R.S. 1933 & C. Cross-References. 
57, Chapter 1. 
Conveyances, Title 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Assignment for benefit of creditors. 
Death of partner. 
Property purchased with partnership funds. 
Security for loan. 
Assignment for benefit of creditors. 
Assignment of property of partnership for 
benefit of its creditors is not rendered invalid 
by noninclusion therein of individual property 
of each partner. Wilson v. Sullivan, 17 Utah 
341, 53 P. 994 (1898). 
Death of partner. 
In suit by surviving partner against widow 
of deceased partner to recover title to certain 
real property held in the name of defendant, 
evidence held sufficient to require such land to 
be held in trust for partnership. Matson v. 
Matson, 56 Utah 394, 190 P. 943 (1920). 
Property purchased with partnership 
funds. 
Property purchased with partnership funds 
is prima facie the property of the firm, though 
the title is taken in the individual name of one 
or more of the partners. Deming v. Moss, 40 
Utah 501, 121 P. 971 (1912); Staats v. Staats, 
63 Utah 470, 226 P. 667 (1924). 
Although two partners entered into a con-
tract in their individual names to purchase 
lands, assignments of the contract referred to 
these buyers as individuals, the property was 
referred to as that of the individuals by name 
in the trial, and the parties submitted memo-
randums concerning the issue of cotenancy, 
nevertheless the partnership was the pur-
chaser because of the use of partnership funds. 
Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606 (Utah 1976). 
Security for loan. 
Where partnership money was loaned and 
note and mortgage securing the indebtedness 
were taken in name of partner, note and mort-
gage were property of partnership so that part-
ner could not be charged with amount of loan 
upon dissolution of partnership. Buzianis v. 
Buzianis, 81 Utah 1, 16 P.2d 413 (1932). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partner-
ship §§ 329 to 356. 
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 69. 
A.L.R. — Insurance on life of partner as 
partnership asset, 56 A.L.R.3d 892. 
Key Numbers. — Partnership *=> 67. 
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